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495 afleveringen, van nieuw naar oud
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[17-1702] Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck
25 februari 2019 · 1 uur
Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Feb 25, 2019.
Decided on Jun 17, 2019.Petitioner: Manhattan Community Access Corporation, et al..
Respondent: Deedee Halleck, et al..Advocates:
Michael B. de Leeuw (for the petitioners)
Paul W. Hughes (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
A New York regulation requires cable-TV networks with 36 or more channels to provide “at least one full-time activated channel for public-access use.” This channel must be open to the “public on a first-come, first-served, non-discriminatory basis.” New York City awarded cable franchises for Manhattan to Time Warner, provided that Time Warner provide four public-access channels, which are designated to be overseen by the Manhattan Community Access Corporation (MCAC), known as the Manhattan Neighborhood Network (MNN).
Petitioners DeeDee Halleck and Jesus Papoleto Melendez have had a contentious relationship with MNN since 2011, and their feud culminated in August 2013 with MNN suspending both Melendez and Halleck from all MNN services and facilities. They filed a lawsuit against MCAC, several employees, and the City of New York, alleging violations of their First Amendment rights.
Generally, private actors cannot violate the constitutional rights of individuals; a finding of a constitutional violation requires “state action.” However, when the government creates a private entity by special law and retains authority to appoint a majority of directors, the actions of that private entity can sometimes be regarded as governmental action. Finding that the government retained authority to appoint only two of the thirteen members of MCAC’s board, the district court held that MCAC, its employees, and the City of New York did not create a public forum within the First Amendment and dismissed the First Amendment claim for lack of state action. A majority of a three-judge panel of the US Court of Appeals fo…
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[17-1657] Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC
20 februari 2019 · 1 uur 3 min
Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Feb 20, 2019.
Decided on May 20, 2019.Petitioner: Mission Product Holdings, Inc..
Respondent: Tempnology, LLC.Advocates:
Danielle Spinelli (for the petitioner)
Zachary D. Tripp (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of petitioner)
Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Tempnology, LLC, made and owned the intellectual property to specialized products such as towels, socks, headbands, and other accessories designed to stay at a low temperature even when used during exercise. Tempnology and Mission Product Holdings executed an agreement in 2012 that (1) granted Mission distribution rights to some of Tempnology’s products, (2) granted Mission a nonexclusive license to Tempnology’s intellectual property, and (3) granted Mission a license to use Tempnology’s trademark and logo to sell and promote the products.
After accruing multi-million-dollar operating losses in 2013 and 2014, Tempnology filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in September 2015. The following day, it moved to reject its agreement with Mission under Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows a debtor-in-possession to “reject any executory contract” that is not beneficial to the company.
Although the parties do not dispute that Mission can insist that the rejection not apply to the patent licenses in the agreement, it is unsettled in the First Circuit (where the proceedings were brought) whether Mission can also insist that the rejection not apply to the trademark licenses. The bankruptcy court found that Tempnology’s rejection of the agreement left Mission with only a claim for damages for breach of contract, and no claim that Tempnology was under an obligation to further perform the license agreement. The First Circuit affirmed.
Question
Under…
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[17-1594] Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service
19 februari 2019 · 1 uur 1 min
Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Feb 19, 2019.
Decided on Jun 10, 2019.Petitioner: Return Mail, Inc..
Respondent: United States Postal Service.Advocates:
Beth S. Brinkmann (for the petitioner)
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Return Mail, Inc. owns a US patent directed to the processing of mail items that are undeliverable due to an inaccurate or obsolete address of the intended recipient. Return Mail sought to license the patent to the US Postal Service (“USPS”) and when it was unsuccessful, it filed a lawsuit against USPS alleging unlicensed and unlawful use and infringement of the patent. USPS filed a petition with the Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) asking that the patent be declared unpatentable on several grounds. In response, Return Mail addressed the unpatentability arguments and further argued that USPS lacked statutory standing to institute review proceedings under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”).
The Board held that USPS was not statutorily barred from filing the petition for review, and on the merits determined that all of the challenged patent claims were unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.
Question
Is the government a “person” who may institute review proceedings under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act?
Conclusion
Under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), the federal government is not a “person” capable of petitioning the Patent Trial and Appeal Board to institute patent review proceedings. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 6-3 majority opinion.
The Court determined that the AIA does not define “person” and looked instead to the Dictionary Act, which defines “person” as including natural individuals and businesses, but not governments “unless the context indicates otherwise.” The Court then looked to whethe…
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[18-96] Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas
16 januari 2019 · 51 min
Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Jan 16, 2019.
Decided on Jun 26, 2019.Petitioner: Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association.
Respondent: Russell F. Thomas, Executive Director of the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission, et al..Advocates:
Shay Dvoretzky (for the petitioner)
David L. Franklin (for Illinois, et al. as amici curiae, in support of the petitioner)
Carter G. Phillips (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
To sell liquor in the state of Tennessee, one must have a license from the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission (TABC). Under Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-3-204(b)(2)(A), an individual must have “been a bona fide resident of [Tennessee] during the two-year period immediately preceding the date upon which application is made to the commission,” and there is a ten-year residency requirement to renew a liquor license. The state imposes similar requirements on entities seeking a license.
Two entities did not satisfy the residency requirement when they applied for a license with the TABC, so TABC deferred voting on their applications. The Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association, which represents Tennessee business owners and represented the two entities here, informed TABC that litigation was likely. In response, the state attorney general filed an action in state court seeking declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of the durational-residency requirements. The Association removed the action to federal district court.
The district court determined that the durational-residency requirements are facially discriminatory, in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause of the US Constitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does the dormant Commerce Clause permit a state to regulate liquor sales by granting licenses only to individuals or entities that have met state residency requirements?
Conclusion
The dormant Comme…
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[17-1484] Azar v. Allina Health Services
15 januari 2019 · 55 min
Azar v. Allina Health Services Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Jan 15, 2019.
Decided on Jun 3, 2019.Petitioner: Alex M. Azar, II, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
Respondent: Allina Health Services, et al..Advocates:
Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)
Pratik A. Shah (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) administers the Medicare program, which provides health insurance to Americans 65 and older. Patients may obtain coverage under different “parts” of Medicare, two of which are at issue in this case. When patients enrolled in Medicare Part A receive healthcare, the government makes direct payments to hospitals for the services provided. Patients enrolled in Medicare Part C receive a government subsidy to enroll in a private insurance plan. Importantly, patients enrolled in Part A tend to have lower incomes than those enrolled in Part C.
HHS contracts with “fiscal intermediaries” to reimburse healthcare service providers for services rendered to Medicare Part A patients. These intermediaries make an initial payment based on an estimate of the cost of services provided and are later adjusted based on actual cost reports.
The Medicare Act authorizes reimbursement adjustments to increase payments to hospitals that treat a disproportionately high number of low-income patients. The rate of adjustment is calculated in part based on the number of “patient days” for patients “entitled to benefits under part A” of Medicare. In 2012, HHS sought to interpret this phrase as including patient days for patients entitled to benefits under Part C of Medicare as well. Including Part C days in the adjustment calculus would result in lower reimbursement rates, which translates into hundreds of millions of dollars.
The plaintiff hospitals challenged the rate adjustment in the Provider Reimbursement Review Board, …
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[17-1471] Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson
15 januari 2019 · 55 min
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Jan 15, 2019.
Decided on May 28, 2019.Petitioner: Home Depot U.S.A., Inc..
Respondent: George W. Jackson.Advocates:
William P. Barnette (for the petitioner)
F. Paul Bland, Jr. (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2016, Citibank initiated a debt-collection action in a North Carolina state court against George W. Jackson, alleging that Jackson had failed to pay for a water treatment system he purchased using a Citibank-issued credit card. In responding to Citibank’s complaint, Jackson asserted a counterclaim against Citibank and third-party class-action claims against Home Depot and Carolina Water Systems (CWS). In these third-party claims, Jackson alleged that Home Depot and CWS had engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices with respect to the water treatment systems; Jackson’s counterclaim against Citibank alleged that Citibank was jointly and severally liable to him because Home Depot had sold or assigned the transaction to Citibank. Citibank subsequently dismissed its claims against Jackson.
Home Depot filed a notice of removal in federal court, citing federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Home Depot then filed a motion to realign parties with Jackson as plaintiff and Home Depot, CWS, and Citibank as defendants. Jackson moved to remand the case to state court and amended his third-party complaint to remove any reference to Citibank.
The district court denied Home Depot’s motion to realign parties, finding that there were not “antagonistic parties on the same side,” and granted Jackson’s motion to remand because Home Depot was not a “defendant” eligible to remove under CAFA. The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court properly declined to realign the parties because the purpose of realignment—to prevent parties from fraudulently manufacturing diversity juris…
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[17-1625] Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc.
14 januari 2019 · 1 uur 1 min
Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc. Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Jan 14, 2019.
Decided on Mar 4, 2019.Petitioner: Rimini Street, Inc., et al..
Respondent: Oracle USA, Inc., et al..Advocates:
Mark A. Perry (for the petitioners)
Allon Kedem (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Paul D. Clement (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Oracle licenses its enterprise software for a substantial one-time payment and also sells maintenance contracts to licensees so they can update their software through Oracle’s support website. Rimini Street provided third-party support for Oracle’s software in lawful competition with Oracle’s direct maintenance service. To compete effectively, however, Rimini also needed to provide software updates to its customers, which would constitute copyright infringement if obtained without a proper license (which Rimini did not have). With Oracle’s knowledge, Rimini obtained Oracle software updates from Oracle’s website by a means that violated the Oracle website’s terms of use.
Oracle filed a lawsuit against Rimini and obtained a partial summary judgment and a jury verdict. The jury awarded Oracle $50,027,000 plus attorney’s fees and costs, resulting in a total monetary judgment of $124,291,396.82. Rimini appealed the judgment. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that 17 U.S.C. § 505 allows for recovery of “full costs” and the district court properly relied on Ninth Circuit precedent in Twentieth Century Fox v. Entertainment Distribution in awarding $12,774,550.26 in non-taxable costs, despite ostensibly conflicting language in 28 U.S.C § 1920 identifying six categories of costs taxable against the losing party.
Question
Is the Copyright Act’s allowance for “full costs” to a prevailing party limited to taxable costs or inclusive of non-taxable costs as well?
Co…
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[17-1201] Thacker v. Tennessee Valley Authority
14 januari 2019 · 1 uur
Thacker v. Tennessee Valley Authority Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Jan 14, 2019.
Decided on Apr 29, 2019.Petitioner: Gary Thacker, et ux..
Respondent: Tennessee Valley Authority.Advocates:
Franklin Taylor Rouse (for the petitioners)
Ann O'Connell Adams (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Gary and Venida Thacker filed a lawsuit against the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for its alleged negligence involving an accident on the Tennessee River. The Thackers and a friend were participating in a fishing tournament on the river at the same time the TVA was attempting to raise a downed power line in the same part of the river. An electrical component struck Gary Thacker and the friend, severely injuring Thacker and killing the friend instantly.
The district court dismissed the Thackers’ lawsuit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
The United States enjoys sovereign immunity from suit unless it unequivocally waives its immunity by statute. This immunity extends to government agencies, as well. TVA is a corporate agency expressly authorized to engage in commercial, power-generating activities, and the TVA Act expressly provides that TVA “may sue and be sued in its corporate name,” subject to certain exceptions. Extrapolating from a principle of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Eleventh Circuit has held that TVA cannot be subject to liability when engaged in governmental functions that are discretionary in nature. Applying its own precedent, the Eleventh Circuit found that TVA was engaged in exactly this type of function at the time of the accident with the Thackers and thus was immune from suit.
Question
Are governmental “sue-and-be-sued” entities subject to the discretionary-function exception to a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, or the test for immunity set forth in Federal Housing Au…
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[17-1299] Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt
9 januari 2019 · 57 min
Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Jan 9, 2019.
Decided on May 13, 2019.Petitioner: Franchise Tax Board of California.
Respondent: Gilbert P. Hyatt.Advocates:
Seth P. Waxman (for the petitioner)
Erwin Chemerinsky (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 1993, a tax auditor for the Franchise Tax Board of California (FTB) read a newspaper about Gilbert P. Hyatt, an inventor, and the large amounts of money he was making from the patent. The auditor decided to investigate Hyatt, and, after finding some discrepancies, opened an audit on Hyatt’s 1991 state tax return. In conducting the audit, the auditor found additional discrepancies surrounding Hyatt’s move from California to Nevada and opened an audit as to his 1992 tax returns. FTB determined that Hyatt owed $1.8 million in state income taxes, plus $1.4 million in penalties and $1.2 million in interest, resulted in a tax assessment of $4.5 million for Hyatt’s 1991 tax year. FTB further found that Hyatt owed over $6 million in taxes and interest for 1992, plus penalties.
Hyatt challenged the conclusions by filing protests with FTB and then in California courts. In 1998, Hyatt sued FTB in Nevada state court seeking damages for intentional torts and bad-faith conduct allegedly committed by FTB auditors during tax audits of Hyatt’s 1991 and 1992 state tax returns.
FTB filed a motion for partial summary judgment challenging the Nevada district court’s jurisdiction over Hyatt’s declaratory relief cause of action. The district court granted partial summary judgment, finding that the timing of Hyatt’s move from California to Nevada should be resolved via the administrative investigation. FTB also asked the Nevada Supreme Court to decide whether it was entitled to complete immunity under several theories: it enjoyed complete immunity under California law, it was entitled to sovereign immunity, the Full Faith and Credit Clause,…
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[17-571] Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com
8 januari 2019 · 1 uur 1 min
Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Jan 8, 2019.
Decided on Mar 4, 2019.Petitioner: Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation.
Respondent: Wall-Street.com, LLC, et al..Advocates:
Aaron M. Panner (for the petitioner)
Peter K. Stris (for the respondents)
Jonathan Y. Ellis (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation is a news organization that produces online journalism and licenses articles to websites while retaining the copyright to the articles. Wall-Street.com obtained licenses to several articles produced by Fourth Estate, and under the license agreement, Wall-Street was required to remove all of the content produced by Fourth Estate from its website before cancelling its account. However, when Wall-Street cancelled its account, it continued to display the articles produced by Fourth Estate.
Fourth Estate filed a lawsuit for copyright infringement, although it filed an application to register its allegedly infringed copyrights and the copyright office had not yet registered its claims. The district court dismissed the action, finding “registration” under Section 411 of the Copyright Act required that the register of copyrights “register the claim,” and that step had not occurred. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Question
Is “registration of [a] copyright claim” complete under 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) when the copyright holder delivers the required application, fees, and materials to the copyright office, or only once the copyright office has acted on that application?
Conclusion
Registration of a copyright claim “has been made” not when an application for registration is filed, but only after the copyright office has processed the application and registered the copyright. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Ruth Bader G…
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[17-532] Herrera v. Wyoming
8 januari 2019 · 1 uur 1 min
Herrera v. Wyoming Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Jan 8, 2019.
Decided on May 20, 2019.Petitioner: Clayvin Herrera.
Respondent: Wyoming.Advocates:
George W. Hicks, Jr. (for the petitioner)
Frederick Liu (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
John G. Knepper (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Clayvin Herrera is an enrolled member of the Crow Tribe of Indians. Herrera and several other tribal members went elk hunting on the Crow Reservation, and at some point, followed several elk across a fence, thereby leaving the Crow Reservation and entering the Big Horn National Forest in Wyoming. They shot three bull elk and took the meat with them to Montana. None of the hunters had a license, and it was closed season.
Herrera was cited with two hunting-related misdemeanors under Wyoming law. He moved to dismiss the charges under the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution and the Laramie Treaty of 1868. He argued that the treaty gave the Crow Tribe the right to hunt off the reservation and that the treaty was still valid and thus preempted state law. Bound by the Tenth Circuit’s 1995 decision in Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1995), the state court held that Crow Tribe members do not have off-reservation treaty hunting rights anywhere within the state of Wyoming. Herrera was tried and convicted by a jury on both counts. He appealed the lower court’s pretrial determination on the off-reservation treaty hunting right. Reviewing the lower court’s conclusions de novo, the state appeals court affirmed the lower court.
Question
Did Wyoming’s admission to the Union or the establishment of the Bighorn National Forest abrogate the Crow Tribe of Indians’ 1868 federal treaty right to hunt on the “unoccupied lands of the United States,” thereby permitting the present-day conviction of a Crow member who engaged…
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[17-290] Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht
7 januari 2019 · 1 uur 3 min
Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Jan 7, 2019.
Decided on May 20, 2019.Petitioner: Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp..
Respondent: Doris Albrecht, et al..Advocates:
Shay Dvoretzky (for the petitioner)
Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
David C. Frederick (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Beginning in 2010, hundreds of plaintiffs around the country filed personal injury lawsuits against drug manufacturer Merck Sharp & Dohme (“Merck”), claiming that the osteoporosis drug Fosamax had caused them to suffer severe thigh bone fractures. Under state tort law, each plaintiff alleged, among other things, that Merck’s Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved drug label failed to include an adequate warning regarding the risk of femur fractures.
In 2011 the cases were consolidated as a multi-district litigation action in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The cases subsequently grew to include over 1,000 plaintiffs. After discovery and a bellwether trial, the district court ruled in favor of Merck on a summary judgment motion, dismissing all of the plaintiffs’ claims on the basis that they were preempted by federal law under Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), which held that state-law failure-to-warn claims are preempted in the event that there is “clear evidence” that the FDA would not have approved the warning that a plaintiff claims was necessary.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s ruling, holding that preemption was an affirmative defense, and that Merck had not sufficiently proven that it was entitled to that defense as a matter of law. Under Wyeth’s demanding “clear evidence” standard, the appellate court found that the plaintiffs had produced adequate evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the FDA would…
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[17-1307] Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP
7 januari 2019 · 1 uur 1 min
Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Jan 7, 2019.
Decided on Mar 20, 2019.Petitioner: Dennis Obduskey.
Respondent: McCarthy & Holthus LLP, et al..Advocates:
Daniel L. Geyser (for the petitioner)
Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the respondent)
Jonathan C. Bond (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Dennis Obduskey obtained a mortgage loan for $329,940 in 2007. The loan was serviced by Wells Fargo. Obduskey defaulted on the loan in 2009. Over the next six years foreclosure proceedings were initiated several times, but never completed. Obduskey’s loan remained in default, and in 2014 the bank hired the law firm of McCarthy & Holthus LLP to pursue non-judicial foreclosure proceedings against him. McCarthy sent Obduskey a letter informing him that it had been instructed to begin foreclosure proceedings, and Obduskey responded to the letter disputing the debt. The firm initiated a foreclosure action in May 2015. Obduskey sued McCarthy and Wells Fargo, alleging, among other things, a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss on all claims, and noted disagreement among courts as to whether the FDCPA applied to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings.
Upon Obduskey’s appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the appellate court held that based on the statute’s plain language as well as policy considerations, the FDCPA did not apply to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings in Colorado. It agreed with the district court’s finding that Wells Fargo was not a debt collector because Obduskey was not in default when it began servicing the loan. It also held that McCarthy was not a debt collector under the FDCPA because attempting to enforce a security interest was not the same as attempting to collect a money debt…
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[17-646] Gamble v. United States
6 december 2018 · 1 uur 19 min
Gamble v. United States Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Dec 6, 2018.
Decided on Jun 17, 2019.Petitioner: Terance Martez Gamble.
Respondent: United States.Advocates:
Louis A. Chaiten (for the petitioner)
Eric J. Feigin (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)
Kyle D. Hawkins (Texas Solicitor General, for Texas et al. as amicus curiae, in support of affirmance)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Terance Martez Gamble was convicted for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. He argues that the district court erred in concluding that Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit the federal government from prosecuting Gamble for the same conduct for which he had been prosecuted and sentenced for by the State of Alabama. The US Supreme Court held in Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959), that prosecution in federal and state court for the same conduct does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the state and federal governments are separate sovereigns (the so-called “separate sovereigns” exception). Under this binding precedent, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court.
Question
Should the Court overrule the “separate sovereigns” exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment?
Conclusion
In a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the Court declined to overturn the dual-sovereignty doctrine.
The Court first clarified that the dual-sovereignty doctrine is not an exception to the right against double jeopardy, but a corollary to the text of the Fifth Amendment. The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits individuals from being “twice put in jeopardy . . . for the same offence.” Because an “offence” is determined by law, and laws are determined by a sovereign (the federal or state government), the laws of two sovereigns create two “offences.” The Court found unpersuasive Gamble’s arguments that precedents should be abandoned, i…
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[17-1184] Biestek v. Berryhill
4 december 2018 · 1 uur
Biestek v. Berryhill Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Dec 4, 2018.
Decided on Apr 1, 2019.Petitioner: Michael J. Biestek.
Respondent: Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration.Advocates:
Ishan Bhabha (for the petitioner)
Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Michael Biestek worked for most of his life as a carpenter and a construction laborer. He stopped working in June 2005 due to a degenerative disc disease, Hepatitis C, and depression. He applied for SSI and SSDI benefits in March 2010, alleging a disability onset date of October 28, 2009. The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied his application in August 2010, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied his application, and the Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied review. Biestek timely appealed, and the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s finding that the ALJ had not obtained necessary medical-expert testimony and did not pose a sufficiently specific hypothetical to the vocational expert. On remand, the ALJ found that Biestek was disabled from May 4, 2013, but not before. Biestek appealed the ALJ’s determination, and the district court affirmed.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Biestek did not meet the back-pain-related impairment requirement and that the ALJ properly evaluated the testimony of medical experts and a vocational expert.
Question
During an application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits, does a vocational expert’s testimony count as “substantial evidence” of “other work” if the expert does not provide the underlying data on which that testimony is premised?
Conclusion
A vocational expert’s refusal to provide the underlying private data during a Social Security disability bene…
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[17-1229] Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.
4 december 2018 · 54 min
Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Dec 4, 2018.
Decided on Jan 22, 2019.Petitioner: Helsinn Healthcare S.A..
Respondent: Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al..Advocates:
Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the petitioner)
Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
William M. Jay (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Helsinn owns four patents describing intravenous formulations of palonosetron for reducing the likelihood of chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting (“CINV”). All four claim priority to a provisional patent application filed on January 30, 2003. The critical date for the on-sale bar is one year earlier, January 30, 2002, which means the sale of the invention before that date can invalidate the patent. In its defense, Teva argued that the asserted claims were invalid under the on-sale bar provision of 35 U.S.C. § 102.
The sale referenced by Teva in its defense was an exclusive supply and purchase agreement between Helsinn and MGI Pharma. Everything about the agreement except the terms and price was publicly disclosed.
The district court upheld as valid Helsinn’s patents and rejected Teva’s “on sale” defense. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the patents were subject to an invalidating contract for sale prior to the critical date of January 30, 2002, The court also noted that the evidence that the formulation was ready for patenting before the critical date was “overwhelming.”
Question
Does an inventor’s sale of an invention to a third party who is obligated to keep the invention confidential qualify as prior art for purposes of determining the patentability of the invention?
Conclusion
An inventor’s sale to a third party who is obligated to keep the invention confidential constitutes invalidating prior art. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for …
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[17-1077] Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission
3 december 2018 · 52 min
Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Dec 3, 2018.
Decided on Mar 27, 2019.Petitioner: Francis V. Lorenzo.
Respondent: Securities and Exchange Commission.Advocates:
Robert Heim (for the petitioner)
Christopher G. Michel (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Francis Lorenzo was the director of investment banking at Charles Vista, LLC, a registered broker-dealer. Lorenzo’s only investment-banking client at the relevant time was a start-up company named Waste2Energy Holdings (W2E). W2E claimed to have developed an innovative technology, and its valuation was entirely dependent on realization of that technology.
The technology never materialized, and W2E sought to avoid complete financial ruin by offering up to $15 million in “debentures”—which is debt secured only by the debtor’s earning power, rather than by a lien on a tangible asset. At the time, W2E’s most recent SEC filing did not indicate the possible devaluation of the company’s intangible assets and stated only that they were worth over $10 million.
After an audit, W2E filed a Form 8-K reporting total impairment of its intangible assets and valuing its total assets at $370,552. Lorenzo’s secretary alerted him via email about the amended filings, and Lorenzo contacted the Charles Vista brokers about them. Nearly two weeks later, Lorenzo emailed two potential investors “several key points” about W2E’s pending debenture offering, but rather than even mentioning the devaluation of W2E’s intangible assets, he assured both that the offering came with “3 layers of protection,” which were: $10 million in “confirmed assets”; purchase orders and LOIs for “over $43 [million] in orders”; and Charles Vista has agreed to raise additional monies to repay the debenture holders if necessary. One of these emails stated it had been sent “at the request of [Lorenzo’s boss]” and the ot…
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[17-419] Dawson v. Steager
3 december 2018 · 1 uur
Dawson v. Steager Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Dec 3, 2018.
Decided on Feb 20, 2019.Petitioner: James Dawson, et ux..
Respondent: Dale W. Steager, West Virginia State Tax Commissioner.Advocates:
Lawrence D. Rosenberg (for the petitioners)
Michael R. Huston (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Lindsay S. See (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
West Virginia Code 11-21-12(c)(6) (“Section 12(c)(6)”) exempts from state taxation the retirement income of many state and local firefighters and law enforcement officers, but not federal marshals. Plaintiffs James and Elaine Dawson allege that this differential treatment is proscribed by 4 U.S.C. § 111, which allows for state taxes on federal retirement benefits only if “the taxation does not discriminate...because of the source of the pay or compensation.” James Dawson spent most of his career with the US Marshal Service and retired in 2008. Dawson and his wife sought to exempt Dawson’s federal retirement income from his state income tax, but the tax commissioner refused to allow the exemption.
The Office of Tax Appeals affirmed the tax commissioner’s denial of the Dawsons’ 12(c)(6) exemption, and the Dawsons timely appealed. The Circuit Court of Mercer County found that the tax scheme does violated 4 U.S.C. § 111 and reversed the Office of Tax Appeals. The tax commissioner appealed the circuit court’s decision, and on appeal, the state supreme court reversed.
Question
Does the provision of the West Virginia Code that exempts from state taxation the retirement income of many state and local firefighters and law enforcement officers, but not federal marshals, violate 4 U.S.C. § 111?
Conclusion
The West Virginia law that taxes the retirement income of federal marshal but exempts from taxation state and local law enforcement officers unlawfully discriminates against federal employe…
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[17-1091] Timbs v. Indiana
28 november 2018 · 57 min
Timbs v. Indiana Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 28, 2018.
Decided on Feb 20, 2019.Petitioner: Tyson Timbs.
Respondent: Indiana.Advocates:
Wesley P. Hottot (for the Petitioner)
Thomas M. Fisher (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Tyson Timbs purchased a Land Rover for approximately $42,000 in January 2013 using the proceeds from his father’s life insurance policy. During the following four months, Timbs used the vehicle for multiple trips within Indiana to transport heroin. After a series of controlled purchases involving a confidential informant, Timbs was arrested at a traffic stop. At the time of his arrest in May, the Land Rover had approximately 15,000 more miles on it than when he purchased it in January.
The state charged Timbs with two charges of felony dealing and one charge of conspiracy to commit theft. He later pleaded guilty to one charge of felony dealing and one charge of conspiracy to commit theft in exchange for the state dismissing the remaining charge. After accepting the plea, the trial court sentenced Timbs to six years, five of which were to be suspended. Timbs also agreed to pay fees and costs totaling approximately $1200.
In addition, the state sought to forfeit Timbs’ Land Rover. The trial court denied the state’s action, ruling that the forfeiture would be an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment, characterizing it as grossly disproportional to the seriousness of the offense. The court also noted that the maximum statutory fine for Timbs’ felony dealing charge was $10,000, and the vehicle was worth roughly four times that amount when Timbs purchased it. The trial court ordered the state to release the vehicle immediately. The court of appeals affirmed.
The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the U.S. Supreme Court had never clearly incorporated the Eighth Amendment against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court also ruled that the state had pr…
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[17-1107] Carpenter v. Murphy
27 november 2018 · 1 uur 5 min
Carpenter v. Murphy Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 27, 2018.
Petitioner: Mike Carpenter, Interim Warden.
Respondent: Patrick Dwayne Murphy.Advocates:
Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner)
Edwin S. Kneedler (as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Ian H. Gershengorn (for the Respondent)
Riyaz A. Kanji (as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Patrick Dwayne Murphy, a member of the Creek Nation, was convicted in Oklahoma state court and sentenced to death for the 1999 murder of George Jacobs, who was a member of the same nation. Murphy’s conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Murphy then sought post-conviction relief on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a), gave the federal government exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute murders committed by Indians in Indian Country, a term defined under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 to include reservations, allotments, and dependent Indian communities.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) ultimately rejected Murphy’s jurisdictional argument, ruling that the state’s jurisdiction was proper because the land where the crime occurred was not an allotment, and because Murphy had offered insufficient evidence that the land was part of a reservation or dependent Indian community. The OCCA acknowledged authority from the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals stating that the Creek Reservation still existed but reserving the matter of whether its 1866 boundaries remained intact, and declined to make a finding on the boundary question if the federal courts had not done so.
Murphy then sought habeas relief in federal district court, challenging Oklahoma’s jurisdiction on the theory that the crime had occurred in Indian Country because the land at issue was part of the Creek Reservation under § 1151(a), and because the land was an Indian allotment under § 1151(c). The district court rejected his claims, and Murphy appe…
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[17-1094] Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert
27 november 2018 · 1 uur 1 min
Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 27, 2018.
Decided on Feb 26, 2019.Petitioner: Nutraceutical Corporation.
Respondent: Troy Lambert.Advocates:
John Hueston (for the Petitioner)
Jonathan A. Herstoff (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Troy Lambert purchased an alleged aphrodisiac dietary supplement that was manufactured by Nutraceutical, but that had not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Based on the product’s labels, Lambert believed that the supplement would enhance his sexual performance, and had he known these claims were false, he would not have purchased the product.
Lambert believed that the product violated FDA regulations because it purported to increase sexual desire but had not been through clinical testing, and because it was not FDA-approved. He further alleged that the product illegally failed to prominently display this lack of FDA approval on its labeling, and that the labeling also failed to mention a potentially dangerous ingredient. Lambert filed a consumer class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23(b)(3), alleging state law claims related to unfair competition, false advertising, and other violations.
The district court granted class certification based on the full refund damages model, which applies when a product is useless and involves calculating the average retail price and the number of units sold. The judge hearing the case retired, and Lambert’s action was reassigned to a new judge. Discovery was completed, and Nutraceutical filed a motion for decertification. The new judge granted the motion, finding that Lambert had failed to provide essential evidence to apply his classwide damages model, meaning that common issues did not predominate as required under Rule 23(b)(3).
Ten days after the order was issued decertifying the class, Lambert informed the court that he intended to file a motion for reconsideration, and t…
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[17-204] Apple v. Pepper
26 november 2018 · 1 uur
Apple v. Pepper Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 26, 2018.
Decided on May 13, 2019.Petitioner: Apple, Inc..
Respondent: Robert Pepper, et al..Advocates:
Daniel M. Wall (for the Petitioner)
Noel J. Francisco (as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
David C. Frederick (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
This lawsuit arose out of Apple’s handling of the sale of apps for its iPhone devices. Apple released the iPhone in 2007, and from the outset, it has been a “closed system,” meaning that Apple controls which apps can be loaded onto an iPhone, which it does via the “App Store.” Although Apple develops some of the apps sold in the App Store, most are developed by third parties. For every App Store sale made by a third-party developer, Apple receives 30% of the sale price.
In 2011, four named plaintiffs filed a putative antitrust class action complaint against Apple, alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization of the iPhone app market. The complaint was dismissed on technical grounds, as were several subsequent attempts at similar lawsuits by both the same and other plaintiffs. In September 2013, a set of plaintiffs included in their allegations sufficient facts for the lawsuit to move forward. Among these facts was the key allegation that each plaintiff had purchased iPhone apps from the App Store, and that these transactions involved Apple collecting the entire purchase price and paying the developers after the sale.
Apple filed yet another motion to dismiss the lawsuit, contending that the plaintiffs lacked statutory standing to sue under the US Supreme Court’s precedent in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). Under Illinois Brick, “only the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution” may bring a lawsuit for antitrust violations. If the plaintiffs are considered to have purchased their iPhone apps directly from the app developers, then th…
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[17-1174] Nieves v. Bartlett
26 november 2018 · 1 uur 2 min
Nieves v. Bartlett Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 26, 2018.
Decided on May 28, 2019.Petitioner: Luis A. Nieves, et al..
Respondent: Russell P. Bartlett.Advocates:
Dario Borghesan (for the Petitioners)
Jeffrey B. Wall (as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Zane D. Wilson (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Russell Bartlett was arrested by Alaska state troopers Luis Nieves and Bryce Weight for disorderly conduct and harassment. Bartlett subsequently sued the officers for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, making claims including false arrest and imprisonment, excessive force, malicious prosecution, and retaliatory arrest. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers on all claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling on the retaliatory arrest claim, explaining that under its own precedent, a showing of probable cause did not preclude a claim of retaliatory arrest. The appellate court noted that in 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court had clarified that its decision in Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), which held that a plaintiff could not make a retaliatory prosecution claim if the charges were supported by probable cause, did not necessarily extend to retaliatory arrests. And since that time, the Ninth Circuit had held that a plaintiff could make a retaliatory arrest claim even if the arresting officers had probable cause.
Question
Does probable cause defeat a First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?
Conclusion
The presence of probable cause for an arrest defeats a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim as a matter of law. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the majority opinion.
To prevail on a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim, the plaintiff must show that the official acted with a retaliatory motive and that the motive was the “but-for” cause of the plaintiff’s injury. The Court looked to analog…
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[17-773] Culbertson v. Berryhill
7 november 2018 · 58 min
Culbertson v. Berryhill Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 7, 2018.
Decided on Jan 8, 2019.Petitioner: Richard Allen Culbertson.
Respondent: Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration.Advocates:
Daniel R. Ortiz (for petitioner)
Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for respondent, in support of reversal and remand)
Amy L. Weil (Court-appointed amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Attorney Richard Culbertson represented four plaintiffs appealing denials of Social Security benefits. After successfully challenging all four denials, Culbertson asked the district court to award him attorney’s fees in those cases under 42 U.S.C. § 406 and the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) pertain to proceedings in court, and are statutorily limited to 25% of the past-due benefits the claimant receives. Fees awarded under § 406(a) pertain to administrative proceedings; that section does not explicitly limit the fee amount that the Social Security Commissioner can award in that context.
In ruling on Culbertson’s fee requests, the district court relied on 11th Circuit precedent limiting the total fee amount awarded under both § 406(a) and 406(b) to 25% of the past-due benefits awarded to the claimants. This meant that in one case his fee award was limited to 25% of the past-due benefits, in two cases the district court declined to rule on the § 406(b) fee award until the Commissioner ruled on the §406(a) award (so as to not award him an amount that exceeded 25% of the past-due benefits), and that in the final case, the court granted his § 406(b) request but barred him from requesting any further fees under § 406(a), again seeking to prevent him from exceeding the 25% cap.
In his appeal, Culbertson contended that other circuits have not applied this 25% cap to the aggregate f…
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[16-1094] Republic of Sudan v. Harrison
7 november 2018 · 1 uur 1 min
Republic of Sudan v. Harrison Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 7, 2018.
Decided on Mar 26, 2019.Petitioner: Republic of Sudan.
Respondent: Rick Harrison, et al..Advocates:
Christopher M. Curran (for petitioner)
Erica L. Ross (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting petitioner)
Kannon K. Shanmugam (for respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Sailors and spouses of sailors injured in the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in the Port of Aden, Yemen filed suit in 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1130, 1602, et seq., alleging that Sudan had provided material support to al Qaeda, whom they alleged was responsible for the attack. In accordance with the plaintiffs’ request, the clerk of the court served the summons and complaint on Sudan by mailing the case documents to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sudan via the Sudanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., and received a return receipt. Sudan did not answer the complaint within the required time frame, and the clerk of the court therefore entered a default against Sudan. In 2012, the district court entered a default judgment against Sudan in the amount of approximately $314,000, and found that service had been proper. The clerk of the court mailed a copy of the default judgement to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sudan via the Sudanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., and received confirmation that it had been delivered.
The judgment was registered in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which in late 2013 and early 2014 issued three turnover orders directing particular banks to turn over assets of Sudan to the plaintiffs. After the third turnover order was issued, Sudan filed a notice of appearance, and on the same day, appealed the turnover orders to the Second Circuit. The appeals court …
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[17-8151] Bucklew v. Precythe
6 november 2018 · 1 uur 1 min
Bucklew v. Precythe Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 6, 2018.
Decided on Apr 1, 2019.Petitioner: Russell Bucklew.
Respondent: Anne Precythe, et al..Advocates:
Robert N. Hochman (for petitioner)
D. John Sauer (for respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Russell Bucklew was convicted by a state court jury of murder, kidnapping, and rape, and was sentenced to death. After exhausting the state appeals process, Bucklew was scheduled to be executed on May 21, 2014. He then filed an action in federal district court alleging that execution by Missouri’s lethal injection protocol would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment as applied to him because of a unique congenital medical condition from which he suffers. According to Bucklew, lethal injection would likely cause him to hemorrhage during the execution, potentially choking on his own blood.” As an alternative method, Bucklew proposed execution by nitrogen hypoxia. He also requested discovery of the qualifications of two members of the lethal injection team, alleging that they might not be qualified for the positions for which they are hired.
The district court granted summary judgment to the state, finding that Bucklew failed to show that the state’s execution method “presents a risk that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering, and give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers,” and failed to propose “an alternative that is feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduces a substantial risk of severe pain,” both of which steps are required by US Supreme Court precedent. Additionally, the district court denied Bucklew’s request for discovery, finding that it was inappropriate to “assume that Missouri employs personnel who are incompetent or unqualified to perform their assigned duties.” Reviewing the district court’s findings de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affir…
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[17-1042] BNSF Railway Co. v. Loos
6 november 2018 · 56 min
BNSF Railway Co. v. Loos Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 6, 2018.
Decided on Mar 4, 2019.Petitioner: BNSF Railway Company.
Respondent: Michael D. Loos.Advocates:
Lisa S. Blatt (for petitioner)
Rachel P. Kovner (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting petitioner)
David C. Frederick (for respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Michael Loos worked as an employee of BNSF Railway Company until his termination in November 2012 for a series of attendance policy violations. Related to at least some of the attendance violations was an injury Loos sustained in 2010 when he fell in the train yard. After being terminated, Loos brought two claims against his former employer: a claim of retaliation under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) and a claim of negligence under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). The district court found that Loos had not established a prima facie case of retaliation under FRSA and granted BNSF's motion for summary judgment on that claim, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
The FELA negligence claim proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Loos—$30,000 for lost wages and $11,212.78 for medical expenses. BNSF moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to offset the lost wages award by the amount of Loos’s share of taxes owed under the RRTA. The district court denied the motion, finding no RRTA tax was owed on the award. The Eighth Circuit reviewed this determination de novo and found that the text of RRTA is unambiguous in not including damages for lost wages in its definition of compensation as money remuneration for services rendered. Thus, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling using alternate reasoning.
Question
Are damages for lost wages "compensation" under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act and thus subject to employment taxes?
Conclusion
Damages for lost wages are “compensat…
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[16-1275] Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren
5 november 2018 · 59 min
Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 5, 2018.
Decided on Jun 17, 2019.Petitioner: Virginia Uranium, Inc. et al..
Respondent: John Warren et al..Advocates:
Charles J. Cooper (for petitioners)
Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting petitioners)
Toby J. Heytens (for respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The federal Atomic Energy Act regulates nuclear power generation in the United States, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) enforces the provisions of the Act. In the early 1980s, a uranium deposit was discovered in Pittsylvania County, Virginia, on land owned by Coles Hill and Bowen Minerals (both plaintiffs in this case). The Virginia General Assembly called upon the state Coal and Energy Commission to evaluate the effects of mining uranium but in the meantime banned the mining of uranium “until a program for permitting uranium mining is established by statute.” Despite a recommendation by the state commission, the ban on uranium mining remains in effect.
Virginia Uranium, Coles Hills, and Bowen Minerals filed a federal lawsuit in the Western District of Virginia asking the court to declare the ban preempted by federal law and enjoining the state to grant uranium mining permits. The district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit, finding that the AEA does not regulate non-federal uranium deposits and thus does not preempt the state law ban. Reviewing the district court’s conclusion de novo, the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does the federal Atomic Energy Act preempt a Virginia ban on non-federal uranium mining?
Conclusion
The federal Atomic Energy Act (AEA) does not preempt a Virginia state-law ban on non-federal uranium mining. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the three-justice plurality opinion.
Looking first at the text of the AEA, the plurality found it notably lacking in any pr…
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[17-949] Sturgeon v. Frost
5 november 2018 · 1 uur 1 min
Sturgeon v. Frost Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 5, 2018.
Decided on Mar 26, 2019.Petitioner: John Sturgeon.
Respondent: Bert Frost, in His Official Capacity as Alaska Regional Director of the National Park Service, et al..Advocates:
Matthew T. Findley (for petitioner)
Ruth Botstein (Assistant Attorney General for Alaska as amicus curiae supporting petitioner)
Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
John Sturgeon wanted to use his hovercraft on the Nation River, which runs through Alaska’s Yukon-Charley National Preserve conservation unit, designated as such by the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), 16 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq., to reach moose hunting grounds. The State of Alaska would permit him to do so, whereas the federal government would not pursuant to National Park Service regulations. Sturgeon argued that the Nation River belonged to Alaska, and that the National Park Service could not regulate or prohibit the use of hovercraft on that portion of the river. Sturgeon sought declaratory and injunctive relief barring the Park Service from enforcing its hovercraft ban. The district court and appellate court denied him relief, interpreting the statute as limiting the Park Service’s authority to impose Alaska-specific regulations on inholdings but not its authority to enforce nationwide regulations like the hovercraft rule. The US Supreme Court rejected this interpretation and remanded the case for further consideration.
On remand from the US Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Nation River was public land for purposes of ANILCA and thus that it was subject to the regulatory authority of the National Park Service.
Question
Is Alaska’s Nation River public land and therefore subject to the regulatory authority of the National Park Service?
Conclusion
The Nation River is not public land, so it is exemp…
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[17-961] Frank v. Gaos
31 oktober 2018 · 1 uur 2 min
Frank v. Gaos Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 31, 2018.
Decided on Mar 20, 2019.Petitioner: Theodore H. Frank, et al..
Respondent: Paloma Gaos, et al..Advocates:
Theodore H. Frank (for petitioners)
Jeffrey B. Wall (Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae in support of neither party)
Andrew J. Pincus (for respondent Google LLC)
Jeffrey A. Lamken (for respondents Paloma Gaos et al.)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In a group of consolidated class actions, three plaintiffs sued Google on behalf of internet users who claimed that their privacy was violated under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et. seq., and California law by the company’s disclosure of their internet search terms to third party websites. The case went to mediation, and the parties reached a settlement which they submitted to the district court for approval in July 2013.
Among the terms of the settlement were that Google would pay $5.3 million of the $8.3 million total to six cy pres recipients, provided that they agreed to dedicate the funds to promoting education and initiatives relating to internet privacy. The district court certified the class for settlement purposes, and preliminarily approved the settlement. Notice was sent out to the class in 2014, with 13 class members opting out and 5, including Thomas Frank, filing objections (“the Objectors”).
The district court approved the parties’ settlement in 2015, and with regard to the objections, found that: (1) the cy pres award was appropriate because the award was non-distributable, (2) Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement was not affected by whether the award was cy pres, (3) there was a substantial nexus between the cy pres recipients and the interests of the class members, and there was no evidence that the parties’ preexisting relationships with the recipients influenced the selection process, and (4) the amount of …
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[17-1011] Jam v. International Finance Corp.
31 oktober 2018 · 59 min
Jam v. International Finance Corp. Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 31, 2018.
Decided on Feb 27, 2019.Petitioner: Budha Ismael Jam, et al..
Respondent: International Finance Corporation.Advocates:
Jeffrey L. Fisher (for petitioners)
Jonathan Y. Ellis (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting petitioners)
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (for respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Budha Ismael Jam and others are Indian fishermen, farmers, and others who live in Gujarat, India. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is an international organization headquartered in Washington, DC, that provides loans in the developing world to projects that are unable to receive private capital. The IFC loaned $450 million to an Indian company for the construction and operation of the Tata Mundra Plant in Gujarat, India. The loan agreement with the Indian power company included provisions that the company may not cause damage to surrounding communities, and IFC retained supervisory authority and could revoke financial support for the project.
The plant’s construction and operation did cause harm to the surrounding communities, as reported in IFC’s own internal audit, in violation of the agreement. However, the IFC did not take any steps to force the loan recipients into compliance.
The plaintiff fishermen and farmers brought this lawsuit in federal court in DC seeking damages based largely on tort causes of action. They also raised a claim as an alleged third-party beneficiary of the contract between IFC and the power company.
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim, finding that IFC was immune from suit under the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA) and further that the IFC had not waived its immunity to this suit. The relevant part of IOIA provides that international organizations “shall enjoy the same immunity from suit . . . as is enjoyed…
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[17-1026] Garza v. Idaho
30 oktober 2018 · 1 uur 2 min
Garza v. Idaho Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 30, 2018.
Decided on Feb 27, 2019.Petitioner: Gilberto Garza, Jr..
Respondent: Idaho.Advocates:
Amir H. Ali (for petitioner)
Kenneth K. Jorgensen (for respondent)
Allon Kedem (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae supporting respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
On January 23, 2015, Gilberto Garza, Jr. entered an Alford plea—that is, a plea maintaining innocence but conceding that the evidence is likely to convince a jury of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—to aggravated assault. On February 24, 2015, he pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Both plea agreements required Garza to waive his right to appeal. The district court accepted the plea agreements and imposed the sentence in accordance with both of them. Shortly after sentencing, Garza informed his trial counsel that he wished to appeal, but counsel declined to file the appeal, citing Garza's waivers.
Four months after he was convicted and sentenced, Garza filed a petition for post-conviction relief in each case, alleging that his trial attorney was ineffective for not filing notices of appeal. Garza’s attorney stated in an affidavit that he did not file an appeal because Garza had waived his right to appeal by accepting the plea agreements. The district court dismissed Garza’s petition to open the appeals period on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal.
Under Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to “reasonably effective” legal assistance. A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show: (1) that counsel’s representation was deficient; and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Generally, counsel’s failure to file an appeal at a criminal defendant’s requ…
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[16-1498] Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc.
30 oktober 2018 · 1 uur
Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc. Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 30, 2018.
Decided on Mar 19, 2019.Petitioner: Washington State Department of Licensing.
Respondent: Cougar Den, Inc..Advocates:
Noah Purcell (for petitioner)
Ann O'Connell Adams (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae supporting petitioner)
Adam G. Unikowsky (for respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Under Article III of the Yakama Nation Treaty of 1855, members of the tribe have "the right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public highways." Cougar Den is a Yakama-owned fuel distributor that imports millions of gallons of fuel into the state each year to sell to the public. In December 2013, Cougar Den received an assessment from the Washington State Licensing Department, demanding $3.6 million in unpaid taxes, penalties, and licensing fees for hauling fuel across state lines without a license. Cougar Den protested the assessment, and the Department’s ALJ ruled that the bill was impermissible under the treaty. The director of the Department reversed the ALJ, and Cougar Den then appealed the Department’s order to the Yakima County Superior Court, which reversed the order and ruled that it violated the tribe’s right to travel. The Department sought review by the Washington Supreme Court.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly rejected claims that the treaty provision at issue exempts members from taxes or state fees on commercial activities taking place outside the Yakama Indian Reservation. In the instant case, the Washington Supreme Court adopted a much broader meaning, ruling that this portion of the treaty bars states from taxing "any trade, traveling, and importation" by members of the Yakama tribe “that requires the use of public roads,” even those outside the reservation. Based on this interpretation, the state’…
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[17-988] Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela
29 oktober 2018 · 1 uur
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 29, 2018.
Decided on Apr 24, 2019.Petitioner: Lamps Plus, Inc., et al..
Respondent: Frank Varela.Advocates:
Andrew J. Pincus (for petitioners)
Michele M. Vercoski (for respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Frank Varela filed a class action complaint against his employer, Lamps Plus, under theories including negligence, invasion of privacy, and breach of contract after the company released employee personal identifying information in response to a phishing scam. Varela had signed an arbitration agreement as a condition of his employment. After he filed suit, Lamps Plus relied on this agreement as a basis for a motion to compel bilateral arbitration.
The district court found the agreement to be a contract of adhesion and ambiguous as to whether it permitted class arbitration. It construed the ambiguity against the drafter, Lamps Plus, and allowed the arbitration to proceed on a class-wide basis. Lamps Plus appealed, arguing that it had not agreed to class arbitration, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed and ruled that class arbitration could move forward.
The appeals court explained that because the agreement was capable of two reasonable interpretations, the district court was correct in finding ambiguity. Under California law it was also proper to construe the ambiguity against the drafter, particularly since it was a contract of adhesion. Further, it was a reasonable interpretation of the agreement to conclude that it covered legal disputes including class-wide claims, not just individual ones. By accepting this interpretation, the district court had found the requisite “contractual basis” for agreement to class arbitration under Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
Question
Does the Federal Arbitration Act foreclose a state-law interpretation of an arbitration agreement that would authorize class arbitration based solely o…
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[17-1272] Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc.
29 oktober 2018 · 59 min
Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc. Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 29, 2018.
Decided on Jan 8, 2019.Petitioner: Henry Schein, Inc., et al..
Respondent: Archer and White Sales, Inc..Advocates:
Kannon K. Shanmugam (for petitioners)
Daniel L. Geyser (for respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2012, Archer & White Sales, Inc.—a distributor, seller, and servicer for multiple dental equipment manufacturers—filed a lawsuit against Henry Schein, Inc. and its parent company—allegedly the largest distributor and manufacturer of dental equipment in the United States. In its lawsuit, Archer alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge, and Schein moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a clause in a contract (“Dealer Agreement”) between Archer and another distributor who was allegedly Schein’s predecessor in interest.
After a hearing, the magistrate judge held (1) the arbitration clause manifested an intent to have an arbitrator decide questions of arbitrability; (2) there is a reasonable construction of the arbitration clause that would call for arbitration in this dispute; and (3) the standard for determining whether equitable estoppel is appropriate requires arbitration against both signatories and non-signatories to the Dealer Agreement.
The district court vacated the magistrate judge’s order and held that the court could decide the question of arbitrability, and that the dispute was not arbitrable because the plain language of the arbitration clause expressly excluded suits that involved requests for injunctive relief. The court declined to reach the question of equitable estoppel. Schein appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
In the Fifth Circuit, courts must look first to whether the parties “clearly and unmistakably” intended to delegate the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator. If they did, “the motio…
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[16-1363] Nielsen v. Preap
10 oktober 2018 · 1 uur 2 min
Nielsen v. Preap Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 10, 2018.
Decided on Mar 19, 2019.Petitioner: Kirstjen Nielsen, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al..
Respondent: Mony Preap, et al..Advocates:
Zachary D. Tripp (Assistant to the Solicitor General, US Department of Justice, for petitioners)
Cecillia D. Wang (for repondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Three lawful permanent residents filed a class action for habeas relief in the US District Court for the Northern District of California when immigration authorities took them into custody and detained them without bond hearings years after they had been released from serving criminal sentences for offenses that could lead to removal. The plaintiffs’ position was that they were not detained “when . . . released” from criminal custody, and thus were not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
The district court certified the class, which included “[i]ndividuals in the state of California who are or will be subjected to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. section 1226(c) and who were not or will not have been taken into custody by the government immediately upon their release from criminal custody for a Section 1226(c)(1) offense.” The court also issued a preliminary injunction directing the government to provide all class members with a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a).
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the First Circuit and rejecting reasoning followed in four other circuits, holding that the immigration detention at issue under § 1226(c) must take place promptly upon the noncitizen’s release from criminal custody. The appellate court explained that the statute’s plain language reflected an immediacy with regard to when the immigration detention must take place in relation to the release from custody, and rejected arguments by the government that would allow for detentions to occur following significant delays.
Question
Does a noncitizen…
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[17-1104] Air and Liquid Systems Corp. v. Devries
10 oktober 2018 · 58 min
Air and Liquid Systems Corp. v. Devries Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 10, 2018.
Decided on Mar 19, 2019.Petitioner: Air and Liquid Systems Corp., et al..
Respondent: Roberta G. Devries, Administratrix of the Estate of John B. DeVries, Deceased, et. al..Advocates:
Shay Dvoretzky (for petitioners)
Thomas C. Goldstein (for respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Roberta G. Devries and Shirley McAfee are the widows of two US Navy sailors whom they allege developed cancer after they were exposed to asbestos working on Navy ships and in a naval shipyard. They sued multiple defendants, including manufacturers of “bare metal” ship components, or parts that were made and shipped before any asbestos-containing insulation materials were added. The plaintiffs sued in state court under theories of both negligence and strict liability.
The defendant manufacturers removed the case to federal court, and moved for summary judgment based on the bare metal defense, arguing that they could not be held liable for the sailors’ injuries because they shipped their products out in bare metal form. The district court granted summary judgment as to both the negligence and strict liability claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Third Circuit remanded with instructions to the district court to more clearly address the plaintiffs’ negligence claims, and to explain whether it was applying the bright-line as opposed to the fact-specific rule that can be relevant to the bare metal defense, and regarding which circuits are split. The district court again granted summary judgment on both claims, stating that it was applying the bright line rule.
The plaintiffs appealed again, but the Third Circuit did not consider their strict liability claims on appeal because it considered them abandoned. It therefore affirmed the district court’s ruling in favor of summary judgment for the defendants as to strict liability. The Third Circuit reversed the summary judg…
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[17-5554] Stokeling v. United States
9 oktober 2018 · 1 uur 1 min
Stokeling v. United States Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 9, 2018.
Decided on Jan 15, 2019.Petitioner: Denard Stokeling.
Respondent: United States of America.Advocates:
Brenda G. Bryn (for petitioner)
Frederick Liu (Assistant to the Solicitor General, US Department of Justice, for respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2016, Denard Stokeling pleaded guilty to charges that he was a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He had two previous convictions for robbery in Florida, where an element of that offense was “overcoming victim resistance.” Some state courts have interpreted this offense as requiring only slight force to overcome victim resistance. Stokeling therefore contended that both of his robbery convictions should not qualify as “violent felonies” in the context of enhanced sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), because those convictions did not require a violent use of force. The district court agreed with Stokeling as to one of his convictions. The United States appealed to the 11th Circuit, which vacated Stokeling’s sentence and remanded the case for sentencing as an Armed Career Criminal.
Question
Is a state robbery offense that includes “as an element” the common law requirement of overcoming “victim resistance” categorically a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(b)(i), when that offense has been specifically interpreted by state appellate courts to require only slight force to overcome resistance?
Conclusion
A state robbery offense that has as an element the use of force sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance is categorically a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because it necessitates the use of “physical force.” Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for a 5–4 majority. The ACCA’s elements clause covers any offense that has as an element “the use, attempted use, or threatened…
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[17-765] United States v. Stitt
9 oktober 2018 · 1 uur
United States v. Stitt Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 9, 2018.
Decided on Dec 10, 2018.Petitioner: United States of America.
Respondent: Victor J. Stitt, II.Advocates:
Erica L. Ross (Assistant to the Solicitor General, US Department of Justice, for petitioner)
Jeffrey L. Fisher (for respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2011, Victor Stitt tried to shove a loaded handgun into his girlfriend’s mouth and threatened to kill her. A neighbor called the police, and Stitt fled but later surrendered to police. A jury found Stitt guilty of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. In light of Stitt’s nine prior “violent felony” convictions, the court designated Stitt as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and sentenced him accordingly. The ACCA applies to those felons guilty of possessing a firearm who also have at least three prior convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense. Stitt appealed the conviction, arguing that none of his nine prior convictions constituted “violent felonies.” The US Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Johnson v. United States invalidated the violent-felony status of three of his prior convictions, leaving only six aggravated-burglary convictions. The Sixth Circuit has held that Tennessee aggravated burglary is a violent felony under the ACCA, so a panel of that court affirmed the sentence. Sitting en banc, the Sixth Circuit overturned its precedent and held that a conviction for Tennessee aggravated burglary does not qualify as an ACCA violent felony.
In a separate case, Jason Sims pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and received an enhanced sentence under the ACCA, based in part on two prior Arkansas residential burglary convictions. Sims appealed his conviction and the Eighth Circuit vacated his sentence and remanded his case for rehearing.
The US Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases and consolidated them for the purpose…
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[17-647] Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania
3 oktober 2018 · 1 uur 2 min
Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 3, 2018.
Decided on Jun 21, 2019.Petitioner: Rose Mary Knick.
Respondent: Township of Scott, Pennsylvania.Advocates:
J. David Breemer (for petitioner)
Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, US Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting petitioner)
Teresa Ficken Sachs (for respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2012, the Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, passed an ordinance affecting private properties determined to be or contain cemeteries. In relevant part, the ordinance required that “all cemeteries within the Township … be kept open and accessible to the general public during daylight hours” and that no owner could unreasonably restrict nor charge any fee to access the cemetery (the “public-access provision”). Additionally, the ordinance permitted a Township officer to enter any property within the Township to determine whether there is a cemetery on the property, in order to enforce the public-access provision.
Rose Mary Knick owns property in the Township of Scott, and in April 2013, a Township officer entered her property without an administrative warrant and identified certain stones as grave markers. The officer cited Knick as violating the ordinance. Knick disputes that a cemetery exists on her property and filed a lawsuit to challenge.
Knick challenged the ordinance on several grounds, two of which are most salient. First, she alleges that the ordinance authorizes unrestrained searches of private property in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution. Second, she argues that the ordinance takes private property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Notably, Knick did not initiate an “inverse-condemnation proceeding” against the Township, which is the local administrative process for challenging a taking by the government.
The district court dismissed all b…
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[17-340] New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira
3 oktober 2018 · 49 min
New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 3, 2018.
Decided on Jan 15, 2019.Petitioner: New Prime Inc..
Respondent: Dominic Oliveira.Advocates:
Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. (for petitioner)
Jennifer D. Bennett (for respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Dominic Oliveira completed an apprenticeship program offered by New Prime Inc. (Prime), an interstate trucking company. After Oliveira graduated from the program, Prime representatives advised Oliveira to set up a limited liability company and work for Prime as an independent contractor, as manifested by an independent contractor operating agreement signed by Oliveira on behalf of his new LLC. Oliveira alleges that Prime exercised significant control over his work, inconsistent with his status as an independent contractor. Oliveira terminated his contractor relationship with Prime and began working as an employee of Prime, where his job responsibilities were “substantially identical” to those he had as an independent contractor.
Oliveira then brought a class-action lawsuit against Prime, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), a state minimum-wage statute, among other claims. Prime filed a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which Oliveira opposed on the grounds that the contract is exempted under Section 1 of the FAA and that anyway, the question of applicability of the Section 1 exemption was one for the court to decide.
The district court concluded that the question of applicability of Section 1 of the FAA was for the court to decide, and it then held that “contracts of employment of transportation workers” does not extend to independent contractors. Having reached this conclusion, the district court ordered additional discovery on the issue of whether Oliveira was an employee or an independent contractor in order to be able to decide whether the contract was a contract of employment under Sect…
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[17-6086] Gundy v. United States
2 oktober 2018 · 55 min
Gundy v. United States Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 2, 2018.
Decided on Jun 20, 2019.Petitioner: Herman Avery Gundy.
Respondent: United States.Advocates:
Sarah Baumgartel (for petitioner)
Jeffrey B. Wall (Principal Deputy Solicitor General, US Department of Justice, for respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Herman Avery Gundy was convicted of committing sexual assault in Maryland while on supervised release for a prior federal offense. After serving his sentence for the Maryland sex offense, Gundy was to be transferred to federal custody to serve his sentence for violating his supervised release. As a part of this transfer, Gundy received permission to travel unsupervised by bus from Pennsylvania to New York. Gundy made the trip, but did not register as a sex offender in either Maryland or New York as required by state law.
In January 2013, Gundy was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250, the Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act (SORNA), for traveling from Pennsylvania to New York and then staying in New York without registering as a sex offender. He was convicted and sentenced to time served, along with five years of supervised release.
The 2nd Circuit affirmed this judgment on appeal. Gundy then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review his case, which it agreed to do only as to the question of whether SORNA unlawfully delegates authority to the U.S. Attorney General under 42 U.S.C. § 16913 to impose the law’s registration requirements upon offenders who were convicted before the statute was enacted.
Question
Does the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act’s delegation of authority to the U.S. Attorney General to issue regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 16913 violate the nondelegation doctrine?
Conclusion
The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)’s delegation of authority to the U.S. Attorney General to issue regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 16913 does not violate the nondelegation d…
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[17-7505] Madison v. Alabama
2 oktober 2018 · 56 min
Madison v. Alabama Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 2, 2018.
Decided on Feb 27, 2019.Petitioner: Vernon Madison.
Respondent: State of Alabama.Advocates:
Bryan A. Stevenson (for petitioner)
Thomas R. Govan, Jr. (for respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Vernon Madison has been on death row in Alabama for over 30 years and has had several serious strokes, rendering him unable to remember committing the crime for which he is to be executed. He also exhibits other symptoms of brain damage, including slurred speech, blindness, inability to walk independently, and urinary incontinence. Madison was originally scheduled to be executed in May 2016, and he challenged his competency in state court. The court denied his claim, and Madison then sought habeas corpus relief in federal court. The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that he was incompetent to be executed.
In November 2017, the US Supreme Court reversed the grant of habeas corpus relief in Dunn v. Madison, finding that the state court’s determinations of law and fact were “not so lacking in justification” as to give rise to error “beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement” as required under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).
Madison was rescheduled for execution for January 2018, and he again petitioned state court for relief, this time with new evidence that the court-appointed expert upon whose testimony the prior courts relied had been suspended from the practice of psychology. The court again denied his petition, finding Madison competent to be executed. Madison then sought asked the US Supreme Court to consider the constitutional issues underlying his claim, rather than the AEDPA ones it ruled on earlier.
Question
Does the Eighth Amendment and the Court’s jurisprudence prohibit a state from executing a prisoner whose mental disability leaves him with no memory of the commission of the capital offense…
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[17-71] Weyerhaeuser Company v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service
1 oktober 2018 · 1 uur 2 min
Weyerhaeuser Company v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 1, 2018.
Decided on Nov 27, 2018.Petitioner: Weyerhaeuser Company.
Respondent: United States Fish and Wildlife Service, et al..Advocates:
Timothy S. Bishop (for petitioner)
Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, US Department of Justice, for respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2010, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) included a privately owned parcel of land (“Unit 1”) in Louisiana in an expanded designation of critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog. Though these endangered frogs had not inhabited Unit 1 for decades, the land contained historic breeding sites. Other necessary features would need to be restored however. The landowners, Weyerhaeuser Company and two other entities (collectively, the “Landowners”), intended to use the land for residential and commercial development, as well as timber operations. They brought suit against the FWS in federal district court, challenging Unit 1’s designation as critical habitat and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. All parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the district court ruled in favor of the agency on the merits.
A divided 5th Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, upholding Unit 1’s designation as critical habitat. The court rejected the Landowners’ argument that the FWS had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in making this designation on the theory that Unit 1 was not presently habitable nor essential to species conservation. Explaining that land need not be habitable to be considered “essential” under 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the court deferred to the agency’s interpretation of that term. The majority also held that the FWS had not acted unreasonably in interpreting the ESA to not contain a requirement that land be “currently” habitable by a species to be designated as critic…
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[17-587] Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido
1 oktober 2018 · 55 min
Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 1, 2018.
Decided on Nov 6, 2018.Petitioner: Mount Lemmon Fire District.
Respondent: John Guido, et al..Advocates:
E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for petitioner)
Jeffrey L. Fisher (for respondents)
Jonathan C. Bond (Assistant to the Solicitor General, US Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2000, John Guido and Dennis Rankin were hired by the Mount Lemmon Fire District, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona. They were full-time firefighter captains, and at ages 46 and 54, respectively, were the two oldest full-time employees at the Fire District when they were terminated in 2009. Guido and Rankin filed age discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which found reasonable cause to believe that the Fire District had violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. Guido and Rankin subsequently filed suit against the Fire District.
The Fire District sought summary judgment on the basis that it was not an “employer” within the meaning of the ADEA, and the district court agreed. A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed. Ruling counter to what other circuits have concluded, the appellate court stated that a political subdivision of a state does not need to have 20 or more employees, as private sector employers do, in order to be covered by the ADEA.
Question
Under the ADEA, does the same twenty-employee minimum that applies to private employers also apply to political subdivisions of a state, as the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held, or does the ADEA apply instead to all state political subdivisions of any size, as the Ninth Circuit held in this case?
Conclusion
In a unanimous (8–0) opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the ADEA applies to all state politic…