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495 afleveringen, van nieuw naar oud
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[18-1116] Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma
4 december 2019 · 1 uur 2 min
Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Dec 4, 2019.
Decided on Feb 26, 2020.Petitioner: Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee, et al..
Respondent: Christopher M. Sulyma.Advocates:
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (for the petitioners)
Matthew W.H. Wessler (for the respondent)
Matthew Guarnieri (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2015, Christopher Sulyma, a former Intel employee and participant in the company’s retirement plans filed a lawsuit against the company for allegedly investing retirement funds in violation of Section 1104 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which sets forth the standard of care of fiduciaries. Sulyma alleged that the funds were not properly diversified and that as a result, they did not perform well during his employment (and thus investment) period of 2010 to 2012.
Intel moved to dismiss the complaint as time-barred under 29 U.S.C. § 1113(2), which provides that an action under Section 1104 may not be commenced more than “three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation.” The district court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and ordered discovery for the question of the statute of limitations. After discovery, the district court found no genuine dispute as to any material fact that Sulyma had actual knowledge of the investments more than three years before filing the action, and it granted summary judgment for Intel. Sulyma appealed.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that “actual knowledge” does not mean that the plaintiff knew that the underlying action violated ERISA or that the underlying action even occurred, only that the plaintiff was actually aware of the nature of the alleged breach. For a Se…
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[18-6943] Banister v. Davis
4 december 2019 · 59 min
Banister v. Davis Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Dec 4, 2019.
Decided on Jun 1, 2020.Petitioner: Gregory Dean Banister.
Respondent: Lorie Davis, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.Advocates:
Brian T. Burgess (for the petitioner)
Kyle D. Hawkins (for the respondent)
Benjamin W. Snyder (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Gregory Dean Banister was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. He filed a habeas petition asserting numerous constitutional violations, which the district court denied on the merits on May 15, 2017. He also requested a certificate of appealability (COA), which the district court also denied in the same order.
On June 12, 2017, Banister filed a motion to “amend or alter” the judgment of the district court pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the court denied on the merits on June 20, 2017.
On July 20, 2017, Banister filed a notice of appeal and an application for a COA, which the district court “considered” despite its previous order denying the COA, but again denied on July 28, 2017. Banister then sought and received from the Fifth Circuit an extension of time to file a COA application. He filed a petition for a COA with the Fifth Circuit on October 11, 2017, and the court denied his petition, citing lack of jurisdiction, on May 8, 2018. The Fifth Circuit held that Banister’s purported 59(e) motion was, in fact, a successive habeas petition, which would not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. Citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), the Fifth Circuit noted that “alleging that the court erred in denying habeas relief on the merits is effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the movant …
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[17-1498] Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian, et al.
3 december 2019 · 1 uur 1 min
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian, et al. Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Dec 3, 2019.
Decided on Apr 20, 2020.Petitioner: Atlantic Ritchfield Company.
Respondent: Gregory A. Christian, et al..Advocates:
Lisa S. Blatt (for the petitioner)
Christopher G. Michel (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
Joseph R. Palmore (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
This case arises from Montana’s Anaconda Smelter site—the location of a large copper concentrating and smelting operation that started in 1884 and expanded to other nearby areas in 1902. In 1977, Atlantic Richfield purchased Anaconda Smelter, and it shut down smelter activities in 1980. The smelter operations over the almost-century of operations caused high concentrations of arsenic, lead, copper, cadmium, and zinc to contaminate soil, groundwater, and surface water. In 1983, the EPA prioritized the Anaconda Smelter site as a Superfund site, working with Atlantic Richfield to address the contamination. Since then, Atlantic Richfield has worked with the EPA for 35 years to remediate the site, at a cost of approximately $470 million.
In 2008, landowners within the Anaconda Superfund site sued Atlantic Richfield in Montana state court, alleging that the smelter operations between 1884 and 1980 had caused damage to their properties. Atlantic Richfield raised no objections to the plaintiffs’ claims of loss of use and enjoyment of property, diminution of value, incidental and consequential damages, and annoyance and discomfort. However, it did object to the common-law claim for “restoration” damages.
To establish a claim for restoration damages in Montana, plaintiffs must prove that they will actually use the award to clean up the site. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that restoration of their property requires “work in excess of what the EPA required of Atlantic Richfield in i…
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[18-1269] Rodriguez v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
3 december 2019 · 1 uur
Rodriguez v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Dec 3, 2019.
Decided on Feb 25, 2020.Petitioner: Simon E. Rodriguez.
Respondent: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.Advocates:
Mitchell P. Reich (for the petitioner)
Michael R. Huston (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
United Western Bancorp, Inc. (UWBI) was in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings when it received a tax refund check from the Internal Revenue Service that was the result of net operating losses incurred by one of UWBI’s subsidiaries (United Western Bank). UWBI and its subsidiaries had entered into a tax allocation agreement in 2008 that was the source of the present ownership dispute. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) alleged that, as receiver for the Bank, it was entitled to the federal tax refund that was due because the refund stemmed exclusively from the Bank’s business loss carrybacks. Simon Rodriguez, in his capacity as the Chapter 7 Trustee for the bankruptcy estate of UWBI, initiated a bankruptcy adversary proceeding against the FDIC, alleging that UWBI owned the tax refund and thus that it was part of the bankruptcy estate.
The bankruptcy court agreed with Rodriguez and entered summary judgment. The FDIC appealed to federal district court, which reversed the bankruptcy court. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. Under federal common law, “a tax refund due from a joint return generally belongs to the company responsible for the losses that form the basis of the refund.” Applying this rule and noting that the agreement’s intended treatment of tax refunds mandates the same result, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the tax refund at issue belonged to the Bank and thus that the FDIC, as receiver for the Bank, was entitled to summary judgment.
Question
Does federal common law or the law of…
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[18-280] New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. City of New York
2 december 2019 · 1 uur 2 min
New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. City of New York Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Dec 2, 2019.
Decided on Apr 27, 2020.Petitioner: New York State Rifle and Pistol Association, Inc., et al..
Respondent: City of New York, New York, et al..Advocates:
Paul D. Clement (for the petitioners)
Jeffrey B. Wall (Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Richard P. Dearing (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The State of New York law prohibits the possession of firearms without a license. To obtain a handgun license, an individual must apply with a local licensing officer—which, in New York City, is the police commissioner—and the application process involves an investigation into the applicant’s mental health history, criminal history, and moral character. There are two primary types of handgun licenses: “carry” licenses and “premises” licenses. This case involves the latter, which permits the licensee to “have and possess in his dwelling” a pistol or revolver. The premises license is specific to a particular address, and the handguns permitted by the license may not be removed from that address except in limited circumstances prescribed by law. One such circumstance is to “transport his/her handgun(s) directly to and from an authorized small arms range/shooting club, unloaded, and in a locked container, the ammunition to be carried separately.” All small arms ranges/shooting clubs authorized under the rule are located in New York City.
Three individuals with premises licenses sought to transport their handguns to shooting ranges and competitions outside New York City—which is prohibited by the rule. One of the individuals sought to transport his handgun between the premises in New York City for which it was licensed and his second home in Hancock, New York—which the rule also prohibits. The three individuals an…
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[18-1150] Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org Inc.
2 december 2019 · 1 uur 1 min
Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org Inc. Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Dec 2, 2019.
Decided on Apr 27, 2020.Petitioner: State of Georgia, et al..
Respondent: Public.Resource.Org, Inc..Advocates:
Joshua S. Johnson (for the petitioners)
Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Eric F. Citron (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Official Code of Georgia Annotated is a compilation of Georgia statutes accompanied by various annotations, “consisting of history lines, repeal lines, cross references, commentaries, case notations, editor’s notes, excerpts from law review articles, summaries of opinions of the Attorney General of Georgia, summaries of advisory opinions of the State Bar, and other research references.” Although the Code itself states that the annotations are part of the official code and that the statutory portions “shall be merged with annotations,” Georgia law says that the annotations themselves do not have the force of law. The annotations are prepared pursuant to an agreement between Mathew Bender & Co., an operating division of the LexisNexis Group, and the State of Georgia, under which the state exercises pervasive supervisory control by way of its Code Revision Commission, a body established by the Georgia General Assembly. The Commission is comprised of the Lieutenant Governor, four members of the Georgia Senate, the Speaker of the Georgia House of Representatives, four additional members of the Georgia House of Representatives, and five members appointed by the president of the State Bar of Georgia.
Public.Resource.Org (PRO) is a non-profit organization with a mission of improving public access to government records and primary legal materials. In 2013, PRO purchased all 186 volumes of the print version of the OCGA and its supplements, scanned them, and uploaded them to its website to be freely ac…
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[18-1171] Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African American-Owned Media
13 november 2019 · 59 min
Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African American-Owned Media Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 13, 2019.
Decided on Mar 23, 2020.Petitioner: Comcast Corporation.
Respondent: National Association of African American-Owned Media and Entertainment Studio Networks, Inc..Advocates:
Miguel A. Estrada (for the petitioner)
Morgan L. Ratner (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
Erwin Chemerinsky (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Entertainment Studios Network (ESN), owned by African American actor and comedian Byron Allen, and the National Association of African American-Owned Media, an entity created by Allen, sued Comcast over the latter’s decision not to carry ESN’s channels. ESN alleged that Comcast’s decision not to carry ESN’s networks was based, at least in part, on racial animus against ESN, which is the only 100% African American-owned multi-channel media company in the United States. At the time of Comcast’s decision, several other large distributors— including Charter Communications, Time Warner Cable, DirecTV, and AT&T—had also declined to enter into carriage agreements with ESN.
The district court dismissed ESN’s original complaint and several subsequent amended complaints against Comcast and other defendants for failure to plead facts that state a plausible claim for relief. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit held in a related case involving Charter Communications that “mixed-motive claims are cognizable under § 1981,” meaning that “even if racial animus was not the but-for cause of a defendant’s refusal to contract, a plaintiff can still prevail if she demonstrates that discriminatory intent was a factor in that decision.” Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit concluded that ESN had stated a valid Section 1981 claim based on its assertions that the carriers had entered into contrac…
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[18-938] Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC
13 november 2019 · 1 uur 2 min
Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 13, 2019.
Decided on Jan 14, 2020.Petitioner: Ritzen Group, Inc..
Respondent: Jackson Masonry, LLC.Advocates:
James K. Lehman (for the petitioner)
Griffin S. Dunham (for the respondent)
Vivek Suri (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Ritzen Group contracted to buy a piece of property from Jackson Masonry, but the sale was never completed. Ritzen claims that Jackson breached the contract by providing erroneous documentation about the property just before the deadline, while Jackson claims Ritzen breached by failing to secure funding to purchase the property by the deadline.
Ritzen sued Jackson for breach of contract in Tennessee state court, and just before trial, Jackson filed for bankruptcy, triggering an automatic stay of the litigation under 11 U.S.C. § 362. Ritzen filed a motion to lift the stay, which the bankruptcy court denied, and Ritzen did not appeal the denial. Instead, Ritzen brought a claim against the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court ruled for Jackson, finding that Ritzen, not Jackson, breached the contract.
After this adverse ruling, Ritzen filed two appeals in the district court. The first appeal arose from the bankruptcy court’s order denying relief from the automatic stay (which Ritzen did not appeal at the time). The second appeal arose from the bankruptcy court’s determination that Ritzen, not Jackson, breached the contract. The district court ruled against Ritzen on both appeals; the first appeal was untimely filed, and the second one failed on the merits.
Ritzen appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reviewed the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact under the abuse of discretion standard and its legal conclusions de novo. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Ri…
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[18-587] Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California
12 november 2019 · 1 uur 23 min
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 12, 2019.
Decided on Jun 18, 2020.Petitioner: Department of Homeland Security, et al..
Respondent: Regents of the University of California, et al..Advocates:
Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioners)
Theodore B. Olson (for the private respondents)
Michael J. Mongan (for the state respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2012, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) adopted a program—known as the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)—to postpone the deportation of undocumented immigrants who had been brought to the United States as children and to assign them work permits allowing them to obtain social security numbers, pay taxes, and become part of “mainstream” society in the United States.
In 2017, after the national election, when the Trump administration replaced the Obama administration, DHS began a phase-out of DACA. The parties do not dispute the authority of a new administration to replace old policies with new policies, but the plaintiffs in this and related challenges allege that the new administration terminated DACA based on a mistake of law rather than in compliance with the law. Specifically, the Trump administration terminated DACA based on a conclusion that the Obama administration had created DACA “without proper statutory authority and with no established end-date” and thus that it was an “unconstitutional exercise of authority by the Executive Branch.”
The plaintiffs in this case and the related cases challenged this conclusion of law, alleging that the recission of DACA violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it was arbitrary and capricious, and because it was a substantive rule that did not comply with the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements. The challengers also alleged that the recission deprived DACA recipients of …
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[17-1678] Hernandez v. Mesa
12 november 2019 · 1 uur 2 min
Hernandez v. Mesa Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 12, 2019.
Decided on Feb 25, 2020.Petitioner: Jesus C. Hernández, et al..
Respondent: Jesus Mesa, Jr..Advocates:
Stephen I. Vladeck (for the petitioners)
Randolph J. Ortega (for the respondent)
Jeffrey B. Wall (Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Sergio Adrián Hernández Güereca, a 15-year-old Mexican national, was playing with friends in the cement culvert between El Paso, Texas, and Cuidad Juarez, Mexico. Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr. arrived on the scene and detained one of Hernández’s friends on U.S. territory. Hernández ran into Mexican territory and stood by a pillar near the culvert. From U.S. territory, Mesa fired at least two shots across the border at Hernández, one of which struck Hernández in the face and killed him.
Hernández’s parents filed a lawsuit against the officer and various other defendants alleging violation of their son’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and part and reversed in part. The Fifth Circuit held that Hernández lacked Fourth Amendment rights, but his parents were entitled to a remedy under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding an implied cause of action against federal government officials who have violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights), and the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. On rehearing en banc, the full Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the parents’ claims, holding that they had failed to state a claim for a violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not “clearly established” that it was unconstitutional for an officer on U.S. soil to shoot a Mex…
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[18-260] County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund
6 november 2019 · 1 uur 3 min
County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 6, 2019.
Decided on Apr 23, 2020.Petitioner: County of Maui, Hawaii.
Respondent: Hawaii Wildlife Fund.Advocates:
Elbert Lin (for the petitioner)
Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
David L. Henkin (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Clean Water Act (CWA) requires National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits for the discharge of pollutants to navigable waters from point sources, which the CWA defines as “discernible, confined, and discrete conveyances.” In contrast, all other sources of pollution are characterized as nonpoint sources and are controlled through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other non-CWA programs. The CWA also distinguishes between groundwater and navigable waters, the latter being “waters of the United States” and exclusive of the former.
Constructed with funding by the EPA in the 1970s, the County of Maui’s Lahaina Wastewater Reclamation Facility treats wastewater generated by homes and business in the western part of Maui by injecting treated wastewater (called “effluent”) into underground injection control (UIC) wells—a common method used by municipalities to dispose of effluent. Before injection, effluent is treated to meet R-1 water standards, Hawaii’s highest standards for recycled water. Some of the treated effluent is used for resort and golf course irrigation. Upon injection, effluent immediately mixes with groundwater and disperses vertically and horizontally, eventually migrating to the ocean. Over 90% of the effluent/groundwater mixture enters the ocean through diffuse flow, with no identifiable entry point. Reports from 1973, 1991, and 1994 indicate that both the EPA and the Hawaii Department of Health (HDOH) understood that the wastewater entered the ocean, and neit…
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[18-1165] Retirement Plans Committee of IBM v. Jander
6 november 2019 · 1 uur 1 min
Retirement Plans Committee of IBM v. Jander Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 6, 2019.
Decided on Jan 14, 2020.Petitioner: Retirement Plans Committee of IBM, et al..
Respondent: Larry W. Jander, et al..Advocates:
Paul D. Clement (for the petitioners)
Jonathan Y. Ellis (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Samuel Bonderoff (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. __ (2014), the Supreme Court unanimously held that under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), fiduciaries to an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) are not entitled to a presumption of prudence regarding their decisions to buy or hold employer stock. Rather, for a plaintiff to state a claim for breach of the fiduciary duty of prudence based on inside information, the plaintiff need only “plausibly allege that a prudent fiduciary in the defendant’s position could not have concluded that [an alternative action] would do more harm than good to the fund.” Thus the Court established a “context-specific” pleading standard rather than a generalized presumption standard.
IBM offers as a benefit to its employees an ERISA-qualified ESOP, invested predominantly in IBM common stock, with Retirement Plans Committee of IBM as the fiduciary. In 2015, two substantially similar lawsuits were filed against IBM and its officers, one under securities laws and the other under ERISA. Both lawsuits alleged that IBM fraudulently concealed problems with the company’s microelectronics unit, thereby artificially inflating IBM’s reported value. By continuing to invest in IBM stock despite allegedly knowing that the market price was artificially inflated due to the fraudulent scheme, the plaintiffs in the ERISA lawsuit argued that the ESOP’s fiduciaries breached their duty of prudence under Section 404 of ERISA.
The district c…
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[18-565] CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. v. Frescati Shipping Co.
5 november 2019 · 56 min
CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. v. Frescati Shipping Co. Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 5, 2019.
Decided on Mar 30, 2020.Petitioner: CITGO Asphalt Refining Company, et al..
Respondent: Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., et al..Advocates:
Carter G. Phillips (for the petitioners)
Erica L. Ross (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the federal respondent)
Thomas C. Goldstein (for the private respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2004, CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. and related companies contracted with Frescati Shipping Co. and others for a shipment of crude oil from Venezuela to Paulsboro, New Jersey. Frescati owned and operated the oil tanker, which had nearly completed its 1,900-mile journey to its destination berth on the Delaware River. To reach its intended berth, the tanker needed to pass through Federal Anchorage Number 9, a federally designated section of the river in which ships may anchor. That area is periodically surveyed for depth and dredged by the Army Corps of Engineers, but no government agency is responsible for preemptively searching for obstructions. Anyone who wishes to search for obstructions in that area may do so, but dredging requires a permit from the Corps of Engineers.
As it passed through this section of the river, the tanker hit an abandoned anchor, causing approximately 264,000 gallons of crude oil to spill into the river. The cleanup cost was $143 million.
Frescati originally paid for the cleanup and was then reimbursed $88 million by the federal government, under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Frescati and the United States filed a lawsuit seeking a portion of costs from CITGO, the intended recipient of the oil.
At the beginning of what turned out to be extensive litigation, the district court initially found that CITGO was not liable under contract or tort law. The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the decision in part after determining that Fre…
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[18-877] Allen v. Cooper
5 november 2019 · 1 uur 1 min
Allen v. Cooper Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 5, 2019.
Decided on Mar 23, 2020.Petitioner: Frederick L. Allen, et al..
Respondent: Roy A. Cooper, III, Governor of North Carolina, et al..Advocates:
Derek L. Shaffer (for the petitioners)
Ryan Park (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 1996, a private researcher hired petitioner Frederick Allen and his company, Nautilus Productions, LLC, to document the recently discovered shipwreck of Blackbeard’s Queen Anne’s Revenge, which ran aground at Beaufort, North Carolina, in 1718. Allen documented the shipwreck for nearly twenty years in photographs and videos and registered his works with the U.S. Copyright Office.
At some point before October 2013, the state of North Carolina posted various of the copyrighted works of Allen online without his permission. In October 2013, the state and other involved parties entered into a settlement agreement with Allen and his company, paying him for the infringement of his works and agreeing not to infringe the works going forward. At the time, the state removed its infringing works, but shortly afterward, it again posted and published Allen’s works. The state then passed “Blackbeard’s Law,” which purportedly converted Allen’s works into “public record” materials that the state could use freely.
Allen sued the state for copyright infringement, and the state moved to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Allen argued that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA)—which defines potential infringers of copyright to include “any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity”—abrogates state sovereign immunity for copyright infringement claims.
The district court denied the motion to dismiss, finding persuasive Allen’s arguments regarding the CRCA’s abrogation of sover…
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[18-556] Kansas v. Glover
4 november 2019 · 1 uur 1 min
Kansas v. Glover Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 4, 2019.
Decided on Apr 6, 2020.Petitioner: State of Kansas.
Respondent: Charles Glover.Advocates:
Toby Crouse (for the petitioner)
Michael R. Huston (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
Sarah E. Harrington (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
While on patrol, a Kansas police officer ran a registration check on a pickup truck with a Kansas license plate. Upon running the check, the officer learned that the truck was registered to Charles Glover, Jr., and that his license had been revoked. Acting on suspicion that the owner was unlawfully operating the vehicle (based on the assumption that the registered owner of the truck was also the driver), the officer stopped the truck. The officer confirmed that Glover was the driver and issued him a citation for being a habitual violator of Kansas traffic laws.
Glover moved to suppress all evidence from the stop, arguing that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. According to Glover, the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to pull him over. The state argued that a law enforcement officer may infer that the owner of a vehicle is the one driving the vehicle, absent information to the contrary, and the knowledge that the owner has a revoked license combined with that inference gives rise to reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop.
The state trial court concluded that it is not reasonable for an officer to infer that the registered owner of a vehicle is also its driver and granted Glover’s motion to suppress. The appellate court reversed, and the Kansas Supreme Court granted review. The supreme court reversed the lower court, holding that the inference impermissibly “stacked” assumptions and would relieve the state of its burden of showing reasonable suspi…
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[18-725] Barton v. Barr
4 november 2019 · 1 uur
Barton v. Barr Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 4, 2019.
Decided on Apr 23, 2020.Petitioner: Andre Martello Barton.
Respondent: William P. Barr, Attorney General.Advocates:
Adam G. Unikowsky (for the petitioner)
Frederick Liu (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
A native and citizen of Jamaica, Andre Barton was admitted to the United States in 1989 under a B-2 visitor visa. Three years later, in 1992, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 1996, a few months before he had been in the country for seven years, Barton was charged with and convicted of three felonies: aggravated assault, first-degree criminal damage to property, and possession of a firearm during the possession of a felony. In 2007 and 2008, he was charged with and convicted of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. After these offenses, the Department of Homeland Security served Barton with a notice to appear, charging him as removable (deportable) on several grounds. Barton conceded removability as to two of the charges but denied two of them. He also gave notice of his intent to seek cancellation of removal as a lawful permanent resident. The immigration judge sustained the two conceded charges, and the government withdrew the other two charges.
Barton then filed an application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), which allows the attorney general to cancel the removal of an otherwise removable lawful permanent resident if, among other things, the individual “has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status.” This residency requirement is subject to a “stop-time rule” which terminates the accrual of continuous residency when the individual commits a statutorily described crime that renders the individual “inadmissible” or “removable.” The government argued that Barton had not accrued the seven years…
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[18-328] Rotkiske v. Klemm
16 oktober 2019 · 57 min
Rotkiske v. Klemm Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 16, 2019.
Decided on Dec 10, 2019.Petitioner: Kevin C. Rotkiske.
Respondent: Paul Klemm, et al..Advocates:
Scott E. Gant (On behalf of the Petitioner)
Shay Dvoretzky (On behalf of the Respondents)
Jonathan C. Bond (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Kevin Rotkiske accumulated credit card debt between 2003 and 2005, which his bank referred to Klemm & Associates for collection. Klemm filed a collections lawsuit against Rotkiske in March 2008 but was unable to locate him for service of process. Klemm refiled its suit in January 2009 and attempted to serve Rotkiske at the same address. Unbeknownst to Rotkiske, someone at that address accepted service on his behalf, and Klemm obtained a default judgment against him. Rotkiske only discovered the judgment when he applied for a mortgage in September 2014.
Rotkiske filed the present action against Klemm alleging that its actions violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Klemm moved to dismiss the claim as time-barred, and the district court granted the motion to dismiss. The FDCPA provides that any action under the Act must be brought “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” Rotkiske argued that the statute incorporates a “discovery rule,” which is recognized in both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits and which “delays the beginning of a limitations period until the plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury.” The district court rejected this argument, finding that under a plain reading of the statute, the limitations period begins at the time of injury. Rotkiske appealed, but before the appellate panel issued its opinion and judgment, the Third Circuit ordered rehearing en banc. The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the judgment of the district court.
Question
Does the statute of limitations under the Fair Debt Co…
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[17-834] Kansas v. Garcia
16 oktober 2019 · 1 uur 2 min
Kansas v. Garcia Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 16, 2019.
Decided on Mar 4, 2020.Petitioner: Kansas.
Respondent: Ramiro Garcia, et al..Advocates:
Derek Schmidt (Attorney General, Kansas)
Christopher G. Michel (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Paul W. Hughes (On behalf of the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The controversy before the Court arises from three cases presenting the same issue.
In State v. Garcia, Ramiro Garcia was stopped for speeding in Overland Park, Kansas. When asked why he was speeding, he told officers that he was on his way to work. A records check revealed that he was already the subject of an investigation, and police contacted his employer to obtain employment documents. Among the documents was his federal Form I-9, which listed a social security number belonging to another person. Further investigation revealed that Garcia had used the same number on other federal and state forms. On the basis of this information, Garcia was charged with identity theft under state law.
In State v. Morales, a special agent with the Social Security Administration determined that Donaldo Morales was using a social security number issued to another person. The agent reviewed Morales’s employment file, which included a federal Form I-9 as well as various federal and state tax forms. Morales was charged with identity theft and two other state-law offenses.
In State v. Ochoa-Lara, federal and state officers determined that Guadalupe Ochoa-Lara was using a social security number issued to another individual to lease an apartment. On further investigation, officers reviewed the Form W-4 that Ochoa-Lara had completed for employment and found he was using the same social security number that belonged to another individual. On this basis, Ochoa-Lara was charged with two counts of identity theft under state law.
All three defendants were convicted of at least one related c…
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[18-217] Mathena v. Malvo
16 oktober 2019 · 1 uur 3 min
Mathena v. Malvo Lees meer
Justia · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 16, 2019.
Petitioner: Randall Mathena.
Respondent: Lee Boyd Malvo.Advocates:
Toby J. Heytens (On behalf of the Petitioner)
Eric J. Feigin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Danielle Spinelli (On behalf of the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2002, Lee Malvo and John Allen Muhammad killed 10 people in sniper attacks in Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia. Muhammad was sentenced to death and executed in 2009. Malvo, only 17 years old at the time of the attacks, was sentenced to life in prison by judges in Virginia and Maryland. He challenged his Virginia sentences based on two recent US Supreme Court decisions.
In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the Court held that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” Four years later, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. __ (2016), the Court held that its decision in Miller was a “substantive rule of constitutional law” and therefore must be given “retroactive effect” in cases where direct review was complete when Miller was decided.
Malvo argued that his sentence must be vacated because Montgomery modified a “substantive rule of constitutional law” and was thus retroactively applied to his own sentencing. Under this reading, sentences that were legal when imposed, as Malvo’s was, must be vacated if they were imposed in violation of the Court’s new rules. The district court found Malvo’s arguments persuasive and vacated his four sentences of life imprisonment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does the decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana modify a “substantive rule of constitutional law” such that it must be given retroactive effect, requiring the respondent’s sentences of life without the possibility of parole to be vacated?
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[18-1334] Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC
15 oktober 2019 · 1 uur 22 min
Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 15, 2019.
Decided on Jun 1, 2020.Petitioner: Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico.
Respondent: Aurelius Investment, LLC, et al..Advocates:
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (On behalf of the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico)
Jeffrey B. Wall (On behalf of the United States)
Theodore B. Olson (On behalf of Aurelius Investment, LLC, et al.)
Jessica E. Mendez-Colberg (On behalf of UTIER)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Since it was ceded to the United States in 1898, Puerto Rico has accumulated substantial debt, in large part due to its ambiguous legal status as a protectorate of the United States and the economically detrimental policies the United States has enacted over the decades. Exacerbated by a series of governmental financial deficits and a recession, Puerto Rico’s debt crisis came to a head in 2015, when its governor announced that the Commonwealth was in a “death spiral” and was unable to pay its debt. In June 2016, President Barack Obama signed into law the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act of 2016 (PROMESA), which gave him authority to appoint a seven-member Financial Oversight and Management Board that would have control over Puerto Rico’s budget and would negotiate the restructuring of its $125 billion indebtedness. President Obama appointed the seven-member board in August 2016 based on lists supplied by Republic and Democratic lawmakers.
A number of creditors and elected officials of Puerto Rico have been dissatisfied with the board and its decisions and brought a lawsuit challenging President Obama’s authority to appoint the board members. The challengers alleged that the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires that the Senate confirm high-level federal officers and that the board members were within th…
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[17-1618] Bostock v. Clayton County
8 oktober 2019 · 1 uur 2 min
Bostock v. Clayton County Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 8, 2019.
Decided on Jun 15, 2020.Petitioner: Gerald Lynn Bostock.
Respondent: Clayton County, Georgia.Advocates:
Pamela S. Karlan (for the petitioner in 17-1618 and the respondent in 17-1623)
Jeffrey M. Harris (for the respondent in 17-1618 and the petitioner in 17-1623)
Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting affirmance in 17-1618 and reversal in 17-1623)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Gerald Bostock, a gay man, began working for Clayton County, Georgia, as a child welfare services coordinator in 2003. During his ten-year career with Clayton County, Bostock received positive performance evaluations and numerous accolades. In 2013, Bostock began participating in a gay recreational softball league. Shortly thereafter, Bostock received criticism for his participation in the league and for his sexual orientation and identity generally. During a meeting in which Bostock’s supervisor was present, at least one individual openly made disparaging remarks about Bostock’s sexual orientation and his participation in the gay softball league. Around the same time, Clayton County informed Bostock that it would be conducting an internal audit of the program funds he managed. Shortly afterwards, Clayton County terminated Bostock allegedly for “conduct unbecoming of its employees.”
Within months of his termination, Bostock filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Three years later, in 2016, he filed a pro se lawsuit against the county alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court dismissed his lawsuit for failure to state a claim, finding that Bostock’s claim relied on an interpretation of Title VII as prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientatio…
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[18-107] R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
8 oktober 2019 · 57 min
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 8, 2019.
Decided on Jun 15, 2020.Petitioner: R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc..
Respondent: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, et al..Advocates:
David D. Cole (for respondent Aimee Stephens)
John J. Bursch (for the petitioner)
Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for respondent EEOC, supporting reversal)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Aimee Stephens worked as a funeral director at R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., which is a closely held for-profit corporation that operates several funeral homes in Michigan. For most of her employment at the Funeral Home, Stephens lived and presented as a man. Shortly after she informed the Funeral Home’s owner and operator that she intended to transition from male to female, she was terminated.
Stephens filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that she had been terminated based on unlawful sex discrimination. After conducting an investigation, the EEOC brought a lawsuit against the Funeral Home charging that it had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating Stephen’s employment on the basis of her transgender or transitioning status and her refusal to conform to sex-based stereotypes.
The district court granted summary judgment to the Funeral Home, and a panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Funeral Home’s termination of Stephens based on her transgender status constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.
Question
Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibit discrimination against transgender employees based on (1) their status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)?
Conclusion
An employer who fires an individual employee merely fo…
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[18-801] Peter v. NantKwest, Inc.
7 oktober 2019 · 55 min
Peter v. NantKwest, Inc. Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 7, 2019.
Decided on Dec 12, 2019.Petitioner: Laura Peter, Deputy Director, Patent and Trademark Office.
Respondent: NantKwest, Inc..Advocates:
Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)
Morgan Chu (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2001, Dr. Hans Klingemann filed a patent application with the US Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) describing a method for treating cancer using natural killer cells. Dr. Klingemann assigned his application to NantKwest Inc., and in 2010, the examiner rejected the application as obvious. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) affirmed the rejection.
When the Board affirms an examiner’s rejection of a patent application, the applicant may either appeal directly to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or challenge the Board’s decision in district court (under 35 U.S.C. § 145). Pursuant to § 145, NantKwest challenged the Board’s decision by filing a complaint in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The court granted the PTO’s motion for summary judgment, and the Federal Circuit affirmed. After its victory on the merits, PTO filed a motion for reimbursement of “the expenses of the proceedings” under § 145, including almost $80,000 in attorney’s fees and over $33,000 in expert witness fees.
Applicants who invoke § 145 are required by statute to pay “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings” incurred by the PTO in defending the Board’s decision, regardless of the outcome. Historically, the PTO has used this requirement to recover payment for expenses such as travel, printing, and expert witnesses.
The district court denied PTO’s motion with respect to attorney’s fees, citing the American Rule—a “bedrock principle” in this country that “each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose” unless there is an “express grant from Cong…
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[18-5924] Ramos v. Louisiana
7 oktober 2019 · 1 uur 2 min
Ramos v. Louisiana Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 7, 2019.
Decided on Apr 20, 2020.Petitioner: Evangelisto Ramos.
Respondent: State of Louisiana.Advocates:
Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the petitioner)
Elizabeth Murrill (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Evangelisto Ramos was charged with second-degree murder and exercised his right to a jury trial. After deliberating, ten of the twelve jurors found that the prosecution had proven its case against Ramos beyond a reasonable doubt, while two jurors reached the opposite conclusion. Under Louisiana’s non-unanimous jury verdict law, agreement of only ten jurors is sufficient to enter a guilty verdict, so Ramos was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
Ramos appealed his case, and the state appellate court affirmed the lower court. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied review.
Question
Does the Fourteenth Amendment fully incorporate the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a unanimous verdict against the states?
Conclusion
The Sixth Amendment, as incorporated against the states, requires that a jury find a criminal defendant guilty by a unanimous verdict. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the primary opinion.
In Part I, Justice Neil Gorsuch (writing for a majority: himself and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Brett Kavanaugh) noted that the original public meaning of the Sixth Amendment's right to trial by jury, as well as its history, support an interpretation that it requires guilt be determined by a unanimous jury. Because this right is “fundamental to the American scheme of justice,” it is incorporated against the states (that is, it applies to state governments as well) by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous verdict to support a conviction in state court.
In Part II-A, Justice Gorsuch, writing for the same majority, explained how the Court’s jur…
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[18-6135] Kahler v. Kansas
7 oktober 2019 · 1 uur 2 min
Kahler v. Kansas Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 7, 2019.
Decided on Mar 23, 2020.Petitioner: James K. Kahler.
Respondent: Kansas.Advocates:
Sarah Schrup (for the petitioner)
Toby Crouse (for the respondent)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Kraig Kahler enjoyed a happy marriage and valued his family for many years. However, in 2008, his marriage began to falter, and his wife began an extramarital affair. By the next year, the formerly happy couple was heading toward divorce, and Kahler allegedly became abusive toward his wife and estranged from their children. Kahler increasingly suffered from depression and obsessive compulsive disorder, and though he saw several psychologists and psychiatrists who prescribed antidepressants, anti-anxiety medications, and sleep aids, he refused to take his medications as directed.
In November 2009, Kahler went to his wife’s grandmother’s house, where his family was visiting, and shot and killed his wife, his two daughters, and the grandmother. Kahler was arrested, charged, and sentenced to death for the four killings. Experts for the defense and the prosecution agreed that Kahler exhibited major depressive disorder, obsessive-compulsive, borderline, paranoid, and narcissistic personality tendencies. The defense expert testified that, in his opinion, due to Kahler’s mental illness, he did not make the rational choice to kill his family members and indeed had at the time of the shooting temporarily “completely lost control.”
Under Kansas law, a jury cannot consider mental disease or defect as a defense to a crime except insofar as it shows “that the defendant lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged.” In effect, this law makes irrelevant “whether the defendant is unable to know the nature and quality of his actions or know the difference between right and wrong with…
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[18-489] Taggart v. Lorenzen
24 april 2019 · 54 min
Taggart v. Lorenzen Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 24, 2019.
Decided on Jun 3, 2019.Petitioner: Bradley Weston Taggart.
Respondent: Shelley A. Lorenzen, et al..Advocates:
Daniel L. Geyser (for the petitioner)
Sopan Joshi (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of neither party)
Nicole A. Saharsky (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In the words of the Ninth Circuit decision below, “[t]his case arises out of a complex set of bankruptcy proceedings.”
Petitioner Bradley Taggart is a real estate developer who owned 25% interest in Sherwood Park Business Center (“SPBC”). Respondents Terry Emmert and Keith Jehnke also each owned a 25% interest in SPBC. In 2007, Taggart purported to transfer his share of SPBC to his attorney, John Berman.
Emmert and Jehnke sued Taggart and Berman in Oregon state court, alleging that the transfer violated SPBC’s operating agreement by not allowing Emmert and Jehnke the right of first refusal. Emmert and Jehnke also sought attorneys’ fees. Taggart moved to dismiss the claim and filed a counterclaim for attorneys’ fees.
In November 2009, shortly before the case went to trial, Taggart filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The state-court action was stayed pending the resolution of the bankruptcy petition, and in February 2010, Taggart received his discharge in the bankruptcy proceedings.
After the discharge, Emmert and Jehnke, represented by attorney Stuart Brown, continued the state-court action. Taggart was largely absent from subsequent proceedings, although Berman renewed his motion to dismiss on Taggart’s behalf at the close of evidence. After a trial, the state court ruled in favor of Emmert and Jehnke and unwound the transfer of Taggart’s share of SPBC to Berman and expelled Taggart from the company. The state court entered a judgment that allowed any party to petition for attorneys’ fees, which…
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[17-778] Quarles v. United States
24 april 2019 · 56 min
Quarles v. United States Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 24, 2019.
Decided on Jun 10, 2019.Petitioner: Jamar Alonzo Quarles.
Respondent: United States of America.Advocates:
Jeremy C. Marwell (for the petitioner)
Zachary D. Tripp (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Jamar Quarles was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 922(g). At his original sentencing, the district court held that Quarles’s conviction for third-degree home invasion was a violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) but declined to rule whether the offense constituted generic burglary. Finding the felon-in-possession conviction to be a third offense under the ACCA, the court sentenced Quarles to 204 months in prison. In light of the US Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. __ (2015), in which it held unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the ACCA, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing. The district court found that Michigan’s crime of third-degree home invasion constituted a “violent felony” under the ACCA and resentenced Quarles to 204 months’ incarceration.
Under federal law, a generic burglary is “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Michigan law defines the crime of third-degree home invasion as breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, entering the dwelling without permission with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, or breaking and entering a dwelling and while entering or present in the dwelling, committing a misdemeanor. This third option of intent is the subject of the present dispute. Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit found unpersuasive Quarles’s argument that the Michigan…
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[17-9560] Rehaif v. United States
23 april 2019 · 55 min
Rehaif v. United States Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 23, 2019.
Decided on Jun 21, 2019.Petitioner: Hamid Mohamed Rehaif.
Respondent: United States of America.Advocates:
Rosemary T. Cakmis (for the petitioner)
Allon Kedem (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Hamid Mohamed Ahmed Ali Rehaif was present in the United States on an F-1 nonimmigrant student visa to study at Florida Institute of Technology. He was academically dismissed in December 2014, and his immigration status was terminated in February 2015. Rather than departing the country, Rehaif remained, and in December 2015 went to a shooting range, purchased a box of ammunition, and rented a firearm for an hour. Six days later, an employee at the hotel where Rehaif was staying reported to the police that Rehaif had been acting strangely. Following up on the tip, an FBI agent spoke with Rehaif, who admitted firing firearms at the shooting range and knowing that his student visa was out of status because he was no longer a student. Rehaif consented to a search of his hotel room, where agents found the remainder of the ammunition he purchased.
A federal grand jury charged Rehaif with two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits a person who “is illegally or unlawfully in the United States” from possessing “any firearm or ammunition.” The penalty for violating that statute, described in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), is a fine, imprisonment for up to 10 years, or both.
At trial, the government requested a jury instruction that “[t]he United States is not required to prove that the defendant knew that he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States.” Rehaif objected to this instruction, arguing that the government had to prove both that he had knowingly possessed a firearm and that he had known that he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States when he possessed the f…
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[18-6210] Mitchell v. Wisconsin
23 april 2019 · 1 uur 1 min
Mitchell v. Wisconsin Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 23, 2019.
Decided on Jun 27, 2019.Petitioner: Gerald P. Mitchell.
Respondent: State of Wisconsin.Advocates:
Andrew R. Hinkel (for the Petitioner)
Hannah S. Jurss (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In May 2013, Gerald P. Mitchell was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. He became lethargic on the way to the police station, so the arresting officers took him to a hospital instead. An officer read him a statutorily mandated form regarding the state implied consent law, but Mitchell was too incapacitated to indicate his understanding or consent and then fell unconscious. Without a warrant, at the request of the police, hospital workers drew Mitchell’s blood, which revealed his blood alcohol concentration to be .222.
Mitchell was charged with operating while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol concentration. He moved to suppress the results of the blood test on the ground that his blood was taken without a warrant and in the absence of any exceptions to the warrant requirement. The state argued that under the implied-consent statute, police did not need a warrant to draw his blood. Many states, including Wisconsin, have implied consent laws, which provide that by driving a vehicle, motorists consent to submit to chemical tests of breath, blood, or urine to determine alcohol or drug content. The trial court sided with the state and allowed the results of the blood test into evidence. Mitchell was convicted on both counts.
Mitchell appealed his conviction, and the court of appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin with respect to the issue “whether the warrantless blood draw of an unconscious motorist pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law...violates the Fourth Amendment.” The Supreme Court of Wisconsin accepted the certification and upheld the search 5–2, but without any majority for the rationale for uphol…
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[18-966] Department of Commerce v. New York
23 april 2019 · 1 uur 22 min
Department of Commerce v. New York Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 23, 2019.
Decided on Jun 27, 2019.Petitioner: United States Department of Commerce, et al..
Respondent: State of New York, et al..Advocates:
Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for Petitioners)
Barbara D. Underwood (on behalf of Respondents, New York, et al.)
Dale E. Ho (on behalf of Respondents, New York Immigration Coalition, et al.)
Douglas N. Letter (on behalf of the United States House of Representatives, as amicus curiae, in support of the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Secretary of Commerce Wilbur L. Ross issued a decision to reinstate a citizenship question on the 2020 Census questionnaire. The decision was challenged in federal court by a coalition of states, cities, and counties, with the challengers alleging that the question could cause a significant undercount because some households with individuals who are unlawfully present in the country would be deterred from responding. The challengers claim the Secretary’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that it violates various regulatory, statutory, and constitutional provisions.
As part of its challenge, the challengers sought—and the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, the venue for their action, authorized—depositions of high-ranking Executive Branch officials to determine Secretary Ross’s subjective motivations in making the decision at issue.
On October 5, 2018, Justice Ginsburg denied the government’s previous stay application without prejudice, “provided that the Court of Appeals will afford sufficient time for either party to seek relief in this Court before the depositions in question are taken.” The court of appeals denied mandamus relief to quash the deposition of Secretary Ross and the deposition of other high-ranking officials, so the government renewed its application for a stay. The Court then blocked the depo…
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[18-481] Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media
22 april 2019 · 1 uur 2 min
Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 22, 2019.
Decided on Jun 24, 2019.Petitioner: Food Marketing Institute.
Respondent: Argus Leader Media, d/b/a Argus Media.Advocates:
Evan A. Young (for the Petitioner)
Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae in support of Petitioner)
Robert M. Loeb (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Food Stamp Act of 1964 started one of the largest and fastest-growing welfare programs in the country. Formerly known as the Food Stamp Program, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) spent over $78 billion on over 46 million people in fiscal year 2012, as compared to the $75 million spent during its first year. Respondent Argus Leader Media, who runs a newspaper in South Dakota, invoked the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to seek information from the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) on how much money individual retailers received from taxpayers each year. The USDA refused to provide the information, citing numerous exemptions to FOIA.
Argus filed a lawsuit against the USDA in federal district court, which found that the USDA properly withheld the information under FOIA Exemption 3, which applies to information prohibited from disclosure by another federal law. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that Exemption 3 did not apply to the contested data, and remanded the case back to the district court. On remand, the issue before the court was whether Exemption 4—which covers “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential”—applied to the information sought.
For the purpose of applying Exemption 4, the circuit courts have adopted a definition of “confidential” different from the term’s ordinary meaning. Courts have held the term to mean that Exemption 4 applies only if disclosure is likel…
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[18-525] Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis
22 april 2019 · 54 min
Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 22, 2019.
Decided on Jun 3, 2019.Petitioner: Fort Bend County, Texas.
Respondent: Lois M. Davis.Advocates:
Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the Petitioner)
Raffi Melkonian (for the Respondent)
Jonathan C. Bond (for the United States, as amicus curiae in support of the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Lois Davis was an information technology (IT) supervisor for Fort Bend County, Texas. She filed a complaint with the county human resources department alleging that the IT director had sexually harassed and assaulted her, and following an investigation by the county, the director resigned. Davis alleges that after the director’s resignation, her supervisor—who was a personal friend of the director—retaliated against her for making the complaint.
Davis filed a charge with the Texas Workforce Commission alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. While the charge was pending, Davis allegedly informed her supervisor of a specific Sunday she could not work due to a “previous religious commitment,” and the supervisor did not approve the absence. Davis attended the event and did not report to work, and Fort Bend terminated her employment.
Davis submitted to the Commission an “intake questionnaire” in which she wrote in the word “religion” next to a checklist labeled “Employment Harms or Actions” but did not amend her charge of discrimination or explain the note. The Commission informed Davis that it had made a preliminary decision to dismiss her charge and issued a right-to-sue letter. Davis filed her lawsuit in federal district court alleging both retaliation and religious discrimination under Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county on all claims.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court as to the retaliation claim but reversed and remanded as to her religious discrimination claim, finding genuine disputes of material fact th…
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[18-431] United States v. Davis
17 april 2019 · 59 min
United States v. Davis Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 17, 2019.
Decided on Jun 24, 2019.Petitioner: United States of America.
Respondent: Maurice Lamont Davis and Andre Levon Glover.Advocates:
Eric J. Feigin (for the petitioner)
Brandon E. Beck (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
On November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Maurice Lamont Davis guilty on six counts, including the illegal use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (a “Hobbs Act robbery”) and the illegal use or carrying of a firearm to aid and abet conspiracy to commit a crime of violence. Also on November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Andre Levon Glover guilty on seven counts, including the two counts described above.
On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion on January 31, 2017, denying both defendants’ challenges and affirming the district court’s judgment below. The defendants petitioned the US Supreme Court for certiorari, and following the Court’s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. __ (2018), the Court remanded their case back to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of that decision. After requesting supplemental briefing from the parties on the effect of Dimaya, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) contains both an “elements clause” and a “residual clause.” The elements clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” and the residual clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it, “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” In Dimaya, the Court addressed (and invalidated) a residual clause identical to the residual clause in § 924(c) but did not address the eleme…
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[18-485] McDonough v. Smith
17 april 2019 · 59 min
McDonough v. Smith Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 17, 2019.
Decided on Jun 20, 2019.Petitioner: Edward G. McDonough.
Respondent: Youel Smith.Advocates:
Neal Kumar Katyal (for the petitioner)
Jeffrey B. Wall (for the United States, as amicus curiae)
Thomas J. O'Connor (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
During the 2009 Working Families Party primary election in Troy, New York, several individuals forged signatures and provided false information on absentee ballot applications in an attempt to affect the outcome of the primary. The individuals submitted the forged applications to the commissioner of the Rensselaer County elections board, Edward G. McDonough. McDonough approved the applications but later claimed that he did not know they had been forged.
After the plot was uncovered, the state court appointed Youel Smith as a special district attorney to lead the investigation and prosecution of those involved. McDonough claimed that Smith engaged in an elaborate scheme to frame McDonough for the crimes. According to McDonough, Smith knew that McDonough was innocent and fabricated evidence in the form of forged affidavits, false testimony, and faulty DNA methods. After the first trial ended in a mistrial, the second trial ended in McDonough’s acquittal on December 21, 2012.
On December 18, 2015, McDonough filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that Smith and the other defendants violated his due process rights by fabricating evidence and using it against him before a grand jury and in two trials. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming, among other things, that McDonough’s claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations because the allegedly fabricated evidence had been disclosed to McDonough over three years before he filed his Section 1983 claim.
The district court granted the motions to dismiss as to McDonough’s due process claims, citing the statute of limitations. …
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[18-389] Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd. v. Newton
16 april 2019 · 1 uur 2 min
Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd. v. Newton Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 16, 2019.
Decided on Jun 10, 2019.Petitioner: Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd..
Respondent: Brian Newton.Advocates:
Paul D. Clement (for the petitioner)
Christopher G. Michel (for the Unted States, as amicus curiae, in support of petitioner)
David C. Frederick (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Respondent Brian Newton worked for Parker Drilling Management Services on a drilling platform fixed on the outer Continental Shelf, off the coast of Santa Barbara, California. His shifts lasted fourteen days, and he regularly worked twelve hours per day. He alleges that he usually took fifteen to thirty minutes during his shifts to eat without clocking out and that Parker did not provide 30-minute meal periods for each five hours worked, as required under California law. After Parker terminated him, Newton sued in state court for wage and hour violations under California law. Parker removed the case to federal court and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion, finding that under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is a comprehensive statutory scheme that leaves no room for state law to address wage and hour grievances arising on the Outer Continental Shelf. The district court recognized that the FLSA contains a clause that expressly allows for more protective state wage and overtime laws but held nonetheless that California’s laws offered Newton no protections.
A panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal on the pleadings, finding that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act allows the laws of adjacent states to apply to drilling platforms as long as state law is “applicable” and “not inconsistent” with federal law. California’s wage and hour laws are not inconsistent with the FLSA, so the district court erred in dismi…
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[18-457] North Carolina Department of Revenue v. The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust
16 april 2019 · 1 uur 2 min
North Carolina Department of Revenue v. The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 16, 2019.
Decided on Jun 21, 2019.Petitioner: North Carolina Department of Revenue.
Respondent: The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust.Advocates:
Matthew W. Sawchak (for the petitioner)
David A. O'Neil (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 1992, Joseph Lee Rice III established in New York an inter vivos trust with William B. Matteson as trustee and Rice’s descendants as the primary beneficiaries (none of whom lived in North Carolina at the time of creation). In 2002, the original trust was divided into three separate trusts, one for each of Rice’s children. One of these trusts was the Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust (“the Trust”), benefitting his daughter Kimberley Rice Kaestner, who, at the time of the division, was a resident and domiciliary of North Carolina.
In 2005, Matteson resigned as trustee for the three trusts, and Rice appointed a successor trustee, who resided in Connecticut. From 2005 to 2008, the Trust paid state income taxes on income accumulated during those years, despite that no funds were distributed. In 2009, representatives of the Trust filed a claim for a refund of taxes paid to the North Carolina Department of Revenue, which the Department denied. The representatives brought suit in state court, asking the court to require the Department to refund all taxes paid and declare unconstitutional the state statute enabling the Department to collect taxes from the foreign trust. The judge granted the Department’s motion to dismiss the claim for injunctive relief but denied the motion as to the constitutional claims. Both parties then filed motions for summary judgment as to the constitutional claims. Finding the state statute unconstitutional as applied, the state court granted the Trust’s motion for summary judgment. The Department appealed.
The The Due Process…
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[18-302] Iancu v. Brunetti
15 april 2019 · 56 min
Iancu v. Brunetti Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 15, 2019.
Decided on Jun 24, 2019.Petitioner: Andrei Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office.
Respondent: Erik Brunetti.Advocates:
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the petitioner)
John R. Sommer (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Erik Brunetti owns the clothing brand “fuct,” founded in 1990. In 2011, two individuals filed an intent-to-use application for the mark FUCT, and the original applicants assigned the application to Brunetti. The examining attorney refused to register the mark under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, finding it comprised immoral or scandalous matter (the pronunciation of “fuct” sounds like a vulgar word) in violation of that section. Brunetti requested reconsideration and appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed the examining attorney’s refusal to register the mark. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that while the Board did not err in concluding the mark should be excluded under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, that section’s bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks is an unconstitutional restriction of free speech.
Question
Does Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, which prohibits the federal registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” marks, violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?
Conclusion
The Lanham Act prohibition on the registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks infringes the First Amendment. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. __ (2017), the Court held that a prohibition on registration of marks based on their viewpoint violates the First Amendment, and that a provision of the Lanham Act prohibiting registration of “disparaging” marks was viewpoint based. A prohibition on the registration of marks that are “immoral” or “scandalous”—at issue in this case…
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[18-459] Emulex Corp. v. Varjabedian
15 april 2019 · 1 uur 2 min
Emulex Corp. v. Varjabedian Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 15, 2019.
Decided on Apr 23, 2019.Petitioner: Emulex Corporation, et al..
Respondent: Gary Varjabedian and Jerry Mutza.Advocates:
Gregory G. Garre (for the petitioners)
Morgan L. Ratner (for the United States, as amicus curiae)
Daniel L. Geyser (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Emulex Corp., a Delaware company that sold computer components, and Avago Technologies Wireless Manufacturing, Inc., announced in February 2015 that they had entered into a merger agreement, with Avago offering to pay $8.00 for every share of outstanding Emulex stock, which was 26.4% higher than the value of Emulex stock the day before the merger was announced. Pursuant to the terms of the merger agreement, Emerald Merger Sub, Inc., initiated a tender offer for Emulex’s outstanding stock in April 2015. (A tender offer is a type of takeover bid in which the offeror publicly offers to purchase a specified amount of the target company’s stock, usually at a price higher than market value.)
It is customary for the target company to issue a statement to shareholders recommending that they either accept or reject the tender offer. Before issuing such a statement, Emulex hired Goldman Sachs to determine whether the proposed merger agreement would be fair to shareholders. Goldman Sachs determined that it would be fair, despite a below-average merger premium, and Emulex issued a statement consistent with that determination. Some of the shareholders were unhappy with the merger’s terms and brought a class action lawsuit against Emulex, Avago, Merger Sub, and the Emulex Board of Directors, alleging violations of federal securities laws.
The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the lead plaintiff’s claim under Section 14(e) did not plead the requisite mental culpability for claims under that section, the separate claim under Section 14(d) failed because tha…
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[18-15] Kisor v. Wilkie
27 maart 2019 · 1 uur 2 min
Kisor v. Wilkie Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 27, 2019.
Decided on Jun 26, 2019.Petitioner: James L. Kisor.
Respondent: Robert L. Wilkie.Advocates:
Paul W. Hughes (for the petitioner)
Noel J. Francisco (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Petitioner James L. Kisor is a veteran of the US Marine Corps who served in the Vietnam War. In 1982, Kisor filed a claim for disability benefits with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) asserting that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of his service in Vietnam. Ultimately, the VA denied his claim in May 1983. In June 2006, Kisor sought review of his previously denied claim, and the VA granted him relief under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a), which allows a petitioner to “reopen” a denial by “submitting new and material evidence.” In his 2006 petition, Kisor identified materials supporting his claim that existed in 1983 but which were not associated with his file.
Notably, the VA did not grant Kisor relief under Section 3.156(c), which authorizes the agency to “reconsider” a previously denied claim in the event that it “receives or associates with the claims file relevant official service department records that existed and had not been associated with the claims file when VA first decided the claim.” This provision is more favorable to veterans because it provides for a retroactive effective date for any benefits awarded, whereas benefits granted under Section 3.156(a) are effective only on the date the application to reopen was filed.
The VA’s decision (technically made by the Board of Veterans Appeals) relied on the meaning of the term “relevant” as used in 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1). The VA found that the additional documents (Kisor’s Form 214 and the Combat History document) did not qualify as “relevant” for purposes of this section because it did not “suggest or better yet establish that [petitioner] has PTSD as a current disability.” …
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[18-422] Rucho v. Common Cause
26 maart 2019 · 1 uur 11 min
Rucho v. Common Cause Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Mar 26, 2019.
Decided on Jun 27, 2019.Appellant: Robert A. Rucho, et al..
Appellee: Common Cause, et al..Advocates:
Paul D. Clement (for the appellants)
Emmet J. Bondurant, II (for the appellees, Common Cause, et al.)
Allison J. Riggs (for the appellees, League of Women Voters of North Carolina, et al.)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
A three-judge district court struck down North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map, ruling that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the map and that the map was the product of partisan gerrymandering. The district court then enjoined the state from using the map after November 2018. North Carolina Republicans, led by Robert Rucho, head of the senate redistricting committee, appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.
Question
Do the plaintiffs in this case have standing to pursue their partisan gerrymandering claims?
Are the plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering claims justiciable?
Is North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander?
Conclusion
Partisan gerrymandering claims are not justiciable because they present a political question beyond the reach of the federal courts.
Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the 5-4 majority opinion. Federal courts are charged with resolving cases and controversies of a judicial nature. In contrast, questions of a political nature are “nonjusticiable,” and the courts cannot resolve such questions. Partisan gerrymandering has existed since prior to the independence of the United States, and, aware of this occurrence, the Framers chose to empower state legislatures, “expressly checked and balanced by the Federal Congress” to handle these matters. While federal courts can resolve “a variety of questions surrounding districting,” including racial gerrymandering, it is beyond their power to decide the central question: when has political gerrymandering gone…
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[18-726] Lamone v. Benisek
26 maart 2019 · 1 uur
Lamone v. Benisek Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 26, 2019.
Decided on Jun 27, 2019.Appellant: Linda H. Lamone, et al..
Appellee: O. John Benisek, et al..Advocates:
Steven M. Sullivan (for the appellant)
Michael B. Kimberly (for the appellees)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
This is the second time this case regarding partisan gerrymandering in Maryland comes before the Supreme Court. In Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. __ (2018), the Court heard the case and issued a per curiam (unsigned) opinion that did not resolve the substantive legal questions. Rather, in that opinion the Court emphasized that the case was in its early stages and that the Court was reviewing the district court’s decision under a lenient standard—abuse of discretion. Under that standard, the Court found that the district court’s ruling (denying the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction barring the state from enforcing the redistricting plan and requiring it to implement a new map for the 2018 midterm elections) was not unreasonable.
After the Court decided Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. __ (2018)—holding that the Democratic voter plaintiffs in Wisconsin had failed to demonstrate Article III standing based on claims of statewide injury due to unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering—the district court in the Maryland case held another hearing. This time, the district court ruled for the plaintiffs and ordered the state to draw a new map for the 2020 election. Maryland appealed to the Supreme Court.
Question
Are the various legal claims articulated by the three-judge district court unmanageable?
Did the three-judge district court err in granting the plaintffs’ motion for summary judgment?
Did the three-judge district court abuse its discretion in entering an injunction despite the plaintiffs’ years-long delay in seeking injunctive relief?
Conclusion
Partisan gerrymandering claims are not justiciable because they present a political question…
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[17-1705] PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic Inc.
25 maart 2019 · 1 uur
PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic Inc. Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 25, 2019.
Decided on Jun 20, 2019.Petitioner: PDR Network, LLC, et al..
Respondent: Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc..Advocates:
Carter G. Phillips (for the petitioners)
Glenn L. Hara (for the respondent)
Rachel P. Kovner (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Petitioner PDR Network is a company that “delivers health knowledge products and services” to healthcare providers and is perhaps most known for publishing the Physicians’ Desk Reference, a popular reference book with information on various prescription drugs. In December 2013, PDR Network sent by fax to Carlton & Harris, a chiropractic office in West Virginia, an advertisement for a free eBook version of the 2014 Physicians’ Desk Reference. The material advised that the recipient had received the offer “because you are a member of the PDR Network.”
On behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated recipients of faxes from PDR Network, Carlton & Harris sued PDR Network in federal court under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, which generally prohibits the use of a fax machine to send “unsolicited advertisement[s].” Under that statute, the recipient of an unsolicited fax advertisement can sue the sender for damages and recover actual monetary loss or $500 in statutory damages for each violation. If a court finds the sender “willfully or knowingly violated” the TCPA, the recipient is entitled to triple damages.
As a preliminary matter, the court found that the Hobbs Act does not require the court to defer to the FCC’s interpretation of an unambiguous term. Substituting its own definition of “unsolicited advertisement” for the FCC’s definition of the term, which was promulgated by rule in 2006 (“20…
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[18-266] The Dutra Group v. Batterton
25 maart 2019 · 57 min
The Dutra Group v. Batterton Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 25, 2019.
Decided on Jun 24, 2019.Petitioner: The Dutra Group.
Respondent: Christopher Batterton.Advocates:
Seth P. Waxman (for the petitioner)
David C. Frederick (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Respondent Christopher Batterton was a deckhand on a vessel owned and operated by the the petitioner, Dutra Group. While Batterton was working on the vessel, a hatch cover blew open and crushed his hand. The hatch cover blew open because the vessel lacked a particular exhaust mechanism, the lack of which made the vessel unseaworthy as a matter of law.
The district court denied Dutra Group’s motion to strike the claim for punitive damages, and the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
In Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit held that “punitive damages are available under general maritime law for claims of unseaworthiness,” as distinguished from Jones Act claims, where punitive damages are unavailable. Dutra Group argues that Evich is implicitly overruled by the US Supreme Court’s decision in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990), which holds that loss of society damages are unavailable in a general maritime action for wrongful death and lost future earnings are unavailable in a general maritime survival action.
The Ninth Circuit found unpersuasive Dutra Group’s argument, finding that the Court in Miles considered only damages for loss of society and of future earnings, not punitive damages. While Miles does limit recovery for “pecuniary loss,” punitive damages are not “pecuniary loss,” which means simply loss of money. Thus, Miles left undisturbed the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Evich.
Question
Are punitive damages available to a seaman in a personal injury lawsuit alleging a breach of the general maritime duty to provide a seaworthy vessel?
Conclusion
A plaintiff may not recover punitive damages on a m…
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[17-9572] Flowers v. Mississippi
20 maart 2019 · 54 min
Flowers v. Mississippi Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 20, 2019.
Decided on Jun 21, 2019.Petitioner: Curtis Giovanni Flowers.
Respondent: State of Mississippi.Advocates:
Sheri Lynn Johnson (for the petitioner)
Jason Davis (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 1996, four employees of Tardy Furniture Store in Winona, Mississippi, were killed during an armed robbery. Curtis Giovanni Flowers was tried for the murder of one of the employees and was convicted and sentenced to death. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the ground that Flowers’s right to a fair trial had been violated by admission of evidence of the other three murder victims. Flowers was tried and convicted for the murder of a second victim of the same incident, and the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the same grounds. In a third trial, Flowers was tried for all four murders, and a jury found him guilty and sentenced him to death. Finding that prosecutor Doug Evans had engaged in racial discrimination during jury selection, the Mississippi Supreme Court again reversed and remanded. The fourth and fifth trials were on all four counts of capital murder, and both resulted in mistrials when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict during the guilt phase.
In the sixth trial, Flowers was tried again and convicted for all four murders.
Flowers appealed his conviction on several grounds, one of which was that the State violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during the jury selection process by exercising its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory way. The prosecution had struck five African American prospective jurors. The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected Flowers’s arguments as to the jury selection, but the US Supreme Court ordered the court to reconsider in light of its ruling in Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. ___ (2016), where it held that the defendant in a capi…
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[18-315] Cochise Consultancy Inc. v. United States, ex rel. Hunt
19 maart 2019 · 56 min
Cochise Consultancy Inc. v. United States, ex rel. Hunt Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 19, 2019.
Decided on May 13, 2019.Petitioner: Cochise Consultancy, Inc. et al..
Respondent: United States, ex rel. Billy Joe Hunt.Advocates:
Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. (for the petitioners)
Earl N. Mayfield III (for the respondent)
Matthew Guarnieri (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The US Department of Defense awarded petitioner The Parsons Corporation a $60 million contract to perform munitions cleanup in Iraq. One component of the contract was that Parsons must provide adequate security to its employees who would be performing the cleanup. After seeking bids for a subcontract, a Parsons committee awarded it to ArmorGroup. Although petitioner Cochise Consultancy had submitted a bid, it did not win the subcontract. However, an Army Corps of Engineers contracting officer, Wayne Shaw, whom Cochise had allegedly bribed undertook elaborate efforts—including forgery, deception, and threats—to induce Parsons to award the subcontract to Cochise rather than to ArmorGroup. One employee in particular refused to award the subcontract to Cochise, believing that the award was made in violation of government regulations. That employee was replaced, and his replacement allowed the award of the subcontract to Cochise to move forward.
From February to September 2006, Cochise provided security services under the subcontract. Each month, the US government paid Cochise at least $1 million more than it would have paid ArmorGroup had ArmorGroup been awarded the subcontract, plus other expenses related to Cochise not being adequately equipped to perform the services required. In 2006, Shaw, who had orchestrated the fraudulent award of the subcontract to Cochise, rotated out of Iraq, and Parsons immediately reopened the subcontract for bid…
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[17-1606] Smith v. Berryhill
18 maart 2019 · 55 min
Smith v. Berryhill Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 18, 2019.
Decided on May 28, 2019.Petitioner: Ricky Lee Smith.
Respondent: Nancy A. Berryhill.Advocates:
Michael B. Kimberly (for the petitioner)
Michael R. Huston (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of reversal and remand)
Deepak Gupta (Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 1987, Ricky Lee Smith filed an application for supplemental security income (SSI) resulting from disability. The following year, an administrative law judge (ALJ) approved his application, and Smith received benefits until 2004, when he was found to be over the resource limit.
Smith filed another application for SSI in August 2012, alleging additional medical conditions as a result of his original disability. The claim was initial denied, and denied again upon reconsideration.
Smith filed a timely request for a hearing before an ALJ, and after the hearing, an ALJ denied Smith’s claim on March 26, 2014. Smith claims to have mailed a written request for review before the Appeals Council on April 24, 2014, and followed up by fax on September 21, 2014. A claims representative spoke with Smith on October 1, 2014, to inform him that his request may not have been received and that his request was filed as of that day, October 1, 2014.
The Appeals Council dismissed the request for review as untimely, as Smith proffered no evidence showing the request for was sent within the appropriate time. Smith filed a civil action seeking review of the Appeals Council’s dismissal. The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim because the Appeals Council’s dismissal did not constitute a final decision subject to judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Question
Is the decision of the Appeals Council dismissing a disability claim on the grounds that it is untim…
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[18-281] Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill
18 maart 2019 · 1 uur 1 min
Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 18, 2019.
Decided on Jun 17, 2019.Appellant: Virginia House of Delegates, et al..
Appellee: Golden Bethune-Hill, et al..Advocates:
Paul D. Clement (for the appellants)
Morgan L. Ratner (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of neither party)
Toby J. Heytens (Solicitor General of Virginia, for Appellees Virginia State Board of Elections et al.)
Marc E. Elias (for Appellees Golden Bethune-Hill et al.)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
This civil action first arose in 2014, when 12 Virginia voters alleged racial gerrymandering in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That case ultimately went before the US Supreme Court, and in 2017, the Court held that a lower court had applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating the challengers’ claims of racial gerrymandering. The Court upheld one of the districts and remanded the case for the lower court to reconsider the districting in the remaining 11 districts.
In June 2018, the lower court struck down the 11 districts as unconstitutional, finding that race was the main factor used to determine the boundaries for the districts. The court found that the legislature failed to prove that the districts as drawn, which attempted to put the exact same percentage of African American adults in each district, were necessary to comply with federal voting-rights laws.
The Virginia House of Delegates appealed the district court’s decision to the Supreme Court, and the Court agreed to review the case, as well as the preliminary question whether the House of Delegates has judicial standing to appeal.
Question
Did the district court err in holding that the plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence that race predominated over traditional districting factors in the construction of the 11 remaining challenged distri…
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[17-1717] The American Legion v. American Humanist Association
27 februari 2019 · 1 uur 14 min
The American Legion v. American Humanist Association Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Feb 27, 2019.
Decided on Jun 20, 2019.Petitioner: The American Legion, et al..
Respondent: American Humanist Association, et al..Advocates:
Neal Kumar Katyal (for the petitioner in No. 18-18)
Michael A. Carvin (for the petitioners in No. 17-1717)
Jeffrey B. Wall (Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Monica L. Miller (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In Bladensburg, Maryland, as part of a memorial park honoring veterans is a 40-foot tall cross, which is the subject of this litigation. Construction on the cross began in 1918, and it was widely described using Christian terms and celebrated in Christian services. In 1961, Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission acquired the cross and the land, as well as the responsibility to maintain, repair, and otherwise care for the cross. The Commission has spent approximately $117,000 to maintain and repair the cross, and in 2008, it set aside an additional $100,000 for renovations.
Several non-Christian residents of Prince George’s County, Maryland, expressed offense at the cross, which allegedly amounts to governmental affiliation with Christianity. American Humanist Association is a nonprofit organization advocating for separation of church and state. Together, AHA and the individual residents sued the Commission under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Commission’s display and maintenance of the cross violates the Establishment Clause. Applying the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the district court found that the Commission did not violate the Establishment Clause because (1) the cross has a secular purpose, (2) it neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) it does not have a primary effect of endorsing religion. The Fourth Circuit reversed and rem…
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[17-1672] United States v. Haymond
26 februari 2019 · 56 min
United States v. Haymond Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Feb 26, 2019.
Decided on Jun 26, 2019.Petitioner: United States of America.
Respondent: Andre Ralph Haymond.Advocates:
Eric J. Feigin (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)
William D. Lunn (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Andre Ralph Haymond was convicted by a jury of one count of possession and attempted possession of child pornography and was sentenced to 38-months’ imprisonment followed by ten years of supervised release. Two years into his supervised release, probation officers conducted a surprise search of Haymond’s apartment and seized several devices. After conducting a forensic examination of the devices, officers found evidence that the devices had recently contained child pornography. Based on these findings, Haymond’s probation officer alleged that Haymond had committed five violations of his supervised release, the relevant one of which was the possession of child pornography, in violation of the mandatory condition that Haymond not commit another federal, state, or local crime.
The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Haymond had possessed child pornography, which triggered a mandatory minimum sentence of five years’ incarceration under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k). Haymond challenged the district court’s findings, arguing, among other things, that the statute violates his constitutional rights by subjecting him to imprisonment based on facts not found by a jury. The Tenth Circuit agreed with Haymond’s constitutional arguments. It affirmed the district court’s revocation of his supervised release but vacated his sentence and remanded for sentencing.
Question
Does 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by imposing a mandatory minimum punishment on a criminal defendant upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant engaged in certain c…
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[17-8995] Mont v. United States
26 februari 2019 · 1 uur
Mont v. United States Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Feb 26, 2019.
Decided on Jun 3, 2019.Petitioner: Jason J. Mont.
Respondent: United States of America.Advocates:
Vanessa F. Malone (for the petitioner)
Jenny Ellickson (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Petitioner Jason Mont was convicted for federal drug-related offenses in 2005 and sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. He was released on March 6, 2012, so by his sentence he was subject to supervised release until March 6, 2017.
While on supervised release, Mont allegedly engaged in and was indicted for state-law offenses. In October 2016, Mont pleaded guilty to some of the state-court charges in exchange for a predetermined six-year sentence. Due to administrative delays and a series of continuances, Mont was sentenced on March 21, 2017. The sentencing judge credited as time served the roughly ten months Mont had spent incarcerated pending a disposition. On March 30, 2017, Mont’s probation officer informed the federal district court of Mont’s state-court convictions and sentences, and the court exercised jurisdiction to adjudicate whether he violated the terms of his supervised release. The district court then sentenced Mont to 42 months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively with his imprisonment for state-court convictions.
Mont challenged the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction, but the US Court of Appeals held that under binding precedent, a term of supervised release is paused by imprisonment in connection with a new state conviction. As such, the federal district court properly exercised jurisdiction.
Question
Is the term of supervised release for one offense paused by imprisonment for another offense?
Conclusion
Pretrial detention later credited as time served for a new conviction tolls (pauses) a supervised-release term unde…