Alle afleveringen
495 afleveringen, van nieuw naar oud
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[19-546] Brownback v. King
9 november 2020 · 1 uur 4 min
Brownback v. King Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 9, 2020.
Decided on Feb 25, 2021.Petitioner: Douglas Brownback, et al..
Respondent: James King.Advocates:
Michael R. Huston (for the petitioners)
Patrick M. Jaicomo (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Two undercover FBI agents mistakenly identified petitioner James King as a criminal suspect and approached him. The parties differed in their account of the facts as to whether the agents identified themselves as police officers, but King apparently perceived he was being mugged and resisted their attempts to restrain him. A violent fight ensued, in which the officers severely beat King until onlookers called 911 and local police arrived on the scene. The local police officers ordered bystanders to delete video footage of the altercation because the videos could reveal the identities of undercover FBI officers. King was taken to the hospital, where he received medical treatment and was discharged. On his discharge, police arrested him and took him to Kent County Jail, where he spent the weekend in jail before posting bail and visiting another hospital for further examination. Prosecutors pursued charges, but a jury acquitted King of all charges.
King then filed a lawsuit against the United States and both FBI agents, alleging that the agents violated his clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an unreasonable seizure and by using excessive force. In general, the United States and its agents are immune from liability under the principle of sovereign immunity. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives sovereign immunity in specific situations, and the plaintiff bringing an FTCA claim bears the burden of showing his claim falls within such situations. The FTCA also contains a “judgment bar” provision that precludes a plaintiff from bringing additional claims concerning the “same subject matter” as an FTCA claim after a judgment is entered on the FTCA …
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[19-863] Niz-Chavez v. Garland
9 november 2020 · 1 uur 10 min
Niz-Chavez v. Garland Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 9, 2020.
Decided on Apr 29, 2021.Petitioner: Augusto Niz-Chavez.
Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General.Advocates:
David J. Zimmer (for the petitioner)
Anthony A. Yang (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Agusto Niz-Chavez, a Guatemalan native and citizen, came to the United States without inspection in 2005. On March 26, 2013, he was served with a notice to appear before an immigration judge at a date and time to be determined later, and approximately two months later, on May 29, 2013, he received a notice of hearing in removal proceedings. Niz-Chavez made an appearance at the hearing on June 25, 2013, where he conceded removability and stated his intent to seek withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and relief under the Convention Against Torture.
After a hearing on the merits, the immigration judge denied both applications, and Niz-Chaves appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. In addition to challenging the immigration judge’s conclusions, Niz-Chavez asked the Board to remand the case in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Pereira v. Sessions, in which the Court held that a notice to appear that does not include the specific time and place of the noncitizen's removal proceedings does not trigger the stop-time rule under §1229(a) of the INA. Niz-Chavez argued that under Pereira, he was now eligible for cancellation because of the deficiency of the notice to appear he received. The Board affirmed the immigration judge’s decision and denied the motion to remand, finding that Niz-Chavez was not eligible for cancellation under Pereira. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied Niz-Chavez’s petition for review of each of the challenged decisions by the Board.
Question
Under Section 1229(a), must the government serve a specific document that includes all required informati…
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[19-123] Fulton v. City of Philadelphia
4 november 2020 · 1 uur 52 min
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Nov 4, 2020.
Decided on Jun 17, 2021.Petitioner: Sharonell Fulton, et al..
Respondent: City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, et al..Advocates:
Lori H. Windham (for the petitioners)
Hashim M. Mooppan (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Neal Kumar Katyal (for respondents Philadelphia et al.)
Jeffrey L. Fisher (for respondents Support Center for Child Advocates and Philadelphia Family Pride)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In March 2018, the City of Philadelphia barred Catholic Social Services (CSS) from placing children in foster homes because of its policy of not licensing same-sex couples to be foster parents. CSS sued the City of Philadelphia, asking the court to order the city to renew their contract. CSS argued that its right to free exercise of religion and free speech entitled it to reject qualified same-sex couples because they were same-sex couples, rather than for any reason related to their qualifications to care for children.
The district court denied CSS’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the City’s non-discrimination policy was a neutral, generally applicable law and that CSS had not demonstrated that the City targeted CSS for its religious beliefs or was motivated by ill will against its religion.
Question
1. To succeed on their free exercise claim, must plaintiffs prove that the government would allow the same conduct by someone who held different religious views, or only provide sufficient evidence that a law is not neutral and generally applicable?
2. Should the Court revisit its decision in Employment Division v. Smith?
3. Does the government violate the First Amendment by conditioning a religious agency’s ability to participate in the foster care system on taking actions and making statements that directly contradict the agency’s religious belief…
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[19-5410] Borden v. United States
3 november 2020 · 1 uur 12 min
Borden v. United States Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 3, 2020.
Decided on Jun 10, 2021.Petitioner: Charles Borden, Jr..
Respondent: United States of America.Advocates:
Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the petitioner)
Eric J. Feigin (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Police caught Charles Borden, Jr., with a pistol during a traffic stop in April 2017, and he subsequently pleaded guilty possessing that firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the government recommended sentencing Borden as an armed career criminal, under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), based on three prior Tennessee aggravated assault convictions. Borden objected, arguing that one of his prior convictions—reckless aggravated assault—did not qualify as a “violent felony” under the “use of force” clause of the ACCA. Borden argued that reckless aggravated assault requires only a mental state of recklessness, and reckless use of force does not amount to a crime of violence under the ACCA. Retroactively applying Sixth Circuit precedent holding that reckless aggravated assault does constitute a violent felony under the “use of force” clause of the ACCA, the district court held that all three of Borden’s aggravated assault victims constituted “crime[s] of violence” under the ACCA and designated him as an armed career criminal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does the “use of force” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act encompass crimes with an intent requirement of mere recklessness?
Conclusion
The “use of force” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) does not encompass reckless aggravated assault. Justice Elena Kagan authored the four-justice plurality opinion. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment to reverse and remand the case.
The elements clause of the ACCA defines “violent felony” as an offense requiring the “use of physical force against the …
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[18-1259] Jones v. Mississippi
3 november 2020 · 1 uur 27 min
Jones v. Mississippi Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 3, 2020.
Decided on Apr 22, 2021.Petitioner: Brett Jones.
Respondent: Mississippi.Advocates:
David M. Shapiro (for the petitioner)
Krissy C. Nobile (for the respondent)
Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
When Brett Jones was fifteen years old, he stabbed his grandfather to death. He was convicted of murder, and the Circuit Court of Lee County, Mississippi, imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, and Mississippi law made him ineligible for parole. The appellate court affirmed his conviction and sentence. In a post-conviction relief proceeding, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ordered that Jones be resentenced after a hearing to determine whether he was entitled to parole eligibility. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. __ (2016). In Miller, the Court held that mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole sentences for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. And in Montgomery, it clarified that Miller barred life without the possibility of parole “for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” The circuit court held the hearing weighing the factors laid out in Miller and determined Jones was not entitled to parole eligibility.
Question
Does the Eighth Amendment require a sentencing authority to find that a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before it may impose a sentence of life without the possibility of parole?
Conclusion
A sentencing authority need not find a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of parole; a discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient to im…
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[19-199] Salinas v. United States Railroad Retirement Board
2 november 2020 · 1 uur 3 min
Salinas v. United States Railroad Retirement Board Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Nov 2, 2020.
Decided on Feb 3, 2021.Petitioner: Manfredo Salinas.
Respondent: United States Railroad Retirement Board.Advocates:
Sarah M. Harris (for the petitioner)
Austin L. Raynor (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2006, Petitioner Manfredo M. Salinas applied for a disability annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act, but the U.S. Railroad Retirement Board (“the Board”) denied his application. After the filing period had expired, Salinas sought reconsideration, which the Board also denied, based on its conclusion that Salinas had not shown good cause for missing the deadline. Salinas did not pursue any further action on his application, so the Board’s denial became a final decision on February 9, 2007.
Nearly seven years later, in 2013, Salinas filed a new application for a disability annuity. The Board granted him an annuity, but Salinas appealed the annuity's beginning date and amount. During that appeal, Salinas asked the Board to reopen all its decisions on his prior applications, including the decision denying his 2006 application. After a hearing, a Board hearing officer concluded that Salinas's 2006 application was beyond the four-year timeframe for reopening based on new and material evidence or administrative error under the Board's regulations. Salinas then asked the U.S. Court of Appeals to review the Board's decision not to reopen his 2006 application. Following its own binding precedent holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review a Board decision declining to reopen a prior benefits claim, the Fifth Circuit dismissed Salinas’s petition.
Question
Does a decision by the Railroad Retirement Board denying a request to reopen a prior benefits claim constitute a “final decision” subject to judicial review?
Conclusion
A decision by the Railroad Retirement Board denying a request to reopen a prior benefits …
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[19-547] U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service v. Sierra Club
2 november 2020 · 1 uur 10 min
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service v. Sierra Club Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Nov 2, 2020.
Decided on Mar 4, 2021.Petitioner: United States Fish and Wildlife Service, et al..
Respondent: Sierra Club, Inc..Advocates:
Matthew Guarnieri (for the petitioners)
Sanjay Narayan (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Industrial facilities, power plants, and other manufacturing complexes use water from lakes, rivers, estuaries, and oceans to cool their facilities through cooling water intake structures. Because these structures potentially cause significant harm to aquatic life, Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate their design and operation. In April 2011, the EPA proposed new regulations for cooling water intake structures. As part of the rule-making process and required by Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, in 2012, the EPA consulted with the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service about the potential impacts of the regulations and produced a written biological opinion on the impacts of the proposed agency action.
The Sierra Club made a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for records generated during the EPA’s rule-making process, including the documents generated as part of the consultation with the Services. The Services withheld some of the requested records, citing Exemption 5 of FOIA, which shields from disclosure documents subject to the “deliberative process privilege.” The district court determined that 12 of the 16 requested records were not protected to the privilege and ordered disclosure. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s order to disclose some of the records but reversed as to two of the records.
Question
Does Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act, by incorporating the deliberative process privilege, protect against compelled disclosure of …
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[19-292] Torres v. Madrid
14 oktober 2020 · 1 uur 17 min
Torres v. Madrid Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 14, 2020.
Decided on Mar 25, 2021.Petitioner: Roxanne Torres.
Respondent: Janice Madrid, et al..Advocates:
Kelsi B. Corkran (for the Petitioner)
Rebecca Taibleson (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur and remand)
Mark D. Standridge (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2014, Roxanne Torres was involved in an incident with police officers in which she was operating a vehicle under the influence of methamphetamine and in the process of trying to get away, endangered the two officers pursuing her. In the process, one of the officers shot and injured her. Torres pleaded no contest to three crimes: (1) aggravated fleeing from a law enforcement officer, (2) assault on a police officer, and (3) unlawfully taking a motor vehicle.
In October 2016, she filed a civil-rights complaint in federal court against the two officers, alleging claims including excessive force and conspiracy to engage in excessive force. Construing Torres’s complaint as asserting the excessive-force claims under the Fourth Amendment, the court concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. In the court’s view, the officers had not seized Torres at the time of the shooting, and without a seizure, there could be no Fourth Amendment violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Must physical force used to detain a suspect be successful to constitute a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment?
Conclusion
The application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure, even if the force does not succeed in subduing the person. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion.
Under the Court’s precedents, common law arrests are considered seizures under the Fourth Amendment, and the application of force to the body of a person with intent to restrain constitutes an arrest…
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[19-438] Pereida v. Wilkinson
14 oktober 2020 · 1 uur 4 min
Pereida v. Wilkinson Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 14, 2020.
Decided on Mar 4, 2021.Petitioner: Clemente Avelino Pereida.
Respondent: Robert M. Wilkinson, Acting Attorney General.Advocates:
Brian P. Goldman (for the Petitioner)
Jonathan C. Bond (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Clemente Avelino Pereida, a native and citizen of Mexico, pleaded no contest to a criminal charge in Nebraska, arising from his attempt to use a fraudulent social security card to obtain employment. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Pereida, and Pereida sought cancellation of the removal application. At issue is whether Pereida's criminal attempt conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude; if so, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, Pereida would be ineligible for cancellation of removal.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that it was Pereida’s burden to establish his eligibility for cancellation of removal. However, the court determined that it was not possible to ascertain which statutory subsection formed the basis for Pereida's conviction, so Pereida failed to meet his burden. Because Pereida did not establish that he was eligible for cancellation of removal, the court upheld the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that he did not show such eligibility and denied Pereida’s petition for review.
Question
Does a criminal conviction bar a noncitizen from applying for relief from removal when the record of conviction is ambiguous as to whether it corresponds to an offense listed in the Immigration and Nationality Act?
Conclusion
A nonpermanent resident seeking to cancel a lawful removal order must show that he has not been convicted of a disqualifying offense when the statutory conviction on his record is ambiguous regarding whether a disqualifying offense formed the basis of his conviction. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored th…
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[19-108] United States v. Briggs
13 oktober 2020 · 1 uur 1 min
United States v. Briggs Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 13, 2020.
Decided on Dec 10, 2020.Petitioner: United States of America.
Respondent: Michael J.D. Briggs.Advocates:
Jeffrey B. Wall (for the petitioner)
Stephen I. Vladeck (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2014, a general court-martial composed of a military judge alone found Michael Briggs guilty of rape in violation of Article 120(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 920(a) (2000), for conduct that occurred nine years earlier, in 2005. The UCMJ allows for a military offense that is punishable by death to be “tried and punished at any time without limitation.” In contrast, other military offenses are subject to a five-year statute of limitations.
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited a death sentence for rape of an adult woman, Briggs argued on appeal that rape was not “punishable by death” and thus was subject to the five-year statute of limitations for non-capital crimes. The United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) rejected his challenge because Briggs had not raised the statute of limitations claim at trial. The court therefore affirmed the finding and sentence of the judge below. Briggs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Reviewing for plain error, the C.A.A.F. reversed the lower court, finding that the Rules for Courts-Martial R.C.M. 907(b)(2)(B) requires the military judge to inform the accused of the right to assert the statute of limitations. As such, the court found that if the military judge had informed Briggs of a possible statute of limitations defense, he would have sought dismissal.
Question
Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces err in concluding—contrary to its own longstanding precedent—that the Uniform Code of Military Justice allows prosecution …
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[19-357] City of Chicago v. Fulton
13 oktober 2020 · 1 uur 22 min
City of Chicago v. Fulton Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 13, 2020.
Decided on Jan 14, 2021.Petitioner: City of Chicago, Illinois.
Respondent: Robbin L. Fulton, et al..Advocates:
Craig Goldblatt (for the petitioner)
Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
Eugene R. Wedoff (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The City of Chicago towed and impounded the Robbin Fulton’s vehicle for a prior citation of driving on a suspended license. Fulton filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy action treating the City as an unsecured creditor. The City filed an unsecured proof of claim, and the bankruptcy court confirmed Fulton’s plan. The City then amended its proof of claim and asserted its status as a secured creditor. It refused to return Fulton’s vehicle, and Fulton filed a motion for sanctions against the City.
The bankruptcy court held that the City was obligated to return the vehicle under Thompson v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2009), a binding case in which the Seventh Circuit had held that a creditor must comply with the automatic stay and return a debtor’s vehicle upon her filing of a bankruptcy petition. The City moved to stay the order in federal district court, and the court denied its request. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgment denying the City's request.
Question
Does the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C § 362, require that an entity that is passively retaining possession of property in which a bankruptcy estate has an interest return that property to the debtor or trustee immediately upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition?
Conclusion
The Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. § 362 prohibits only affirmative acts that would disturb the status quo of estate property at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed, not the mere passive retention of possession of the debtor’…
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[18-956] Google LLC v. Oracle America Inc.
7 oktober 2020 · 1 uur 36 min
Google LLC v. Oracle America Inc. Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 7, 2020.
Decided on Apr 5, 2021.Petitioner: Google LLC.
Respondent: Oracle America, Inc..Advocates:
Thomas C. Goldstein (for the petitioner)
E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for the respondent)
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
When Google implemented its Android Operating System (Android OS), it wrote its own programming language based on Java, which is owned by Oracle. To facilitate developers writing their own programs for Android OS, Google’s version used the same names, organization, and functionality as Java's Application Programming Interfaces (APIs).
Oracle sued Google for copyright infringement, but the federal district judge held that APIs are not subject to copyright because permitting a private entity to own the copyright to a programming language would stifle innovation and collaboration, contrary to the goals of copyright. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court, finding that the Java APIs are copyrightable but leaving open the possibility of a fair use defense. The U.S. Supreme Court denied Google’s petition for certiorari.
Upon remand to the district court, a jury found that Google's use of the Java API was fair use. Oracle appealed, and the Federal Circuit again reversed the lower court. The Federal Circuit held that Google's use was not fair as a matter of law.
Question
1. Does copyright protection extend to a software interface?
2. If so, does the petitioner’s use of a software interface in the context of creating a new computer program constitute fair use?Conclusion
Assuming a software interface may be subject to copyright protection, Google’s limited copying of the Java SE Application Programming Interface constituted a fair use of that material under copyright law. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 6-2 majority opin…
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[19-368] Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court
7 oktober 2020 · 1 uur 1 min
Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 7, 2020.
Decided on Mar 25, 2021.Petitioner: Ford Motor Company.
Respondent: Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, et al..Advocates:
Sean Marotta (for the petitioner)
Deepak Gupta (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2015, Markkaya Jean Gullett, a Montana resident, was driving a Ford Explorer on a Montana highway when the tread on one of her tires separated. She lost control of the vehicle and died as a result of the vehicle rolling into a ditch.
The personal representative of Gullett’s estate sued Ford Motor Co. in Montana state court, alleging design-defect, failure-to-warn, and negligence claims. Ford moved to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction.
For a state court to have personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the Due Process Clause requires that the court have either general personal jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction. A court has general personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if the defendant’s headquarters are within the state or if it is incorporated in the state. A court has specific personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if the plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s activities within the state.
Ford Motor Co. has its headquarters in Michigan and is incorporated in Delaware. Ford assembled the vehicle in Kentucky and first sold it to a dealership in Washington State. The dealership then sold it to an Oregon resident, who later sold the vehicle to a purchaser who brought it to Montana.
The district court denied Ford’s motion to dismiss, finding a “connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.” The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that by advertising and selling parts within the state of Montana, Ford had availed itself of the privilege of doing business in that state and was therefore s…
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[19-71] Tanzin v. Tanvir
6 oktober 2020 · 1 uur 1 min
Tanzin v. Tanvir Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 6, 2020.
Decided on Dec 10, 2020.Petitioner: FNU Tanzin, et al..
Respondent: Muhammad Tanvir, et al..Advocates:
Edwin S. Kneedler (for the petitioners)
Ramzi Kassem (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The plaintiffs, Muslim men born outside of the U.S. but living lawfully inside the country, allege that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) placed their names on the national “No Fly List,” despite posing no threat to aviation, in retaliation for their refusal to become FBI informants reporting on fellow Muslims. They sued the agents in their official and individual capacities in U.S. federal court under the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the RFRA. They claim that the listing of their names substantially burdened their exercise of religion, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), because their refusal was compelled by Muslim tenets. Under RFRA, “[a] person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.”
The U.S. District Court dismissed the claims against the agents in Appeals for the Second Circuit, a panel of which reversed the lower court. One of the agents, Tanzin, moved for rehearing en banc, which the court denied, over the dissent of several judges.
Question
Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, permit lawsuits seeking money damages against individual federal employees?
Conclusion
The express remedies of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) permit litigants to obtain money damages against federal officials in their individual capacities. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the unanimous (8-0) Court.
RFRA states that persons may sue and “obtain approp…
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[18-540] Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Management Association
6 oktober 2020 · 1 uur 12 min
Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Management Association Lees meer
Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 6, 2020.
Petitioner: Leslie Rutlege, Arkansas Attorney General.
Respondent: Pharmaceutical Care Management Association.Advocates:
Nicholas J. Bronni (for the petitioner)
Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
Seth P. Waxman (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2015, the legislature of Arkansas passed a law regulating the conduct of pharmacy benefits managers ("PBMs")—the entities that serve as intermediaries between health plans and pharmacies—in an attempt to address the trend in that state of significantly fewer independent and rural-serving pharmacies. PBMs perform numerous functions in this rule, including creating a maximum allowable cost ("MAC") list which sets reimbursement rates to pharmacies dispensing generic drugs. As a result of contracts between PBMs and some pharmacies, some other pharmacies might actually lose money on a particular prescription transaction. The Act sought to address this and other situations where the conduct of PBMs could cause harm to pharmacies.
Pharmaceutical Care Management Association (PCMA), a pharmacy trade association, filed a lawsuit on behalf of its members claiming, among other arguments, that Arkansas Act 900 is preempted by both ERISA and Medicare Part D. The district court found that ERISA did preempt some portions of the Act but that Medicare Part D did not preempt the Act.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that Act 900 was preempted by both ERISA and Medicare Part D. The appellate court noted that ERISA broadly preempts "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plans." Because Act 900 “both relates to and has a connection with employee benefit plans,” ERISA preempts it.
Question
Does ERISA preempt an Arkansas law r…
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[19-309] Carney v. Adams
5 oktober 2020 · 1 uur 1 min
Carney v. Adams Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 5, 2020.
Decided on Dec 10, 2020.Petitioner: John C. Carney, Governor of Delaware.
Respondent: James R. Adams.Advocates:
Michael W. McConnell (for the petitioner)
David L. Finger (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
James R. Adams is a resident of Delaware and member of that state’s bar. Adams considered applying for a judicial position but ultimately decided not to because the state required the candidate to be a Republican, and Adams was neither a Republican nor a Democrat.
Adams filed a lawsuit against the governor, challenging the provision of the Delaware Constitution that limits judicial service to members of the Democratic and Republican Parties. First, the district court held Adams had Article III (“constitutional”) standing as to some, but not all of the provisions, but that because he had prudential standing to the other provisions, it would consider his challenge as to all of them. Turning to the merits, the district court noted that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent in Elrod v. Burns and Branti v. Finkel, a government employer may not make employment decisions based on political allegiance except with respect to policymakers. The court found that a judge’s job is to apply, rather than create, the law, and thus that judges do not fall within the policymaking exception of Elrod and Burns. As such, the court found the provision unconstitutional in its entirety.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed only as to the provisions for which Adams lacked Article III standing.
Question
1. Does the plaintiff in this case have Article III standing to challenge Delaware’s judicial service requirements?
2. Does a state law that effectively limits judicial service to members of the Democratic and Republican parties violate the First Amendment?
Conclusion
Because Adams had not shown that he was “abl…
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[65-orig] Texas v. New Mexico
5 oktober 2020 · 1 uur 15 min
Texas v. New Mexico Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 5, 2020.
Decided on Dec 14, 2020.Petitioner: Texas.
Respondent: New Mexico.Advocates:
Kyle D. Hawkins (for the State of Texas)
Jeffrey J. Wechsler (for the State of New Mexico)
Masha G. Hansford (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting New Mexico)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Texas and New Mexico entered into the Pecos River Compact to resolve disputes about the Pecos River, which traverses both states. A River Master performs annual calculations of New Mexico's water delivery to ensure it complies with its Compact obligations. A party may seek the Supreme Court's review of the River Master's calculations within 30 days of its final determination.
In 2014 and 2015, after heavy rainfall, a federally owned reservoir in New Mexico retained large amounts of flood waters in the Pecos Basin. When the reservoir's authority to hold the water expired, it began to release the water. Texas could not use the released water, so it also released the water to make room for water flowing from New Mexico.
When the River Master calculated and reported New Mexico's obligations for 2014 and 2015, it did not reduce Texas's rights to delivery based on the evaporation of water stored in the federal reservoir in New Mexico that Texas could not use. The 30-day review period lapsed, and New Mexico filed no objection. However, in 2018, New Mexico filed a motion challenging the River Master's calculations. Rather than dismiss the untimely objection, the River Master modified the governing manual to allow retroactive changes to final reports, gave that modification retroactive effect, and amended the 2015 report to credit New Mexico for the evaporative loss.
Question
1. Did the River Master err in retroactively amending the River Master Manual?
2. Did the River Master err in charging Texas for evaporative losses?
Conclusion
Texas’s motion to review the Pecos Rive…
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[19-465] Chiafalo v. Washington
13 mei 2020 · 1 uur 14 min
Chiafalo v. Washington Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on May 13, 2020.
Decided on Jul 6, 2020.Petitioner: Peter Bret Chiafalo, Levi Jennet Guerra, and Esther Virginia John.
Respondent: State of Washington.Advocates:
Lawrence Lessig (for the petitioners)
Noah Purcell (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Under Washington State law, each political party with presidential candidates is required to nominate for the Electoral College electors from its party equal to the number of senators and representatives allotted to the state. Nominees must pledge to vote for the candidate of their party, and any nominee who does not vote for their party candidate is subject to a fine of up to $1,000. Washington, as is the case with all but two other states, has a “winner-take-all” electoral system, which means that all of a state’s electoral votes go to the winner of the popular vote in that state.
In the 2016 Presidential Election, petitioner Chiafolo and others were nominated as presidential electors for the Washington State Democratic Party. When Hillary Clinton and Tim Kaine won the popular vote in Washington State, the electors were required by law to cast their ballots for Clinton/Kaine. Instead, they voted for Colin Powell for President and a different individual for Vice President. The Washington secretary of state fined the electors $1,000 each for failing to vote for the nominee of their party in violation of state law.
The electors challenged the law imposing the fine as violating the First Amendment. An administrative law judge upheld the fine, and a state trial court on appeal affirmed.
This case was originally consolidated with a similar case arising in Colorado, Colorado Department of State v. Baca, No. 19-518, but is no longer consolidated as of the Court's order of March 10, 2020.
Question
Does a state law requiring presidential electors to vote the way state law directs or else be subject to a fine viol…
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[19-518] Colorado Department of State v. Baca
13 mei 2020 · 1 uur 1 min
Colorado Department of State v. Baca Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on May 13, 2020.
Decided on Jul 6, 2020.Petitioner: Colorado Department of State.
Respondent: Micheal Baca, et al..Advocates:
Philip J. Weiser (for the petitioner)
Jason Harrow (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Michael Baca, Polly Baca, and Robert Nemanich were appointed as three of Colorado’s nine presidential electors for the 2016 general election. Colorado law requires presidential electors to cast their votes for the winner of the popular vote in the state for President and Vice President. When Hillary Clinton won the popular vote in that state, instead of casting his vote for her, Mr. Baca cast his vote for John Kasich. The Colorado Secretary of State discarded his vote and removed him as an elector. As a result, Ms. Baca and Mr. Nemanich voted for Hillary Clinton, despite their desire to vote for John Kasich.
The three presidential electors sued the Colorado Department of State, alleging that the law requiring presidential electors to vote for the presidential candidate who wins the popular vote in that state violates their constitutional rights under Article II and the Twelfth Amendment of the federal Constitution. The district court dismissed the action, finding the electors lacked standing to bring the lawsuit, and in the alternative, because the electors failed to state a legal claim because the Constitution does not prohibit states from requiring electors to vote for the winner of the state’s popular vote. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court as to Mr. Baca’s standing, but reversed as to the standing of the other two electors who did not cast their votes in violation of the law. On the merits, the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court, finding the state’s removal of Mr. Baca and nullification of his vote were unconstitutional.
Question
1. Do the petitioners in this case, the president…
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[19-715] Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP
12 mei 2020 · 1 uur 36 min
Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on May 12, 2020.
Decided on Jul 9, 2020.Petitioner: Donald J. Trump, et al..
Respondent: Mazars USA, LLP, et al..Advocates:
Patrick Strawbridge (for the petitioners)
Jeffrey B. Wall (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Douglas N. Letter (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Reform issued a subpoena to Mazars USA, the accounting firm for Donald Trump (in his capacity as a private citizen) and several of his businesses, demanding private financial records belonging to Trump. According to the Committee, the requested documents would inform its investigation into whether Congress should amend or supplement its ethics-in-government laws. Trump argued that the information serves no legitimate legislative purpose and sued to prevent Mazars from complying with the subpoena.
The district court granted summary judgment for the Committee, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed, finding the Committee possesses the authority under both the House Rules and the Constitution.
In the consolidated case, Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 19-760, two committees of the U.S. House of Representatives—the Committee on Financial Services and the Intelligence Committee—issued a subpoena to the creditors of President Trump and several of his businesses. The district court denied Trump’s motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent compliance with the subpoenas, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in substantial part and remanded in part.
Question
Does the Constitution prohibit subpoenas issued to Donald Trump’s accounting firm requiring it to provide non-privileged financial records relating to Trump (as a private citizen) and some of his businesses?
Conclusion
The courts below did not take adequate account of the significant separatio…
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[19-635] Trump v. Vance
12 mei 2020 · 1 uur 41 min
Trump v. Vance Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on May 12, 2020.
Decided on Jul 9, 2020.Petitioner: Donald J. Trump.
Respondent: Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., in His Official Capacity as District Attorney of the County of New York, et al..Advocates:
Jay Alan Sekulow (for the petitioner)
Noel J. Francisco (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
Carey R. Dunne (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The district attorney of New York County issued a grand jury subpoena to an accounting firm that possessed the financial records of President Donald Trump and one of his businesses. Trump asked a federal court to restrain enforcement of that subpoena, but the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction and dismissed the case based on Supreme Court precedent regarding federal intrusion into ongoing state criminal prosecutions. The court held, in the alternative, that there was no constitutional basis to temporarily restrain or preliminarily enjoin the subpoena at issue.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court with respect to the alternative holding, finding that any presidential immunity from state criminal process does not extend to investigative steps like the grand jury subpoena. However, it found that the Supreme Court precedent on which the lower court relied did not apply to the situation and vacated the judgment as to that issue and remanded the case to the lower court.
Question
Does the Constitution permit a county prosecutor to subpoena a third-party custodian for the financial and tax records of a sitting president, over which the president has no claim of executive privilege?
Conclusion
Article II and the Supremacy Clause neither categorically preclude, nor require a heightened standard for, the issuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting President. All nine justices agreed that a President does not have absolute immunity from the issuanc…
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[18-9526] McGirt v. Oklahoma
11 mei 2020 · 1 uur 32 min
McGirt v. Oklahoma Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on May 11, 2020.
Decided on Jul 9, 2020.Petitioner: Jimcy McGirt.
Respondent: Oklahoma.Advocates:
Ian H. Gershengorn (for the petitioner)
Riyaz A. Kanji (for the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
Mithun Mansinghani (for the respondent)
Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Jimcy McGirt, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation was convicted of sex crimes against a child by the state of Oklahoma within the historical Creek Nation boundaries. He argued that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction over him because under the Indian Major Crimes Act, any crime involving a Native American victim or perpetrator, or occurring within recognized reservation boundaries, is subject to federal jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction.
Question
Can a state prosecute an enrolled member of the Creek Tribe for crimes committed within the historical Creek boundaries?
Conclusion
Land reserved for the Creek Nation since the 19th century remains “Indian country” under the Major Crimes Act (MCA), which grants the federal government exclusive jurisdiction to try certain major crimes committed by enrolled members of a tribe on that land. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 5-4 majority opinion holding that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prosecute Jimcy McGirt.
The Court first noted that all parties agreed that McGirt’s crimes were committed on lands described as belonging to the Creek Nation in an 1866 treaty and federal statute. Though the early treaties did not refer to the Creek lands as a “reservation,” the Court has held that similar language in treaties from the same era was sufficient to create a reservation. An 1856 treaty promised that “no portion” of Creek lands “would ever be embraced or included within, or annexed to, any Territory or State” and that the Creek Nation wo…
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[19-267] Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru
11 mei 2020 · 1 uur 39 min
Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on May 11, 2020.
Decided on Jul 8, 2020.Petitioner: Our Lady of Guadalupe School.
Respondent: Agnes Morrissey-Berru.Advocates:
Eric C. Rassbach (for the petitioners)
Morgan L. Ratner (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Agnes Deirdre Morrissey-Berru was an teacher at Our Lady of Guadalupe School and brought a claim against the school under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school on the basis that Morrissey-Berru was a “minister.” In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, the Supreme Court first recognized a ministerial exception, which exempts religious institutions from anti-discrimination laws in hiring employees deemed “ministers.”
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court, finding that Morrissey-Berru was not a “minister”; she had taken one course on the history of the Catholic church but otherwise did not have any religious credential, training, or ministerial background. Given that she did not hold herself out to the public as a religious leader or minister, the court declined to classify her as a minister for the purposes of the ministerial exception.
Question
Do the First Amendment’s religion clauses prevent civil courts from adjudicating employment-discrimination claims brought by an employee against her religious employer, when the employee carried out important religious functions but was not otherwise a “minister”?
Conclusion
The “ministerial exception,” which derives from the religion clauses of the First Amendment, prevents civil courts from adjudicating the former employee's discrimination claims in this case, and in the consolidated case, St. James School v. Biel, against the religious schools th…
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[19-631] Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants Inc.
6 mei 2020 · 1 uur 13 min
Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants Inc. Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on May 6, 2020.
Decided on Jul 6, 2020.Petitioner: William P. Barr, Attorney General; Federal Communications Commission.
Respondent: American Association of Political Consultants, Inc., et al..Advocates:
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the petitioners)
Roman Martinez (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 to address intrusive and unwanted phone calls to Americans. One provision of that Act—the automatic call ban—prohibits phone calls to cell phones that use “any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice.” As passed, the Act recognized two exceptions to the ban: automated calls “for emergency purposes” and those made to a cell phone with “the prior express consent of the called party.” In 2015, Congress amended the Act to add a third exception for calls made to cell phones “to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.” Moreover, automated calls made by the federal government itself are not barred by the automated call ban.
The American Association of Political Consultants, Inc. challenged this third provision of the Act, alleging that it violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by imposing a content-based restriction on speech. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, finding unpersuasive the free speech argument. The district court applied strict scrutiny review (testing whether the government had demonstrated the law is necessary to a "compelling state interest," that the law is "narrowly tailored" to achieving this compelling purpose, and that the law uses the "least restrictive means" to achieve that purpose) to the debt-collection exemption and ruled that it does not violate the Free Speech Clause. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the lower court that st…
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[19-431] Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania
6 mei 2020 · 1 uur 39 min
Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on May 6, 2020.
Decided on Jul 8, 2020.Petitioner: The Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home.
Respondent: Commonweath of Pennsylvania and State of New Jersey.Advocates:
Noel J. Francisco (for the petitioners in 19-454)
Paul D. Clement (for the petitioner in 19-431)
Michael J. Fischer (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Women’s Health Amendment to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires that women's health insurance include coverage for preventive health care, including contraception. The rule provided that a nonprofit religious employer who objects to providing contraceptive services may file an accommodation form requesting an exemption to the requirement, thereby avoiding paying for or otherwise participating in the provision of contraception to its employees.
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014), the Supreme Court held that under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), closely-held for-profit corporations were also entitled to invoke the exemption if they had sincere religious objections to the provision of contraceptive coverage. Then, in Wheaton College v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 958, (2014), the Court held that an entity seeking an exemption did not need to file the accommodation form; rather, its notification to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was sufficient to receive the exemption. HHS and the Departments of Labor and Treasury promulgated a final rule in compliance with these rulings.
Then, in Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. __ (2017), the Court considered another challenge to the rule, which asserted that merely submitting the accommodation notice “substantially burden[ed] the exercise of their religion,” in violation of RFRA. In a per curiam opinion, the Court declined to reach the merits of that question.
In 2017, the Department of Healt…
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[19-177] United States Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc.
5 mei 2020 · 1 uur 9 min
United States Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on May 5, 2020.
Decided on Jun 29, 2020.Petitioner: United States Agency for International Development, et al..
Respondent: Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., et al..Advocates:
Christopher G. Michel (for the petitioners)
David W. Bowker (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Alliance for Open Society International and other organizations receive funding from the U.S. government to help with their mission of fighting HIV/AIDS abroad. The government provides the funds on the condition that “no funds be used to provide assistance to any group or organization that does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.” In U.S. Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International Inc., decided in 2013, the Court held that the condition compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. Although the government consequently did not apply the condition to Alliance for Open Society International, it continued to apply the condition to the organization’s foreign affiliates. The organization sued, asking for permanent injunctive relief. The district court granted the requested relief, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does the Court’s decision in U.S. Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International Inc.—which holds that the First Amendment prohibits Congress from enforcing a law that would have required U.S.-based organizations that receive federal funds to fight HIV/AIDS abroad to “have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking”—imply that Congress may not enforce that law with respect to entities not directly involved in that case?
Conclusion
Because the foreign affiliates of American nongovernmental organizations possess no First Amendment r…
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[19-46] U.S. Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V.
4 mei 2020 · 1 uur 16 min
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V. Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on May 4, 2020.
Decided on Jun 30, 2020.Petitioner: United States Patent and Trademark Office.
Respondent: Booking.com B.V..Advocates:
Erica L. Ross (Assistant to the Solicitor General, for the petitioners)
Lisa S. Blatt (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Booking.com operates a website on which customers can make travel and lodging reservations and has used the name BOOKING.COM since at least 2006. In 2011 and 2012, Booking.com filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) four trademark applications for the use of BOOKING.COM as a word mark and for stylized versions of the mark.
Under the Lanham Act, marks must be “distinctive” to be eligible for protection, and generic terms are not distinctive. The USPTO examiner rejected Booking.com’s applications, finding that the marks were not protectable because BOOKING.COM was generic as applied to the services for which it sought registration (online hotel reservation services, among others).
The Lanham Act also allows protection for “descriptive” terms that have acquired secondary meaning, or a mental association in the minds of consumers between the proposed mark and the source of the product or service. In the alternative, the USPTO concluded that the marks were merely descriptive and that Booking.com had failed to establish that they had acquired secondary meaning as required for trademark protection.
Booking.com appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed the rejection of Booking.com’s applications. The Board found that BOOKING.COM was a generic term for these types of services and therefore ineligible for trademark protection. Because “booking” generically refers to “a reservation or arrangement to buy a travel ticket or stay in a hotel room” and “.com” indicates a commercial website, the Board reasoned that consumers would understand the resulting term…
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[18-1323] June Medical Services LLC v. Russo
4 maart 2020 · 1 uur
June Medical Services LLC v. Russo Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Mar 4, 2020.
Decided on Jun 29, 2020.Petitioner: June Medical Services L.L.C., et al..
Respondent: Stephen Russo, Interim Secretary, Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals.Advocates:
Julie Rikelman (for June Medical Services LLC)
Elizabeth Murrill (for Stephen Russo, Interim Secretary, Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals)
Jeffrey B. Wall (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting Stephen Russo, Interim Secretary, Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In June 2014, Louisiana passed Act 620, which required “that every physician who performs or induces an abortion shall ‘have active admitting privileges at a hospital that is located not further than thirty miles from the location at which the abortion is performed or induced.’”
Several abortion clinics and doctors challenged Act 620, and while that challenge was pending in the district court, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a “nearly identical” Texas law in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt (WWH), finding that the Texas law imposed an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to have an abortion while bringing about no “health-related benefit” and serving no “relevant credentialing function.” The district court hearing the challenge to Act 620 accordingly declared Act 620 facially invalid and permanently enjoined its enforcement.
The district court made detailed findings of fact and determined that “admitting privileges also do not serve ‘any relevant credentialing function,’” and that “physicians are sometimes denied privileges … for reasons unrelated to [medical] competency.” The district court further determined that the law would “drastically burden women’s right to choose abortions.”
A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit the panel majority reviewed the evidence de novo and concluded that the district court er…
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[19-7] Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
3 maart 2020 · 1 uur 15 min
Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Mar 3, 2020.
Decided on Jun 29, 2020.Petitioner: Seila Law LLC.
Respondent: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.Advocates:
Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioner)
Noel J. Francisco (the Respondent, supporting vacatur)
Paul D. Clement (Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment on Q1)
Douglas N. Letter (for the U.S. House of Representatives, as amicus curiae)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was investigating Seila Law LLC, a law firm that provides debt-relief services, among others. As part of its investigation, the CFPB issued a civil investigative demand to Seila Law that requires the firm to respond to several interrogatories and requests for documents. Seila Law refused to comply with the demand, so the CFPB filed a petition in the district court to enforce compliance. The district court granted the petition and ordered Seila Law to comply with the CID. Seila Law appealed the district court’s order on two grounds, one of which was that the CFPB is unconstitutionally structured.
Specifically, Seila Law argued that the CFPB’s structure violates the Constitution’s separation of powers because it is an independent agency headed by a single Director who exercises substantial executive power but can be removed by the President only for cause. The Ninth Circuit disagreed.
The court found two Supreme Court decisions on separation of powers controlling: Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). According to the Ninth Circuit panel, those cases indicate that the for-cause removal restriction protecting the CFPB’s Director does not “impede the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty” to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Question
Does the vesting of substantial executive authority …
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[18-1501] Liu v. Securities and Exchange Commission
3 maart 2020 · 53 min
Liu v. Securities and Exchange Commission Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 3, 2020.
Decided on Jun 22, 2020.Petitioner: Charles C. Lui, et al..
Respondent: Securities and Exchange Commission.Advocates:
Gregory G. Rapawy (for the Petitioner)
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Charles Liu operated an EB-5 fund, which is a fund that offers lawful permanent residence opportunities to foreigners who make significant investments in the United States. However, Liu misappropriated millions of dollars that had been invested in the fund, in violation of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, which prohibits the making of false statements in the context of a securities offering.
The district court ordered Liu to “disgorge” (pay back) $26 million, the amount investors had paid into the EB-5 fund, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. In petitioning the Supreme Court’s review, Liu argued that the SEC lacked the authority to obtain disgorgement, under the Court’s 2017 decision in Kokesh v. SEC, which held that disgorgement awarded under the court’s equitable power is a penalty, not a remedial measure.
Question
May the Securities and Exchange Commission seek and obtain disgorgement from a court as “equitable relief” for a securities law violation, even though the Court has determined that such disgorgement is a penalty?
Conclusion
In a Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement action, a disgorgement award that does not exceed a wrongdoer’s net profits and is awarded for victims is equitable relief permissible under 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5). Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the opinion on behalf of the 8-1 majority of the Court.
To determine whether disgorgement was an available remedy, the Court first looked to traditional equitable remedies, noting that courts have long used equitable remedies (albeit by different names) to prevent parties from unjustly gaini…
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[18-1432] Nasrallah v. Barr
2 maart 2020 · 1 uur 1 min
Nasrallah v. Barr Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 2, 2020.
Decided on Jun 1, 2020.Petitioner: Nidal Khalid Nasrallah.
Respondent: William P. Barr, Attorney General.Advocates:
Paul W. Hughes (for the Petitioner)
Matthew Guarnieri (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Nidal Khalid Nasrallah, a native and citizen of Lebanon, was 17 years old when he entered the United States on a tourist visa in 2006. He became a lawful permanent resident the following year.
In 2011, pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Nasrallah pleaded guilty to two counts of receiving stolen property in interstate commerce. An immigration judge determined that one of those convictions made Nasrallah subject to removal as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). However, the judge also found Nasrallah had established a clear probability that he would be tortured and persecuted in Lebanon by groups such as Hezbollah and ISIS because of his Druze religion and western ties, so the judge granted him a deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. Both the government and Nasrallah appealed the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). On appeal, the BIA held that the immigration judge erred in granting Nasrallah a deferral, and it ordered his removal.
Nasrallah appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Reviewing the BIA’s conclusions of law de novo, the Eleventh Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part Nasrallah’s petition for review. Specifically, Nasrallah had asked the court to reweigh the factors involved in the removal order, but under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2), the courts lack jurisdiction to review the factual findings underlying the denial of removal relief. The court therefore dismissed Nasrallah’s claim for lack of jurisdiction.
Question
Do the federal courts have jurisdiction to review an administrative agency’s factual findings under…
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[19-161] Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam
2 maart 2020 · 1 uur 1 min
Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 2, 2020.
Decided on Jun 25, 2020.Petitioner: Department of Homeland Security, et al..
Respondent: Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam.Advocates:
Edwin S. Kneedler (for the Petitioner)
Lee Gelernt (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam is a native and citizen of Sri Lanka and a Tamil, an ethnic minority group in Sri Lanka. Thuraissigiam entered the United States via its southern border, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers arrested him and placed him in expedited removal proceedings. Thuraissigiam indicated a fear of persecution in Sri Lanka, but an asylum officer determined he had not established a credible fear of persecution and referred him for removal. A supervisor affirmed the officer’s finding, and an immigration judge affirmed it as well in a check-box decision.
Thuraissigiam filed a habeas petition in federal district court, arguing that his expedited removal order violated his statutory, regulatory, and constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e) did not authorize jurisdiction over Thuraissigiam’s claims and rejecting his argument that the removal process to which he was subjected effectively suspended the writ of habeas corpus, in violation of the Suspension Clause.
A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court. Because the administrative scheme governing credible fear determinations in this context is “meager,” and § 1252(a)(2) disallows judicial review of whether DHS complied with the procedures, the process does not meet minimum constitutional requirements.
Question
Does 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) as applied to the respondent Thuraissigiam violate the Suspension Clause of the Constitution?
Conclusion
As applied to this case, 8 U.S.C. §1252(e)(2)—wh…
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[18-8369] Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez
26 februari 2020 · 58 min
Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Feb 26, 2020.
Decided on Jun 8, 2020.Petitioner: Arthur James Lomax.
Respondent: Christina Ortiz-Marquez, et al..Advocates:
Brian T. Burgess (for the Petitioner)
Eric R. Olson (for the Respondents)
Jeffrey A. Rosen (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Arthur J. Lomax is a Colorado prisoner at the Limon Correctional Facility. While at a different prison, he filed a lawsuit against several prison employees and filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (without paying the usual court fees) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Upon direction of the district court, Lomax amended his complaint to allege violations of his Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The same district court dismissed without prejudice three of Mr. Lomax's previous actions on the grounds that they failed to state a claim. The district court further noted that these dismissals were “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which bars inmates from filing or appealing a federal civil action without paying the associated fees if they have filed three or more cases or appeals that were dismissed because the lawsuits were frivolous or malicious or did not properly state a legal claim for relief.
Because of the previous strikes, the court ordered Lomax to show cause before proceeding in forma pauperis. In response to the show cause order, Lomax argued (among other things) that because the prior dismissals were without prejudice, they do not count as strikes.
The district court denied Lomax’s motion as barred by the three-strikes provision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does a dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim count as a strike under the Prison Litigation Reform Act?
Conclusion
Dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim counts as a strike under three-strik…
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[19-67] United States v. Sineneng-Smith
25 februari 2020 · 59 min
United States v. Sineneng-Smith Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Feb 25, 2020.
Decided on May 7, 2020.Petitioner: United States of America.
Respondent: Evelyn Sineneng-Smith.Advocates:
Eric J. Feigin (for the Petitioner)
Mark C. Fleming (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Evelyn Sineneng-Smith operated an immigration consulting firm in San Jose, California. Her clients were mostly natives of the Philippines, who were unlawfully employed in the United States and were seeking to obtain legal permanent residence (green cards). Sineneng-Smith purported to help her clients obtain permanent residence through the Labor Certification process, but that program expired on April 30, 2001. Sineneng-Smith knew that the program had expired but nonetheless continued to tell clients that they could obtain green cards via Labor Certifications.
Federal law prohibits encouraging or inducing an alien to reside in the country, knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact that such residence is in violation of the law. Sineneng-Smith was indicted, charged, and convicted by a jury of violating this law. She appealed her conviction, and the U.S. Court of Appeals solicited supplemental briefing on several constitutional questions presented in the appeal. The court held that the statute was overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, criminalizing a “substantial amount of protected expression in relation to the statute’s narrow legitimate sweep.”
Question
Is a federal law criminalizing the act of encouraging or inducing illegal immigration for commercial advantage or private financial gain unconstitutional on its face?
Conclusion
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit panel abused its discretion when it “drastic[ally]” departed from the principle of party presentation in ruling on the issue of constitutional overbreadth. The Court found that the Ninth Circuit d…
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[17-1268] Opati v. Republic of Sudan
24 februari 2020 · 1 uur
Opati v. Republic of Sudan Lees meer
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Argued on Feb 24, 2020.
Petitioner: Monicah Okoba Opati, et al..
Respondent: Republic of Sudan, et al..Advocates:
Matthew D. McGill (for the Petitioners)
Erica L. Ross (for the United States, as amicus curiae supporting the Petitioners)
Christopher M. Curran (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 1998, truck bombs exploded outside the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing over 200 people and injuring over a thousand. It was later discovered that al Qaeda was behind these bombings and that Sudan allegedly provided material support to al Qaeda in the form of safe harbor and training.
Starting in 2001, victims of the bombings began to bring lawsuits against Sudan and Iran in U.S. courts under a provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) that withdraws sovereign immunity and grants courts jurisdiction to hear suits against foreign states designated as sponsors of terrorism. When Sudan and Iran did not appear to defend these cases, the district court entered default judgments against them in several cases, including $4.3 billion in punitive damages. Sudan then appeared, filing appeals and motions to vacate the judgments. The district court denied Sudan’s motions to vacate, and Sudan again appealed.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that FSIA does not permit the recovery of punitive damages arising from terrorist activities that occurred before Congress amended the law in 2008 to authorize punitive damages. The court pointed out that there is a strong presumption against retroactivity unless Congress made clear its intent. In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court noted that retroactive authorization of punitive damages “would raise a serious constitutional question.” Because the FSIA terrorism exception does not contain a clear statement of retroactive effect yet …
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[18-1584] United States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association
24 februari 2020 · 1 uur 2 min
United States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Feb 24, 2020.
Decided on Jun 15, 2020.Petitioner: United States Forest Service, et al..
Respondent: Cowpasture River Association, et al..Advocates:
Anthony A. Yang (for the Petitioner)
Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner)
Michael K. Kellogg (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Appalachian Trail spans over 2,000 miles, from Maine to Georgia, with approximately 1,000 miles of the Trail crossing through lands within national forests. Under the National Trails System Act, the Secretary of the Interior has the responsibility to administer the trail and that responsibility may not be transferred to any other federal agencies. The Mineral Leasing Act grants the U.S. Forest Service the authority to grant certain rights-of-way through lands in the National Forest System, but no federal agency has the authority to grant equivalent rights-of-way through lands in the National Park System.
In 2017, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission granted Atlantic Coast Pipeline LLC (Atlantic) authorization to construct, operate, and maintain a natural gas pipeline that would cross the Appalachian Trail at points located within the George Washington and Monogahela National Forests. After a review process, the Forest Service authorized Atlantic to proceed with construction of the pipeline, finding it had authority under the Mineral Leasing Act to grant a right-of-way for the pipeline and that the pipeline “would have no long lasting impacts” on the Trail.
Cowpasture River Preservation Association and others filed a petition in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review of the Forest Service’s record of decision and special use permit. The court granted the petition, vacated the record of decision and special use permit, and remanded to the Forest Service. Notably, the court determined that the Forest…
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[18-1195] Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue
22 januari 2020 · 1 uur 3 min
Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 22, 2020.
Decided on Jun 30, 2020.Petitioner: Kendra Espinoza, Jeri Ellen Anderson and Jamie Schaefer.
Respondent: Montana Department of Revenue, et al..Advocates:
Richard D. Komer (for the petitioners)
Jeffrey B. Wall (Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Adam G. Unikowsky (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Petitioners Kendra Espinoza and others are low-income mothers who applied for scholarships to keep their children enrolled in Stillwater Christian School, in Kalispell, Montana. The Montana legislature enacted a tax-credit scholarship program in 2015 to provide a modest tax credit to individuals and businesses who donate to private, nonprofit scholarship organizations. Shortly after the program was enacted, the Montana Department of Revenue promulgated an administrative rule (“Rule 1”) prohibiting scholarship recipients from using their scholarships at religious schools, citing a provision of the state constitution that prohibits “direct or indirect” public funding of religiously affiliated educational programs.
Espinoza and the other mothers filed a lawsuit in state court challenging Rule 1. The court determined that the scholarship program was constitutional without Rule 1 and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Department of Revenue argued that the program is unconstitutional without Rule 1. The Montana Supreme Court agreed with the Department and reversed the lower court.
Question
Does a state law that allows for funding for education generally while prohibiting funding for religious schools violate the Religion Clauses or the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution?
Conclusion
The application of the Montana Constitution’s “no-aid” provision to a state program providing …
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[18-1048] GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS v. Outokumpu Stainless USA LLC
21 januari 2020 · 1 uur 1 min
GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS v. Outokumpu Stainless USA LLC Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 21, 2020.
Decided on Jun 1, 2020.Petitioner: GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. a Foreign Corporation Formally Known As Converteam SAS.
Respondent: Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, et al..Advocates:
Shay Dvoretzky (for the petitioner)
Jonathan Y. Ellis (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
Jonathan D. Hacker (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Outokumpu operates a steel plant in Alabama that contains three “cold rolling mills,” which are required for manufacturing and processing certain steel products. In November 2007, while Outokumpu’s plant was under construction, the company’s predecessor, ThyssenKrupp, entered into three contracts with F.L. Industries (“Fives”) to provide three different-sized mills. Each of these three contracts contains an arbitration clause that, among other things, requires that arbitration take place in Dusseldorf, Germany, and that the forum apply the substantive law of Germany.
The contracts define the parties to each as Outokumpu and Fives and provide that any mention of either party also includes any subcontractors of that party; appended to the contracts is a list of subcontractors, including petitioner GE Energy Conversion France SAS (“GE Energy”), formerly known as Converteam SAS.
Fives contracted with GE Energy to provide three motors for each of the three mills, for a total of nine motors, which were manufactured in France and delivered and installed in Alabama between 2011 and 2012. By June 2014, the motors began to fail, and by August 2015, motors in all three mills failed. It came to light that Fives and GE Energy had entered into a separate agreement with another party that designated Fives to represent the interests of all three parties in the event of a dispute.
…
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[18-6662] Shular v. United States
21 januari 2020 · 1 uur 1 min
Shular v. United States Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Jan 21, 2020.
Decided on Feb 26, 2020.Petitioner: Eddie Lee Shular.
Respondent: United States of America.Advocates:
Richard M. Summa (for the petitioner)
Jonathan C. Bond (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) provides in relevant part that a person who has three previous convictions for a “violent felony” or a “serious drug offense” shall serve a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison. In recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a “categorical” approach to determine whether a prior conviction constitutes a “violent felony” within the ACCA. Under this approach, the sentencing court must look only to the statutory definition of the prior offense and not to the particular facts underlying the prior convictions. At issue in this case is whether the categorical approach applies to the determination of whether a prior conviction constitutes a “serious drug offense” as well.
Eddie Lee Shular qualified as an armed career criminal on the basis of six prior Florida convictions for controlled substance offenses—five for sale of cocaine and one for possession with intent to sell. None of these offenses required that the government prove that Shular had “knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance,” that is, that the substance possessed or sold was cocaine. Under the categorical approach, none of Shular’s Florida convictions would qualify as a “serious drug offense” because the Florida crimes are broader than the generic drug analogues under federal law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected the categorical approach to serious drug offenses, holding that the plain language of the ACCA definition “requires only that the predicate offense involve certain activities related to controlled substances.”
Question
Does the determin…
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[18-882] Babb v. Wilkie
15 januari 2020 · 59 min
Babb v. Wilkie Lees meer
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Argued on Jan 15, 2020.
Decided on Apr 6, 2020.Petitioner: Noris Babb.
Respondent: Robert Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans Affairs.Advocates:
Roman Martinez (for the petitioner)
Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Petitioner Noris Babb worked as a pharmacist for the Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center in Bay Pines, Florida, since 2004. While there, she helped to develop the Geriatric Pharmacotherapy Clinic (GPC), which serves older veterans with diseases or disabilities common to individuals of advanced age with military service. In 2009, Pharmacy Management gave Babb an advanced scope (full practice authority) to prescribe medications without a physician, which was necessary for her position. In 2010, the VA rolled out a nationwide treatment initiative similar to the GPC Babb had helped develop. Against recommendations by Human Resources and despite requests from doctors, Pharmacy Management rejected applications by several current module pharmacists—all females over 50—and granted applications of two pharmacists under 40.
Two of the female pharmacists who were denied advancement filed Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints, and Babb provided statements and testified in support of their EEO claims. The pharmacists claimed that their non-selection purportedly for lack of advanced scopes was pretext for discrimination and that any justification for denying advanced scopes was pretext for discrimination as well.
Babb alleged that as a result of her participation in the EEO process, she was denied opportunities to participate in the new program and that Pharmacy Management required her to agree to a schedule that was unworkable for her department. Unable to meet this requirement, Babb’s advanced scope was removed and was consequently disqualified from promotion. A female pharmacist under 30 witho…
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[18-1059] Kelly v. United States
14 januari 2020 · 1 uur
Kelly v. United States Lees meer
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Argued on Jan 14, 2020.
Decided on May 7, 2020.Petitioner: Bridget Anne Kelly.
Respondent: United States of America.Advocates:
Jacob M. Roth (for the petitioner)
Michael Levy (for respondent William Baroni, supporting the petitioner)
Eric J. Feigin (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
This case arises from the scandal that became known as “Bridgegate.” Defendants William E. Baroni, Jr. and Bridget Anne Kelly conspired to create major traffic jams in Fort Lee, New Jersey, after Fort Lee’s mayor refused to endorse the 2013 reelection bid of then-Governor Chris Christie. The defendants and others limited motorists’ access to the George Washington Bridge, the world’s busiest bridge, for four days during the first week of Fort Lee’s school year, resulting in extensive traffic delays.
In 2015, a grand jury indicted Baroni and Kelly for their roles in the scheme. Each was charged with seven counts, including conspiracy to obtain by fraud, knowingly convert, or intentionally misapply property of an organization receiving federal benefits, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and the substantive offense underlying that conspiracy, 18 U.S.C § 666(a)(1)(A). A jury convicted the defendants on all counts. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the conviction as to four of the seven, including the two at issue here. In support of its conclusion, the court reasoned that the defendants had defrauded the Port Authority of its property by citing a “traffic study” as the purpose for the lane closures rather than their “real reason” of political payback.
Question
Did the public officials in this case “defraud” the government of its property by advancing a “public policy reason” for an official decision that is not her subjective “real reason” for making the decision?
Conclusion
Baroni and Kell…
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[18-1233] Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc.
14 januari 2020 · 58 min
Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 14, 2020.
Decided on Apr 23, 2020.Petitioner: Romag Fasteners, Inc..
Respondent: Fossil, Inc., et al..Advocates:
Lisa S. Blatt (for the petitioner)
Neal Kumar Katyal (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Petitioner Romag Fasteners, Inc., sells magnetic snap fasteners for use in wallets, handbags, and other leather goods. Respondent Fossil designs, markets, and distributes fashion accessories, including handbags and small leather goods. In 2002, Fossil and Romag entered into an agreement to use Romag fasteners in Fossil’s products, and Fossil’s manufacturers purchased tens of thousands of Romag fasteners between 2002 and 2008. In 2010, the president of Romag discovered that certain Fossil handbags sold in the United States contained counterfeit snaps bearing the Romag mark. Romag sued Fossil in 2010 for patent and trademark infringement. Romag alleged that Fossil knowingly adopted and used the Romag mark without Romag’s consent.
A jury found that Fossil had infringed Romag’s trademark and patents but that none of the violations were willful. The jury awarded Romag trademark damages under two theories: over $90,000 in profits “to prevent unjust enrichment” and over $6.7 million in profits “to deter future trademark infringement.” For the latter award, the jury found that Fossil had acted with “callous disregard” for Romag’s trademark rights. However, the district court struck the jury’s award, finding that “a finding of willfulness remains a requirement for an award of defendants’ profits in this Circuit.” On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that within the Second Circuit, a showing of willfulness was required for an award of profits. Romag petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. In light of its decision in SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC, 580 U.S. __ (2017…
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[17-1712] Thole v. U.S. Bank, N.A.
13 januari 2020 · 1 uur 2 min
Thole v. U.S. Bank, N.A. Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Jan 13, 2020.
Decided on Jun 1, 2020.Petitioner: James J. Thole, et al..
Respondent: U.S. Bank, N.A., et al..Advocates:
Peter K. Stris (for the petitioners)
Sopan Joshi (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Joseph R. Palmore (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Named plaintiff James Thole and others brought a class action lawsuit against U.S. Bank and other over alleged mismanagement of a defined benefit pension plan between 2007 and 2010. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated Section 404, 405, and 406 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by breaching their fiduciary duties and causing the plan to engage in prohibited transactions with a subsidiary company. The plaintiffs argued that as a result of these prohibited transactions, the plan suffered significant losses and became underfunded in 2008.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the district court granted in part. However, the court permitted the plaintiffs to proceed with their claim that the defendants engaged in a prohibited transaction by investing in a subsidiary. In 2014, with the parties still in litigation, the plan became overfunded; that is, it contained more money than was needed to meet its obligations. The defendants raised the argument that the plaintiffs had not suffered any financial loss and moved to dismiss the remainder of the action. The district court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs lacked a concrete interest in any monetary relief the court could award to the plan if the plaintiffs prevailed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Must a plaintiff demonstrate individual financial loss or the imminent risk of financial loss in an ERISA plan in order to seek injunctive relief…
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[18-1086] Lucky Brand Dungarees Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Group Inc.
13 januari 2020 · 1 uur 2 min
Lucky Brand Dungarees Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Group Inc. Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 13, 2020.
Decided on May 14, 2020.Petitioner: Lucky Brand Dungarees Inc., et al..
Respondent: Marcel Fashions Group, Inc..Advocates:
Dale M. Cendali (for the petitioners)
Michael B. Kimberly (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Marcel and Lucky Brand are competitors in the apparel industry, and this dispute arises over Marcel’s allegation that Lucky Brand is infringing on its “Get Lucky” trademark through its use of “Lucky” on its merchandise in violation of an injunction entered in an earlier action between the two parties.
In 2003, the two parties entered into a settlement agreement to resolve a trademark dispute in which Lucky Brand agreed not to use “Get Lucky” and Marcel agreed to release certain claims it might have in the future arising out of its trademarks. The two parties contest the scope of Marcel’s release of claims, with Marcel contending that it only released claims as to infringement that occurred prior to the 2003 execution of the agreement and Lucky Brand arguing that it released any future claim Marcel may have in relation to any trademark registered prior to the execution of the agreement. Further litigation ensued.
In litigation between the two parties over substantially the same trademark disputes, Lucky Brand argued for its interpretation of the 2003 settlement agreement. It moved to dismiss on the basis that because the marks at issue were registered prior to the settlement agreement, Marcel released any claim alleging infringement of those marks. The district court denied the motion, concluding that it was premature to determine which claims were subject to release in the 2001 agreement. However, the district court noted that Lucky Brand was “free to raise the issue . . . again after the record is more fully developed.” Lucky Brand raised the defense again in its answer and as an affirmativ…
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[18-1109] McKinney v. Arizona
11 december 2019 · 59 min
McKinney v. Arizona Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Dec 11, 2019.
Decided on Feb 25, 2020.Petitioner: James Erin McKinney.
Respondent: State of Arizona.Advocates:
Neal Kumar Katyal (for the petitioner)
Oramel H. Skinner (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
By way of relevant background, James McKinney’s childhood was “horrific” due to poverty, physical and emotional abuse—all detailed in the court filings. Around age 11, he began drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, and he dropped out of school in the seventh grade. He repeatedly tried to run away from home and was placed in juvenile detention.
In 1991, when McKinney was 23, he and his half-brother Michael Hedlund committed two burglaries that resulted in two deaths. The state of Arizona tried McKinney and Hedlund before dual juries. McKinney’s jury found him guilty of two counts of first-degree murder (without specifying whether it reached that verdict by finding premeditation or by finding felony murder), and Hedlund’s jury found him guilty of one count of first-degree murder and one count of second-degree murder.
At McKinney’s capital sentencing hearing (before a judge), a psychologist testified that he had diagnosed McKinney with PTSD “resulting from the horrific childhood McKinney had suffered.” The psychologist further testified that witnessing violence could trigger McKinney’s childhood trauma and produce “diminished capacity.” The trial judge credited the psychologist’s testimony, but under Arizona law at the time, the judge was prohibited from considering non-statutory mitigating evidence that the judge found to be unconnected to the crime. Because McKinney’s PTSD was not connected to the burglaries, the judge could not consider it mitigating evidence and thus sentenced him to death.
The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed McKinney’s death sentence on appeal. In 2003, McKinney filed a habeas petition in federal court. The district court denied re…
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[18-935] Monasky v. Taglieri
11 december 2019 · 1 uur
Monasky v. Taglieri Lees meer
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Argued on Dec 11, 2019.
Decided on Feb 25, 2020.Petitioner: Michelle Monasky.
Respondent: Domenico Taglieri.Advocates:
Amir C. Tayrani (for the petitioner)
Sopan Joshi (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of neither party)
Andrew J. Pincus (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Michelle Monasky, a U.S. citizen married to Domenico Taglieri, an Italian citizen, claimed that Taglieri had repeatedly assaulted her before and during her pregnancy. Monasky returned to the United States with their two-month-old daughter, and Taglieri asked an Italian court to terminate Monasky’s parental rights.
The Italian court ruled in Taglieri’s favor ex parte (without an appearance by Monasky). Taglieri then asked a federal court to require that Monasky return the baby to Italy. The court granted Taglieri’s petition, finding that Italy was the baby’s habitual residence. Both the Sixth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court denied Monasky’s motion for a stay pending appeal, so Monasky returned their daughter to Italy. A panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, and then the Sixth Circuit agreed to a rehearing en banc.
The International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. § 9001 et seq. implements the Hague Convention in the United States, and the law defines wrongful removal as taking a child in violation of custodial rights “under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal.” To determine the child’s habitual residence, a court must look “to the place in which the child has become ‘acclimatized,’ or as a back-up inquiry, “shared parental intent.” Because the child, at two months of age, was too young to acclimate to a country, the relevant inquiry is the parents’ shared intent. The district court is in the best position to make such an…
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[18-7739] Holguin-Hernandez v. United States
10 december 2019 · 47 min
Holguin-Hernandez v. United States Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Dec 10, 2019.
Decided on Feb 26, 2020.Petitioner: Gonzalo Holguin-Hernandez.
Respondent: United States.Advocates:
Kendall Turner (for the petitioner)
Morgan L. Ratner (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent in support of vacatur)
K. Winn Allen (for the court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Gonzalo Holguin was convicted for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of federal law, and sentenced to 24 months in prison, followed by two years of supervised release. Holguin was again arrested for possession and intent to distribute, and after that arrest the government filed a petition to revoke the supervised release term. Before the revocation hearing occurred, Holguin pleaded guilty to the second set of charges.
At the revocation hearing, the district court explained the allegations of the revocation petition to Holguin and asked how he pleaded. Holguin answered “True.” Holguin’s attorney argued for a concurrent sentence on the revocation, but the court issued a 12-month consecutive sentence instead. Holguin appealed the reasonableness of his sentence, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding Holguin had failed to make a formal objection after the announcement of his sentence.
Question
Must a criminal defendant make a formal objection after the pronouncement of his sentence to invoke appellate reasonableness review of the length of the sentence?
Conclusion
A criminal defendant need not make a formal objection to his issued sentence in order to preserve his right on appeal to have that sentence reviewed for “reasonableness” rather than for “plain error,” the standard that would control absent sufficient objection at the time of sentencing. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Breyer noted a split of author…
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[18-1023] Maine Community Health Options v. United States
10 december 2019 · 1 uur 1 min
Maine Community Health Options v. United States Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Dec 10, 2019.
Decided on Apr 27, 2020.Petitioner: Maine Community Health Options.
Respondent: United States.Advocates:
Paul D. Clement (for the petitioners)
Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Congress, in order to persuade the nation’s health insurance industry to provide insurance to previously uninsured or uninsurable persons, the legislation creating the Affordable Care Act provided that insurance losses over a designated percentage would be reimbursed, and comparable profits would be turned over to the government.
In reliance on the government’s commitment to reimburse them, the nation’s insurance industry provided the designated health insurance. However, when some carriers experienced significant losses, the government refused to appropriate the funds to pay the statutory shortfall and prohibited existing funds from being used for this purpose. As a result, the insurers did not receive reimbursement.
Several of these insurance carriers filed suit against the government seeking reimbursement. The courts denied them the relief they sought, in part relying on the “cardinal rule” disfavoring implied repeals, which applies with “especial force” to appropriations acts and requires that repeal not to be found unless the later enactment is “irreconcilable” with the former.
Question
Do the insurance carriers in this case have a right to payment under the “Risk Corridors” program of the Affordable Care Act?
Conclusion
The insurance carriers in this case have a right to payment under the “Risk Corridors” program of the Affordable Care Act, Congress did not repeal the obligation of the federal government to pay the carriers, and the carriers can sue for payment under the Tucker Act in the Court of Federal Claims.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered th…
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[18-776] Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr
9 december 2019 · 58 min
Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Dec 9, 2019.
Decided on Mar 23, 2020.Petitioner: Pedro Pablo Guerrero-Lasprilla.
Respondent: William P. Barr.Advocates:
Paul W. Hughes (for the petitioners)
Frederick Liu (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Pedro Pablo Guerrero-Lasprilla, a native and citizen of Colombia, entered the United States in 1986 as a legal immigrant but was removed in 1998 due to felony drug convictions. In September 2016, Guerrero filed a motion to reopen, claiming that the 2014 decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in Matter of Abdelghany rendered him eligible to seek relief under former Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c). The immigration judge denied Guerrero’s motion to reopen, finding it not timely filed. Given that Abdelghany was decided in 2014, the immigration judge found the two-year delay in filing the motion to reopen indicated Guerrero had not diligently pursued his rights as required for equitable tolling.
On appeal, the BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s denial of the motion to reopen, finding that the motion was untimely because it was not filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision. And the BIA agreed with the immigration judge that equitable tolling did not apply to extend the 90-day deadline. Guerrero argued that he could not have filed his motion to reopen until the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that a litigant is entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations if he establishes “that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.”).
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s determination that equitable tolling did not apply. Within the Fifth Circuit, un…
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[18-916] Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Technologies, LP
9 december 2019 · 1 uur 3 min
Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Technologies, LP Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Dec 9, 2019.
Decided on Apr 20, 2020.Petitioner: Thryv, Inc..
Respondent: Click-to-Call Technologies, LP and Andrei Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office.Advocates:
Adam H. Charnes (for the petitioner)
Jonathan Y. Ellis (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the federal respondent, supporting reversal)
Daniel L. Geyser (for the private respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
This case arises out of a complex procedural history involving a patent dispute between several parties and concerns not the merits of the proceedings but a procedural aspect of it.
The America Invents Act created “inter partes review” as a way of challenging a patent before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. One provision, 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), precludes the institution of inter partes review more than one year after the petitioner “is served with a complaint” alleging infringement of the patent. The parties disagree over whether this one-year time bar applies when the underlying patent infringement suit has been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.
The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, held that it does apply. The court rejected the argument that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice restores the parties to their positions as though no legal proceedings had ever begun, concluding instead that a defendant served with a complaint remains “served” even if the civil action is voluntarily dismissed without prejudice and thus does such a dismissal does not toll the statute of limitations.
Further, 35 U.S.C. § 315(d) provides that “the determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.” Notwithstanding this provision, the en banc Federal Circuit held that a decision to institute an int…