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495 afleveringen, van nieuw naar oud
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[20-480] Babcock v. Kijakazi
13 oktober 2021 · 53 min
Babcock v. Kijakazi Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 13, 2021.
Decided on Jan 13, 2022.Petitioner: David Bryon Babcock.
Respondent: Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security.Advocates:
Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Petitioner)
Nicole F. Reaves (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
David Babcock enlisted in the Michigan National Guard in 1970 and served for 3.5 years. After his service, Babcock went to flight school and received his pilot’s license, then returned to work as a National Guard dual-status technician, where he worked for over 33 years, including an active-duty tour in Iraq between 2004 and 2005. (Under 10 U.S.C. § 10216(a)(1), a National Guard dual-status technician “is a Federal civilian employee” who “is assigned to a civilian position as a technician” while a member of the National Guard.)
Babcock retired from his position in 2009, at which time he began receiving Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) payments and, separately, military retirement pay from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. He fully retired in 2014 and at that point, applied for Social Security retirement benefits. On his application, he confirmed that he was receiving monthly CSRS payments. The Social Security Administration (SSA) granted his application but reduced his benefits because of his CSRS pension. Babcock asked the SSA to reconsider the reduction, noting that members of a uniformed service were not generally subject to the reduction in benefits (under the Windfall Elimination Provision, or WEP), and that as a dual-status technician, he qualified for that exception. SSA refused to change its initial determination, an administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the determination, and then the Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ’s decision. A federal district court entered judgment against Babcock, and the appellate court affirmed.
Question
Is a civil service pension received for federal civilian employ…
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[20-443] United States v. Tsarnaev
13 oktober 2021 · 1 uur 35 min
United States v. Tsarnaev Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 13, 2021.
Decided on Mar 4, 2022.Petitioner: United States.
Respondent: Dzhokhar A. Tsarnaev.Advocates:
Eric J. Feigin (for the Petitioner)
Ginger D. Anders (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2013, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and his brother detonated two homemade pressure cooker bombs near the finish line of the race, killing three and injuring hundreds. He was sentenced to death for his role in the bombings, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit threw out his death sentences on the grounds that the district court should have asked potential jurors what media coverage they had seen about Tsarnaev’s case, and the district court should not have excluded from the sentencing phase evidence that Tsarnaev’s brother was involved in a separate triple murder.
Question
Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit err in vacating the death sentence for the district court’s failure to ask prospective jurors for a specific accounting of the pretrial media coverage they had seen, heard, or read, and for its exclusion of evidence at the sentencing phase of trial that Tsarnaev’s brother had been involved in different crimes two years before the bombing?
Conclusion
The First Circuit improperly vacated Tsarnaev’s capital sentences. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
The district court did not abuse its discretion during jury selection when it declined to ask every prospective juror what they learned from the media about the case. The district court has substantial discretion during jury selection, and it was reasonable for the court to conclude that the proposed question wrongly emphasized what a juror knew before coming to court rather than revealing potential bias. The “supervisory authority” of federal courts does not allow them to “create prophylactic supervisory rules that circumvent or sup…
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[20-659] Thompson v. Clark
12 oktober 2021 · 1 uur 30 min
Thompson v. Clark Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 12, 2021.
Decided on Apr 4, 2022.Petitioner: Larry Thompson.
Respondent: Pagiel Clark, et al..Advocates:
Amir H. Ali (for the Petitioner)
Jonathan Y. Ellis (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
John D. Moore (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Camille Watson was staying with her sister and her sister’s husband, Larry Thompson, when she dialed 911 after seeing a diaper rash on the couple’s infant daughter and mistaking the rash for signs of abuse. In response, two Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) arrived at Thompson’s apartment building to investigate. The EMTs saw nothing amiss, and, unaware of Camille’s 911 call, Thompson told the EMTs that no one in his home had called 911. He asked the EMTs to leave, and they did.
Four police officers followed up to investigate the alleged child abuse and insisted on seeing Thompson’s daughter. Thompson asked to speak to the officers’ sergeant, and after being denied that request, asked whether the officers had a warrant (which they did not). Nevertheless, they physically tried to enter Thompson’s home, and when Thompson attempted to block the doorway, the officers tackled and handcuffed him. He was arrested and taken to jail, where he spent two days. He was charged with resisting arrest and obstructing governmental administration, and about three months later, the prosecution dropped the charges against him, stating that “People are dismissing the case in the interest of justice.”
Thompson filed a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim against the police officers involved. A federal district court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants on Thompson’s malicious prosecution claim due to his failure to establish favorable termination of his criminal case, which is required under binding Second Circuit precedent. The appellate court affirmed.
Qu…
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[20-601] Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center
12 oktober 2021 · 1 uur 13 min
Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 12, 2021.
Decided on Mar 3, 2022.Petitioner: Daniel Cameron, Attorney General of Kentucky.
Respondent: EMW Women's Surgical Center, P.S.C., et al..Advocates:
Matthew F. Kuhn (for the Petitioner)
Alexa Kolbi-Molinas (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Dilation and extraction (D&E) is the standard method of abortion used in the second trimester of pregnancy, accounting for 95% of second-trimester abortions nationwide. Kentucky House Bill 454 requires patients to undergo a procedure to end potential fetal life before they may receive an abortion using the D&E method.
Kentucky’s only abortion clinic and two of its doctors filed a lawsuit challenging the law, arguing that it violates patients’ constitutional right to abortion prior to fetal viability. All defendants except then-Secretary of Kentucky’s Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Adam Meier, and Commonwealth Attorney Thomas B. Wine, were voluntarily dismissed prior to trial. After a five-day bench trial, the district court ruled for the plaintiffs and entered a permanent injunction. In the meantime, governor Matt Bevin was replaced by Andy Beshear and Meier was replaced by Eric Friedlander.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court, and the new Health Secretary declined to continue defending the law. Daniel Cameron, the Kentucky attorney general, asked the Sixth Circuit for permission to intervene to defend the law, but the court declined.
Question
Should a state attorney general vested with the power to defend state law be permitted to intervene after a federal court of appeals invalidates a state statute when no other state actor will defend the law?
Conclusion
The Kentucky attorney general should have been permitted to intervene on the Commonwealth’s behalf in litigation concerning Kentucky House Bill 454. Justice Samuel Al…
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[20-827] United States v. Zubaydah
6 oktober 2021 · 1 uur 10 min
United States v. Zubaydah Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 6, 2021.
Decided on Mar 3, 2022.Petitioner: United States.
Respondent: Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka Abu Zubaydah, et al..Advocates:
Brian H. Fletcher (for the Petitioner)
David F. Klein (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Zayn Husayn, also known as Abu Zubaydah, is a former associate of Osama bin Laden. U.S. military forces captured him in Pakistan and detained him abroad before moving him to the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, where he is currently being held. Zubaydah alleged that, before being transferred to Guantanamo, he was held at a CIA “dark site” in Poland, where two former CIA contractors used “enhanced interrogation techniques” against him. Zubaydah intervened in a Polish criminal investigation into the CIA’s conduct in that country, and he sought to compel the U.S. government to disclose evidence connected with that investigation.
The government has declassified some information about Zubaydah’s treatment in CIA custody, but it has asserted the state-secrets privilege to protect other information. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s assertion of state-secrets privilege based on its own assessment of potential harms to national security and allowed discovery in the case to proceed.
Question
Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit err in rejecting the federal government’s assertion of the state-secrets privilege based on its own assessment of the potential harms to national security that would result from disclosure of information pertaining to clandestine CIA activities?
Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit erred in holding, based on its own assessment, that the state secrets privilege did not apply to information that could confirm or deny the existence of a CIA detention site in Poland. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 7-2 majority opinion.
To invoke the sta…
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[20-826] Brown v. Davenport
5 oktober 2021 · 52 min
Brown v. Davenport Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 5, 2021.
Decided on Apr 21, 2022.Petitioner: Mike Brown, Acting Warden.
Respondent: Ervine Davenport.Advocates:
Fadwa A. Hammoud (for the Petitioner)
Tasha Bahal (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
A Michigan jury convicted Ervine Lee Davenport of first-degree murder in 2008. He challenged his conviction in a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because at trial he was restrained at the waist, wrist, and ankles, although there was a privacy curtain around the defense table. The State admitted that the visible restraints were unconstitutional but argued that the error was harmless. The Michigan Court of Appeals agreed, finding that while it was error for the trial court to order the defendant to be restrained without justification, Davenport had not shown that his restraints were visible to the jury and thus failed to show prejudice. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed and remanded, and on remand, five jurors testified that they saw the shackles and two others had heard comments about the shackles.
Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that although some jurors saw the shackles, the prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the shackling did not affect the jury’s verdict. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Davenport challenged the conviction in federal court, and the district court denied the petition and certificate of appealability. Davenport petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for a certificate of appealability, which the court granted. Noting that “shackling is inherently prejudicial,” the Sixth Circuit concluded that the State had not met its burden to show that the restraints did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict” and reversed.
Question
What is the appropriate standard of review fo…
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[20-637] Hemphill v. New York
5 oktober 2021 · 1 uur 10 min
Hemphill v. New York Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 5, 2021.
Decided on Jan 20, 2022.Petitioner: Darrell Hemphill.
Respondent: New York.Advocates:
Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioner)
Gina Mignola (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In April 2006, two men got into a fight with several other people on a street in the Bronx. Shortly thereafter, someone opened fire with a 9 millimeter handgun, killing a child in a passing car. Three eyewitnesses identified Nicholas Morris as the shooter. Police searched Morris’s home and found a 9 millimeter cartridge and ammunition for a .357 revolver. They arrested him the next day. He was indicted for the child’s murder and for possession of a 9 millimeter handgun, but the prosecution ended in a mistrial. Instead of trying him again, the State offered Morris a deal: If Morris pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm at the scene of the shooting, the State would request that the murder charge be dismissed with prejudice. Morris accepted the plea deal. However, the State charged Morris with possessing a .357 revolver at the scene of the shooting, rather than a 9 millimeter established as the murder weapon. The prosecution lacked sufficient evidence to establish possession of the .357 revolver, so Morris supplied the evidence through his own statement.
In 2013, the state charged Darrell Hemphill, the petitioner in this case who was also present at the fight in the Bronx, with the murder. At trial, Hemphill elicited testimony that police had recovered the 9 millimeter cartridge on Morris’s nightstand hours after the shooting. In response, the prosecution sought to introduce into evidence Morris’s statement that he possessed a .357 revolver at the scene. Based in part on this evidence, Hemphill was found guilty of second-degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison. An appellate court affirmed the conviction, as did New York’s highest cour…
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[20-5279] Wooden v. United States
4 oktober 2021 · 1 uur 5 min
Wooden v. United States Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 4, 2021.
Decided on Mar 7, 2022.Petitioner: William Dale Wooden.
Respondent: United States.Advocates:
Allon Kedem (for the Petitioner)
Erica L. Ross (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 1997, William Wooden broke into a mini-storage facility in Georgia and stole from 10 different units, resulting in 10 counts of burglary, to which he pled guilty. Then, in 2014, a plainclothes officer went to Wooden’s home, where he witnessed Wooden in possession of a rifle. Wooden was arrested and charged in state court with being a felon in possession of a firearm, but the case was dismissed when the district attorney noted that there was no probable cause for Wooden’s arrest. Wooden was subsequently charged by federal indictment with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 924(e). After Wooden was found guilty, the district court found during his sentencing hearing that Wooden qualified as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), based on his conviction for the 10 counts of burglary, and sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment accordingly. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Wooden’s prior burglaries were separate from each other, despite occurring as part of a single criminal spree.
Question
Are offenses committed as part of a single criminal spree but sequentially in time “committed on occasions different from one another” for purposes of a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act?
Conclusion
Offenses committed as part of a single criminal episode did not occur on different “occasions” and thus count as only one offense for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion that was unanimous in the judgment to reverse the lower court.
The ordinary meaning of the word “occasion” do…
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[143-orig] Mississippi v. Tennessee
4 oktober 2021 · 1 uur 11 min
Mississippi v. Tennessee Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 4, 2021.
Decided on Nov 22, 2021.Petitioner: State of Mississippi.
Respondent: State of Tennessee, et al..Advocates:
John V. Coghlan (On Behalf of the Plaintiff)
David C. Frederick (On Behalf of the Defendant)
Frederick Liu (for the United States as Amicus Curiae, in Support of Overruling Plaintiff's Exceptions)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The State of Mississippi sued the State of Tennessee in 2014, alleging that Tennessee was taking Mississippi’s groundwater by allowing a Tennessee utility company to pump large amounts of groundwater from the Middle Claiborne Aquifer, which is located at the Mississippi-Tennessee border. Mississippi argues that the groundwater stored in the aquifer lies entirely within Mississippi and would never flow into Tennessee if it were not for the pumping. Mississippi expressly disclaims any equitable apportionment remedy, arguing that the principle does not apply to this dispute. Instead it seeks only damages and related relief. The Special Master recommended that the Court dismiss the complaint but grant Mississippi leave to amend its complaint to seek equitable apportionment.
Question
Is Mississippi entitled to damages, injunctive, and other equitable relief for the groundwater taken by Tennessee?
Conclusion
Mississippi is entitled only to the remedy of equitable apportionment, and since its complaint expressly disclaimed equitable apportionment, its complaint is dismissed without leave to amend. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
Equitable apportionment is a judicial remedy that seeks to fairly allocate a shared water resource between two or more states. Although the Court has not previously considered whether the doctrine of equitable apportionment applies to interstate aquifers, it has applied the remedy when transboundary water resources were at issue, and the same reasoning applies. …
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[20-5904] Terry v. United States
4 mei 2021 · 1 uur 23 min
Terry v. United States Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on May 4, 2021.
Decided on Jun 14, 2021.Petitioner: Tarahrick Terry.
Respondent: United States.Advocates:
Andrew L. Adler (for the Petitioner)
Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent, supporting reversal)
Adam K. Mortara (Court-appointed amicus curiae, supporting the judgment below)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Tarahrick Terry pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute a substance containing a “detectable” amount of cocaine base (3.9 grams), thus triggering the penalties in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Based on his prior convictions, the statutory term of imprisonment was 0 to 30 years, and the district court sentenced him to 188 months’ imprisonment with 6 years’ supervised release.
Terry moved for a sentence reduction on the basis that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 raised the weight ceiling of § 841(b) from 5 grams of cocaine base to 28 grams. The district court denied his motion, concluding that Terry did not commit a “covered offense” and thus was not eligible for relief under the First Step Act, which made retroactive the statutory penalties for certain offenses committed before August 3, 2010. Because the Fair Sentencing Act did not expressly amend § 841(b)(1)(C), Terry’s offense was not a “covered offense.”
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Question
Do pre-August 3, 2010, crack offenders sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) have a “covered offense” under Section 404 of the First Step Act?
Conclusion
Crack offenders sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) do not have a “covered offense” under Section 404 of the First Step Act because a sentence reduction under the Act is available only if an offender’s prior conviction of a crack cocaine offense triggered a mandatory minimum sentence. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the majority opinion of the Court.
An offender is eligible for a sentence reduction only…
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[20-255] Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L.
28 april 2021 · 1 uur 52 min
Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 28, 2021.
Decided on Jun 23, 2021.Petitioner: Mahanoy Area School District.
Respondent: B. L., a Minor, By and Through Her Father, Lawrence Levy, and Her Mother, Betty Lou Levy.Advocates:
Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner)
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
David D. Cole (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
B.L., a student at Mahanoy Area High School (MAHS), tried out for and failed to make her high school's varsity cheerleading team, making instead only the junior varsity team. Over a weekend and away from school, she posted a picture of herself on Snapchat with the caption “Fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything.” The photo was visible to about 250 people, many of whom were MAHS students and some of whom were cheerleaders. Several students who saw the captioned photo approached the coach and expressed concern that the snap was inappropriate. The coaches decided B.L.’s snap violated team and school rules, which B.L. had acknowledged before joining the team, and she was suspended from the junior varsity team for a year.
B.L. sued the school under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging (1) that her suspension from the team violated the First Amendment; (2) that the school and team rules were overbroad and viewpoint discriminatory; and (3) that those rules were unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted summary judgment in B.L.’s favor, ruling that the school had violated her First Amendment rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does the First Amendment prohibit public school officials from regulating off-campus student speech?
Conclusion
The First Amendment limits but does not entirely prohibit regulation of off-campus student speech by public school officials, and, in this case, the school district’s decision to suspend B.L. from…
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[19-1039] PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey
28 april 2021 · 1 uur 29 min
PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 28, 2021.
Decided on Jun 29, 2021.Petitioner: PennEast Pipeline Co. LLC.
Respondent: New Jersey, et al..Advocates:
Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner)
Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Jeremy M. Feigenbaum (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717Z, permits private companies to exercise the federal government’s power to take property by eminent domain, subject to certain jurisdictional requirements. PennEast Pipeline Co. obtained federal approval to build a pipeline through Pennsylvania and New Jersey and sued under the NGA to gain access to the properties along the pipeline route, of which the State of New Jersey owns 42. New Jersey sought dismissal of PennEast’s lawsuits for lack of jurisdiction based on the state’s sovereign immunity and, separately, because PennEast failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the NGA.
The district court ruled in favor of PennEast and granted a preliminary injunctive relief for immediate access to the properties. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated, finding that while the NGA delegates the federal government’s eminent-domain power, it does not abrogate state sovereign immunity. PennEast’s lawsuits are thus barred by Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Question
Does the Natural Gas Act delegate the federal government’s eminent-domain power, and does it abrogate state sovereign immunity in such cases?
Conclusion
Section 717(h) of the Natural Gas Act authorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to delegate to a private company the power to condemn all necessary rights-of-way, whether owned by private parties or states. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.
States are generally immune from lawsuits unless they have cons…
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[20-472] HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining LLC v. Renewable Fuels Association
27 april 2021 · 1 uur 40 min
HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining LLC v. Renewable Fuels Association Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 27, 2021.
Decided on Jun 25, 2021.Petitioner: HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC, et al..
Respondent: Renewable Fuels Association, et al..Advocates:
Peter D. Keisler (for the Petitioners)
Christopher G. Michel (for the federal Respondent)
Matthew W. Morrison (for the private Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Congress amended the Clean Air Act through the Energy Policy Act of 2005 in an effort to reduce the nation’s dependence on fossil fuels. The legislation set certain targets for replacing fossil fuels with renewable fuels but created several exemptions, including one for small refineries if compliance in a given year would impose disproportionate economic hardship.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated three different orders granting extensions of the small refinery exemption, but these orders were not made publicly available. A group of renewable fuels producers challenged the orders, alleging that the orders exceeded the EPA’s statutory authority. The Tenth Circuit agreed, finding that a small refinery may obtain an exemption only when it had received uninterrupted, continuous extensions of the exemption for every year since 2011.
Question
To qualify for a hardship exemption under Section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) of the Renewable Fuel Standards, must a small refinery have received uninterrupted, continuous hardship exemptions for every year since 2011?
Conclusion
A small refinery that previously received a hardship exemption may obtain an “extension” under §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) even if it saw a lapse in exemption coverage in a previous year. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion.
Although the key term “extension” is not defined in the statute, three textual clues indicate that it means an extension in time. The plain meaning of the word “extension” in a temporal sense does not requi…
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[20-437] United States v. Palomar-Santiago
27 april 2021 · 50 min
United States v. Palomar-Santiago Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 27, 2021.
Decided on May 24, 2021.Petitioner: United States.
Respondent: Refugio Palomar-Santiago.Advocates:
Erica L. Ross (for the Petitioner)
Bradley N. Garcia (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Refugio Palomar-Santiago, a Mexican national, was granted permanent resident status in the United States in 1990. In 1991, he was convicted of a felony DUI in California, and he was subsequently deported because a DUI is a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16, and felony DUI is an aggravated felony for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). Three years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided in United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001), that a DUI is not a crime of violence and later held that classification to apply retroactively. United States v. Aguilera-Rios, 769 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2013).
Palomar-Santiago returned to live in the United States, this time without authorization. He was indicted for illegal reentry after deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He moved to dismiss the indictment under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), which requires a district court to dismiss a § 1326 indictment if the defendant proves (1) he exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available to seek relief against the order; (2) he was deprived of the opportunity for judicial review at the deportation hearing; and (3) that the deportation order was fundamentally unfair. However, under Ninth Circuit precedent, a defendant does not need to prove the first two elements if he can show the crime underlying the original removal was improperly characterized as an aggravated felony and does not need to show the third element if he can show the removal should not have occurred at all.
The district court held that Palomar-Santiago met his burden in showing his crime was improperly characterized as an aggravated felony and t…
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[19-251] Americans for Prosperity v. Bonta
26 april 2021 · 1 uur 44 min
Americans for Prosperity v. Bonta Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Apr 26, 2021.
Decided on Jul 1, 2021.Petitioner: Americans for Prosperity Foundation.
Respondent: Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California.Advocates:
Derek L. Shaffer (for the Petitioners)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur and remand)
Aimee A. Feinberg (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The California Attorney General’s office has a policy requiring charities to provide the state, on a confidential basis, information about their major donors, purportedly to help the state protect consumers from fraud and the misuse of their charitable contributions. Petitioner Americans for Prosperity (and the petitioner in the consolidated case, Thomas More Law Center) either failed to file or filed redacted lists of their major donors with the California Attorney General’s office, despite filing complete lists with the federal Internal Revenue Service, as required by federal law.
In response to demands by the California Attorney General that they file the lists, the organizations filed a lawsuit alleging that the filing requirement unconstitutionally burdened their First Amendment right to free association by deterring individuals from financially supporting them. The organizations provided evidence that although the state is required to keep donor names private, the state’s database was vulnerable to hacking, and many donor names were repeatedly released to the public. Based in part on this finding, the district court granted both organizations’ motions for a preliminary injunction and then ultimately found for them after a trial, holding that the organizations and their donors were entitled to First Amendment protection under the principles established in the Supreme Court’s decision in NAACP v. Alabama. In so holding, the court reasoned that the government’s filing demands were not the “lea…
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[20-382] Guam v. United States
26 april 2021 · 53 min
Guam v. United States Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 26, 2021.
Decided on May 24, 2021.Petitioner: Territory of Guam.
Respondent: United States.Advocates:
Gregory G. Garre (for the Petitioner)
Vivek Suri (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The United States captured the island of Guam from Spain in 1898, during the Spanish-American War. From 1903, the United States maintained military rule until the passage of the Guam Organic Act in 1950, which formally transferred power from the United States to Guam’s newly formed civilian government. Guam remains an “unincorporated territory of the United States.”
In the 1940s, the Navy constructed and operated the Ordot Dump for the disposal of municipal and military waste, allegedly including munitions and chemicals such as DDT and Agent Orange, and continued to use the landfill throughout the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The Ordot Dump lacked basic environmental safeguards, and as a result, contaminants were released into the Lonfit River, which ultimately flows into the Pacific Ocean.
In 1983, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) added the Ordot Dump to its National Priorities List, and in 1988, it designated the Navy as a potentially responsible party. However, because the Navy had relinquished sovereignty over the island, Guam remained the owner and operator of the Ordot Dump. As such, the EPA repeatedly ordered Guam to propose plans for containing and disposing of waste at the landfill.
In 2002, the EPA sued Guam under the Clean Water Act, asking the court to require Guam to comply with the Act, in part by submitting plans and a compliance schedule for a cover system of the Ordot Dump, and by completing construction of the cover system. The EPA and Guam agreed that Guam would pay a civil penalty, close the Ordot Dump, and design a cover system. Guam closed the Ordot Dump in 2011.
In 2017, Guam sued the United States, alleging that the Navy was respons…
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[20-334] San Antonio v. Hotels.com, L.P.
21 april 2021 · 1 uur 11 min
San Antonio v. Hotels.com, L.P. Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 21, 2021.
Decided on May 27, 2021.Petitioner: City of San Antonio, Texas, On Behalf of Itself and All Other Similarly Situated Texas Municipalities.
Respondent: Hotels.com, L.P., et al..Advocates:
Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner)
David B. Salmons (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2006, the City of San Antonio, Texas, filed a class-action lawsuit against various online travel companies (OTCs), such as Hotels.com, Hotwire, Orbitz, and Travelocity, alleging that the service fees those companies charged constitute the “cost of occupancy” and therefore are subject to municipal hotel tax ordinances. After extensive litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the OTCs, reasoning that the hotel occupancy tax applied only to the discounted room rate paid by the OTC to the hotel.
Toward the end of litigation, the OTCs moved for "an order entering Final Judgment in favor of the OTCs, releasing all supersedeas bonds, and awarding costs to the OTCs as the prevailing parties." The OTCs’ proposed order stated that "costs shall be taxed against the Cities in favor of the OTCs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, and Fed. R. App. P. 39." San Antonio did not object, so the district court entered the OTC’s proposed order.
Then the OTCs filed a bill of costs in the district court seeking over $2.3 million, which included over $2 million for “post-judgment interest” and “premiums paid for the supersedeas bonds.” San Antonio objected and asked the district court to refuse to tax, or to substantially reduce, the appeal bond premiums sought by the OTCs. The district court concluded that it lacked the discretion to reduce taxation of the bond premiums. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, despite that every other circuit confronting the question has held the opposite.
Question
Do district courts have the discretion to deny…
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[20-440] Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc.
21 april 2021 · 1 uur 29 min
Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc. Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 21, 2021.
Decided on Jun 29, 2021.Petitioner: Minerva Surgical, Inc..
Respondent: Hologic, Inc., et al..Advocates:
Robert N. Hochman (for the Petitioner)
Morgan L. Ratner (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Matthew M. Wolf (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Hologic, Inc. and another company sued Minerva Surgical, Inc. for patent infringement (U.S. Patent Nos. 6,872,183 and 9,095,348). The patents relate to procedures and devices for endometrial ablation, which is a treatment involving the destruction of the lining of the uterus in order to treat menorrhagia, or abnormally heavy menstrual bleeding.
Both of the patents at issue list as an inventor Csaba Truckai, who assigned his interests in both patents to NovaCept, Inc., a company he co-founded. NovaCept was subsequently acquired by another company, and Hologic acquired that company. Hologic is the current assignee of both patents and sells the resulting NovaSure system throughout the United States.
Truckai left NovaCept and, in 2008, founded the accused infringer in this case, Minerva Surgical. Truckai and others at Minerva developed the Endometrial Ablation System (EAS), which received FDA approval in 2015 for the same indication as Hologic’s NovaSure system.
In 2015, Hologic sued Minerva alleging that Minerva’s EAS infringed certain claims of its patents. Minerva asserted that the patents were invalid based on lack of enablement and failure to provide an adequate written description, and moreover were not patentable due to prior art. Hologic moved for summary judgment based on the doctrine of assignor estoppel, which bars a patent’s seller from attacking the patent’s validity in subsequent patent infringement litigation. The court granted the motion as to both patents, based on the relationship between the inventor Truckai and his company M…
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[19-8709] Greer v. United States
20 april 2021 · 1 uur 4 min
Greer v. United States Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 20, 2021.
Decided on Jun 14, 2021.Petitioner: Gregory Greer.
Respondent: United States.Advocates:
M. Allison Guagliardo (for the Petitioner)
Benjamin W. Snyder (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2007, Tracy A. Greer pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), along with numerous other charges not directly relevant to this case. In the plea agreement, the parties agreed that Greer was “punishable as an Armed Career Criminal” based on his five prior convictions for aggravated burglary under Ohio law. The district court agreed and sentenced Greer to 272 months’ imprisonment.
In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), and in 2016 it made that invalidation retroactive on collateral review. Greer moved to vacate his sentence, but the district court denied his motion, holding that his convictions qualified under the ACCA’s enumerated-offenses clause, not the residual clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
In 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, which held that when a person is charged with possessing a gun while prohibited from doing so under 18 U.S.C. § 922, the prosecution must prove both that the accused knew that they possessed a gun and that they knew they held the relevant status. The Court granted Greer’s petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment affirming his conviction, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Rehaif.
On remand, Greer requested that the Eleventh Circuit vacate his conviction or, in the alternative, grant him a new trial, because the prosecution did not prove, nor was the jury instructed to find, that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that although Greer had shown plain error, he could n…
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[20-444] United States v. Gary
20 april 2021 · 48 min
United States v. Gary Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 20, 2021.
Decided on Jun 14, 2021.Petitioner: United States.
Respondent: Michael Andrew Gary.Advocates:
Jonathan Y. Ellis (for the Petitioner)
Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2017, Michael Andrew Gary was driving with his cousin when police pulled them over for running a red light. Gary admitted he was driving on a suspended license, so he was placed under arrest. Upon a search of his car, police found a loaded gun. He was charged under state law with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Five months later, Gary had another encounter with police, and upon consenting to a search, police found him in possession of a stolen firearm which Gary admitted was his. Gary was arrested and charged under state law with possession of a stolen firearm.
A federal grand jury indicted Gary on two counts of possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The state charges were dropped, and Gary pleaded guilty to the two federal charges. The district court advised Gary that if he proceeded to trial, the government would have to prove four elements, but did not mention that the government would also need to prove Gary was aware that he was a felon. Gary agreed with the prosecutor’s summary of the facts and entered a guilty plea.
Gary then appealed his sentence but did not challenge the conviction itself. While the appeal was pending, in 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, holding that when a person is charged with possessing a gun while prohibited from doing so under 18 U.S.C. § 922, the prosecution must prove both that the accused knew that they possessed a gun and that they knew they held the relevant status. Gary then submitted a letter raising the relevance of the Rehaif decision. After receiving supplemental briefings from the parties on the relevance of Rehaif, the court of a…
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[20-315] Sanchez v. Mayorkas
19 april 2021 · 59 min
Sanchez v. Mayorkas Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 19, 2021.
Decided on Jun 7, 2021.Petitioner: Jose Santos Sanchez, et al..
Respondent: Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al..Advocates:
Amy M. Saharia (for the Petitioners)
Michael R. Huston (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Petitioners Jose Sanchez and his wife were citizens of El Salvador who entered the United States without inspection or admission in 1997 and again in 1998. Following a series of earthquakes in El Salvador in 2001, they applied for and received temporary protected status (TPS) and were subsequently permitted to remain in the United States due to periodic extensions of TPS eligibility for El Salvadoran nationals by the Attorney General.
In 2014, Sanchez and his wife applied to become lawful permanent residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied their applications, finding that Sanchez was “statutorily ineligible” for adjustment of status because he had not been admitted into the United States. They challenged the denial in federal district court, and the district court granted their motion for summary judgment, holding a grant of TPS meets § 1255(a)’s requirement that an alien must be “inspected and admitted or paroled” to be eligible for adjustment of status. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, finding no support in the text, context, structure, or purpose of the statutes for the claim that a grant of TPS may serve as an admission for those who entered the United States illegally.
Question
Does the conferral of Temporary Protected Status under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a constitute an “admission” into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1255?
Conclusion
The conferral of Temporary Protected Status under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a does not constitute an “admission” into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1255, so recipients of such status are no…
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[20-543] Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation
19 april 2021 · 1 uur 44 min
Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 19, 2021.
Decided on Jun 25, 2021.Petitioner: Janet L. Yellen, Secretary of the Treasury.
Respondent: Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation, et al..Advocates:
Matthew Guarnieri (for the Petitioner)
Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners)
Jeffrey S. Rasmussen (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
For over a century after the Alaska Purchase in 1867, the federal government had no settled policy on recognition of Alaska Native groups as Indian tribes. In 1971, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which authorized the creation of two types of corporations to receive money and land: Alaska Native Regional Corporations and Alaska Native Village Corporations (collectively ANCs).
In 1975, Congress enacted the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) to “help Indian tribes assume responsibility for aid programs that benefit their members.” ISDA defines an “Indian tribe” as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community, including any Alaska Native village or regional or village corporation as defined in or established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (85 Stat. 688), which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians.”
In 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Title V of which makes certain funds available to the recognized governing bodies of any "Indian Tribe" as that term is defined in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA). The Department of the Treasury concluded that ANCs were eligible to receive Title V funds.
Six federally recognized tribes in Alaska and twelve federally recognized tribes in the lower 48 states challenged that determination, a…
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[20-512] National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston
31 maart 2021 · 1 uur 34 min
National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Mar 31, 2021.
Decided on Jun 21, 2021.Petitioner: National Collegiate Athletic Association.
Respondent: Shawne Alston, et al..Advocates:
Seth P. Waxman (for the Petitioners)
Jeffrey L. Kessler (for the Respondents)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), the Supreme Court struck down the NCAA’s television plan as violating antitrust law, but in so doing it held that the rules regarding eligibility standards for college athletes are subject to a different and less stringent analysis than other types of antitrust cases. Because of this lower standard, the NCAA has long argued that antitrust law permits them to restrict athlete compensation to promote competitive equity and to distinguish college athletics from professional sports.
Several Division 1 football and basketball players filed a lawsuit against the NCAA, arguing that its restrictions on “non-cash education-related benefits,” violated antitrust law under the Sherman Act. The district court found for the athletes, holding that the NCAA must allow for certain types of academic benefits, such as “computers, science equipment, musical instruments and other tangible items not included in the cost of attendance calculation but nonetheless related to the pursuit of academic studies.” However, the district court held that the NCAA may still limit cash or cash-equivalent awards for academic purposes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, recognizing the NCAA’s interest in “preserving amateurism,” but concluding nevertheless that its practices violated antitrust law.
Question
Does the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)’s prohibition on compensation for college athletes violate federal an…
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[20-297] TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez
30 maart 2021 · 1 uur 30 min
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Mar 30, 2021.
Decided on Jun 25, 2021.Petitioner: TransUnion LLC.
Respondent: Sergio L. Ramirez.Advocates:
Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner)
Nicole F. Reaves (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Samuel Issacharoff (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In February 2011, Sergio Ramirez went with his wife and father-in-law to purchase a car. When the dealership ran a joint credit check on Ramirez and his wife, it discovered that Ramirez was on a list maintained by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), of people with whom U.S. companies cannot do business (i.e. “a terrorist list”). Ramirez and his wife still bought a car that day, but they purchased it in her name only. TransUnion, the company that had prepared the report, eventually removed the OFAC alert from any future credit reports that might be requested by or for Ramirez.
On behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Ramirez TransUnion in federal court, alleging that the company’s actions violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The district court certified a class of everyone who, during a six-month period, had received a letter from TransUnion stating that their name was a “potential match” for one on the OFAC list, although only a fraction of those class members had their credit reports sent to a third party.
The jury awarded each class member nearly $1,000 for violations of the FCRA and over $6,000 in punitive damages, for a total verdict of over $60 million. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the statutory damages but reduced the punitive damages to approximately $32 million.
TransUnion asked the Supreme Court to resolve two questions, of which the Court agreed to decide only the first.
Question
Does either Article III of the Constitution or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure…
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[20-222] Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System
29 maart 2021 · 1 uur 23 min
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Mar 29, 2021.
Decided on Jun 21, 2021.Petitioner: Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., et al..
Respondent: Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, et al..Advocates:
Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioners)
Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Thomas C. Goldstein (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Shareholders of Goldman Sachs Group filed a class-action lawsuit alleging that the company and several of its executives committed securities fraud by misrepresenting the company’s freedom from, or ability to combat, conflicts of interest in its business practices. The district court certified a shareholder class, but in 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the order because the district court did not apply the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in determining whether Goldman had rebutted the legal presumption that the shareholders relied on Goldman’s alleged misstatements in purchasing its stock at the market price (known as the Basic presumption). On remand, the district court certified the class once more, and this time, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order certifying the class. The court concluded that, on remand, the district court had applied the correct legal standard and did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Goldman’s rebuttal evidence to conclude that it had failed to rebut the Basic presumption.
Question
1. May a defendant in a securities class action rebut the presumption of classwide reliance recognized in Basic Inc. v. Levinson by pointing to the generic nature of the alleged misstatements in showing that the statements had no impact on the price of the security?
2. Does a defendant seeking to rebut the Basic presumption have only a burden of production or also the ultimate burden of persuasion?
Conclusion
While a defe…
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[20-157] Caniglia v. Strom
24 maart 2021 · 1 uur 42 min
Caniglia v. Strom Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Mar 24, 2021.
Decided on May 17, 2021.Petitioner: Edward A. Caniglia.
Respondent: Robert F. Strom, et al..Advocates:
Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioner)
Marc Desisto (for the Respondent)
Morgan L. Ratner (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Edward Caniglia and his wife Kim got into a heated argument, during which Caniglia displayed a gun and told Kim something to the effect of “shoot me now.” Fearing for her husband’s state of mind, Kim decided to vacate the premises for the night. The next morning, she asked an officer from the Cranston Police Department to accompany her back to the house because she was worried that her husband might have committed suicide or otherwise harmed himself.
Kim and several police officers went to the house, and while the encounter was non-confrontational, the ranking officer on the scene determined that Caniglia was imminently dangerous to himself and others and asked him to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation, which Caniglia agreed to. While Caniglia was at the hospital, the ranking officer (with telephone approval from a superior officer) seized two of Caniglia’s guns, despite knowing that Caniglia did not consent to their seizure.
Caniglia was evaluated but not admitted as an inpatient. In October of 2015, after several unsuccessful attempts to retrieve his firearms from the police, Caniglia’s attorney formally requested their return, and they were returned in December. Subsequently he filed a lawsuit under Section 1983 alleging the seizure of his firearms constituted a violation of his rights under the Second and Fourth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Caniglia appealed. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized “community caretaking” as an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement i…
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[19-1414] United States v. Cooley
23 maart 2021 · 1 uur 9 min
United States v. Cooley Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 23, 2021.
Decided on Jun 1, 2021.Petitioner: United States.
Respondent: Joshua James Cooley.Advocates:
Eric J. Feigin (for the Petitioner)
Eric R. Henkel (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Joshua James Cooley was parked in his pickup truck on the side of a road within the Crow Reservation in Montana when Officer James Saylor of the Crow Tribe approached his truck in the early hours of the morning. During their exchange, the officer assumed, based on Cooley’s appearance, that Cooley did not belong to a Native American tribe, but he did not ask Cooley or otherwise verify this conclusion. During their conversation, the officer grew suspicious that Cooley was engaged in unlawful activity and detained him to conduct a search of his truck, where he found evidence of methamphetamine. Meanwhile, the officer called for assistance from county officers because Cooley “seemed to be non-Native.”
Cooley was charged with weapons and drug offenses in violation of federal law. He moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that Saylor was acting outside the scope of his jurisdiction as a Crow Tribe law enforcement officer when he seized Cooley, in violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”). The district court granted Cooley’s motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that Saylor, a tribal officer, lacked jurisdiction to detain Cooley, a non-Native person, without first making any attempt to determine whether he was Native.
Question
May a police officer for a Native American tribe detain and search a non-tribe member within a reservation on suspicion of violating a state or federal law?
Conclusion
A tribal police officer has the authority to detain temporarily and to search a non-tribe member traveling on a public right-of-way running through a reservation for potential violations of state or federal law. …
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[20-107] Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid
22 maart 2021 · 1 uur 9 min
Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Mar 22, 2021.
Decided on Jun 23, 2021.Petitioner: Cedar Point Nursery, et al..
Respondent: Victoria Hassid, et al..Advocates:
Joshua P. Thompson (for the Petitioners)
Michael J. Mongan (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 1975, California enacted the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (“ALRA”), which, among other things, created the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (“the Board”). Shortly after Act went into effect and established the Board, the Board promulgated a regulation allowing union organizers access to agricultural employees at employer worksites under specific circumstances.
Cedar Point Nursery, an Oregon corporation, operates a nursery in Dorris, California, that raises strawberry plants for producers. It employs approximately 100 full-time workers and more than 400 seasonal workers at that location. On October 29, 2015, organizers from the United Farm Workers union ("the UFW") entered the nursery, without providing prior written notice of intent to take access as required by the regulation. The UFW allegedly disrupted the workers, and some workers left their work stations to join the protest, while a majority of workers did not.
Sometime later, the UFW served Cedar Point with written notice of intent to take access. Cedar Point filed a charge against the UFW with the Board, alleging that the UFW had violated the access regulation by failing to provide the required written notice before taking access. The UFW likewise filed a countercharge, alleging that Cedar Point had committed an unfair labor practice.
Cedar Point then sued the Board in federal district court alleging that the access regulation, as applied to them, amounted to a taking without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and an illegal seizure, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted the Board’s motion to dismiss for f…
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[19-1442] Carr v. Saul
3 maart 2021 · 1 uur 2 min
Carr v. Saul Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Mar 3, 2021.
Decided on Apr 22, 2021.Petitioner: Willie Earl Carr, et al..
Respondent: Andrew M. Saul, Commissioner of Social Security.Advocates:
Sarah M. Harris (for the Petitioners)
Austin L. Raynor (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Willie Earl Carr sought disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), but an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied his claim and the agency’s Appeals Council declined to review the decision. Carr appealed to a federal district court.
While his case in the district court was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission, that Securities and Exchange Commission ALJs are “inferior officers” under the Appointments Clause of Article II of the U.S. Constitution, and as inferior officers, they must be appointed by the President, a court, or the head of the agency.
In response to Lucia, the SSA Commissioner appointed the SSA’s ALJs. After these appointment actions, Carr raised a claim for the first time that the ALJs who had rejected their claims had not been properly appointed under the Appointments Clause.
The district court agreed, vacating the SSA’s decision and remanding the case for new hearings before constitutionally appointed ALJs. By agreeing on the merits, the district court held that Carr had not waived his right to raise an Appointments Clause claim by failing to raise that claim during the administrative proceedings. The SSA Commissioner appealed, arguing that Carr did waive the Appointments Clause challenge by failing to raise it earlier. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed and reversed the lower court.
Question
Does a person seeking disability benefits under the Social Security Act forfeit their ability to challenge the appointment of an administrative law judge under the Appointments Clause if they fail to present that chal…
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[19-1257] Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee
2 maart 2021 · 1 uur 54 min
Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Mar 2, 2021.
Decided on Jul 2, 2021.Petitioner: Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, et al..
Respondent: Democratic National Committee, et al..Advocates:
Michael A. Carvin (for the Petitioners in No. 19-1258 (Arizona Republican Party, et al.))
Mark Brnovich (for the Petitioners in No. 19-1257 (Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, et al.))
Jessica R. Amunson (for Respondent Secretary Hobbs)
Bruce V. Spiva (for Respondents Democratic National Committee, et al.)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Arizona offers two methods of voting: (1) in-person voting at a precinct or vote center either on election day or during an early-vote period, or (2) “early voting” whereby the voter receives the ballot by mail and either mails back the voted ballot or delivers the ballot to a designated drop-off location.
Arizona law permits each county to choose a vote center or a precinct-based system for in-person voting. In counties using the vote-center system, registered voters may vote at any polling location in the county. In counties using the precinct-based system, registered voters may vote only at the designated polling place in their precinct. About 90% of Arizona’s population lives in counties using the precinct-based system. If a voter arrives at a polling place and is not listed on the voter rolls for that precinct, the voter may cast a provisional ballot. After election day, election officials review all provisional ballots to determine the voter’s identity and address. If officials determine the voter voted out of precinct (OOP), the county discards the ballot in its entirety, even if (as is the case in most instances), the OOP voter properly voted (i.e., was eligible to vote) in most of the races on the ballot. The Democratic National Committee challenged this OOP policy as violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act because it adve…
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[19-1434] United States v. Arthrex, Inc.
1 maart 2021 · 1 uur 29 min
United States v. Arthrex, Inc. Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Mar 1, 2021.
Decided on Jun 21, 2021.Petitioner: United States.
Respondent: Arthrex, Inc., et al..Advocates:
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States)
Mark A. Perry (for Smith & Nephew, Inc., et al.)
Jeffrey A. Lamken (for Arthrex, Inc.)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Patent Trial and Appeal Board consists of a Director, a Deputy Director, a Commissioner for Patents, a Commissioner for Trademarks, and administrative patent judges. Under 35 U.S.C. § 6(a), the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), appoints Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) to the Board. Among other responsibilities, APJs decide questions of patentability in inter partes review, a “hybrid proceeding” with “adjudicatory characteristics similar to court proceedings.”
Arthrex owns a patent that was subject to inter partes review, and a three-judge panel consisting of three APJs issued a final written decision finding the claims unpatentable. Arthrex appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court for the Federal Circuit, claiming that the appointment of APJs violates the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Federal Circuit agreed, finding that the statute as currently constructed makes APJs principal officers, who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The court severed the portion of the Patent Act restricting removal of the APJs in order to render them inferior officers and thus remedy the constitutional appointment problem.
Question
1. Are administrative patent judges principal officers who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, or inferior officers who may be appointed by a department head?
2. If they are principal officers, can they be rendered inferior officers by severing the portion of the Patent Act restricting their removal…
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[20-18] Lange v. California
24 februari 2021 · 1 uur 52 min
Lange v. California Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Feb 24, 2021.
Decided on Jun 23, 2021.Petitioner: Arthur Gregory Lange.
Respondent: California.Advocates:
Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioner)
Samuel T. Harbourt (for the Respondent, supporting vacatur)
Amanda K. Rice (Court-appointed amicus curiae, supporting the judgment below)
Erica L. Ross (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting affirmance)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
A California Highway Patrol officer observed a parked car “playing music very loudly,” and then the driver, Arthur Gregory Lange, honked the horn four or five times despite there being no other vehicles nearby. Finding this behavior unusual, the officer began following Lange, intending to conduct a traffic stop. After following Lange for several blocks, the officer activated his overhead lights, and Lange “failed to yield.” Lange turned into a driveway and drove into a garage. The officer followed and interrupted the closing garage door. When asked whether Lange had noticed the officer, Lange replied that he had not. Based on evidence obtained from this interaction, Lange was charged with two Vehicle Code misdemeanors and an infraction.
Lange moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the garage. At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor argued that Lange committed a misdemeanor when he failed to stop after the officer activated his overhead lights and that the officer had probable cause to arrest Lange for this misdemeanor offense. Based on this probable cause, the prosecutor argued that exigent circumstances justified the officer’s warrantless entry into Lange’s garage. Lange’s attorney argued that a reasonable person in Lange's position would not have thought he was being detained when the officer activated his overhead lights, and the officer should not have entered Lange's garage without a warrant. The court denied Lange’s motion to suppress, and the appellate divis…
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[19-1155] Garland v. Dai
23 februari 2021 · 1 uur 35 min
Garland v. Dai Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Feb 23, 2021.
Decided on Jun 1, 2021.Petitioner: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General.
Respondent: Ming Dai.Advocates:
Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the Petitioner)
Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Respondent in No. 19-1156 (Alcaraz-Enriquez))
David J. Zimmer (for the Respondent in No. 19-1155 (Dai))
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Ming Dai, a native and citizen of China, sought asylum in the United States. An immigration judge denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, although it did not expressly state that Dai’s testimony lacked credibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the immigration judge’s decision. Dai appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which overturned the BIA and the immigration judge's ruling, holding that Dai was entitled to withholding of removal proceedings. The appellate court specifically noted that absent a finding that Dai was not credible, he was entitled to a presumption of credibility.
This case was consolidated with Garland v. Alcaraz-Enriquez, No. 19-1156.
Question
Can a court of appeals presume that an immigrant’s testimony is credible and true if an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals did not specifically find that he was not credible?
Conclusion
A court of appeals cannot presume that an immigrant’s testimony is true or credible simply based on an absence of an explicit adverse credibility determination. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) requires that a court reviewing a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) accept “administrative findings” of fact as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Coupled with the established principle that a reviewing court is “generally not free to impose” …
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[142-orig] Florida v. Georgia
22 februari 2021 · 1 uur 6 min
Florida v. Georgia Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Feb 22, 2021.
Decided on Apr 1, 2021.Petitioner: Florida.
Respondent: Georgia.Advocates:
Gregory G. Garre (for the Plaintiff)
Craig S. Primis (for the Defendant)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
This is an ongoing case of original jurisdiction, the facts of which are explained here. In sum, the case involves a water-rights dispute between Georgia and Florida over the waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin.
Question
Is Florida is entitled to equitable apportionment of the waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin and appropriate injunctive relief against Georgia to sustain an adequate flow of fresh water into the Apalachicola Region?
Conclusion
Florida failed to establish that Georgia’s overconsumption of interstate waters was either a substantial factor contributing to, or the sole cause of, Florida’s injuries. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the opinion on behalf of the unanimous Court.
To succeed on its claim, Florida must show by the heightened “clear and convincing evidence” that the harm it suffered—collapse of its oyster fisheries—was caused by Georgia’s overconsumption. The record evidence establishes at most that increased salinity and predation contributed to the collapse of Florida’s fisheries, not that Georgia’s overconsumption caused the increased salinity and predation. Thus, Florida failed to meet its burden of persuasion, so its exceptions to the findings of the Special Master’s report are overruled, and the case is dismissed.
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[19-1189] BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore
19 januari 2021 · 1 uur 15 min
BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 19, 2021.
Decided on May 17, 2021.Petitioner: BP P.L.C., et al..
Respondent: Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.Advocates:
Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioners)
Brinton Lucas (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Victor M. Sher (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In July 2018, the Mayor and City of Baltimore filed suit in Maryland state court against 26 oil and gas companies that Maryland says are partly responsible for climate change. The complaint asserted eight causes of action, all founded on Maryland law, and sought monetary damages, civil penalties, and equitable relief. Two of the defendants removed the case to federal court, asserting eight grounds for removal. Baltimore then moved to remand the case back to state court. The district court rejected all eight grounds for removal and granted Baltimore’s motion for remand back to state court.
The defendants appealed the remand order, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court, finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1442 does not provide a proper basis for removal of the suit.
Question
Does federal law permit a court of appeals to review any issue included in a district court’s order remanding a case to state court, or only the ground for removal?
Conclusion
A federal appellate court has jurisdiction to consider all of a defendant’s grounds for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 7-1 majority opinion of the Court.
Section 1447(d) provides that “an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.” In this case, the defendants had r…
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[19-1231] FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project
19 januari 2021 · 1 uur 21 min
FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 19, 2021.
Decided on Apr 1, 2021.Petitioner: Federal Communications Commission, et al..
Respondent: Prometheus Radio Project, et al..Advocates:
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Petitioners in No. 19-1231)
Helgi C. Walker (for the Petitioners in No. 19-1241)
Ruthanne M. Deutsch (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) maintains a collection of rules governing ownership of broadcast media, intended to promote “competition, diversity, and localism.” In 1996, in response to sentiment that the rules were overly restrictive, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act, of which Section 202(h) required the Commission to review the broadcast ownership rules on a regular basis. The FCC’s performance of its duties under that section has been the subject of extensive litigation.
In 2017, the FCC issued an order eliminating altogether newspaper/broadcast and television/radio cross-ownership rules, and making other substantial changes. It also announced its intention to adopt an incubator program, calling for comment on various aspects of the program. In August 2018, the FCC established a radio incubator program. Numerous parties filed petitions for review challenging various aspects of the FCC’s order. Among them, Petitioner Prometheus Radio Project argued that the FCC did not adequately consider the effect its rule changes would have on ownership of broadcast media by women and racial minorities.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that although the FCC did “ostensibly” consider this issue, its analysis was “so insubstantial” that it cannot provide a “reliable foundation” for the FCC’s conclusions. As such, the Third Circuit vacated the bulk of the agency’s actions over the past three years as arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Question
Did th…
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[19-508] AMG Capital Management, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission
13 januari 2021 · 1 uur 7 min
AMG Capital Management, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 13, 2021.
Decided on Apr 22, 2021.Petitioner: AMG Capital Management, LLC, et al..
Respondent: Federal Trade Commission.Advocates:
Michael Pattillo (on behalf of the Petitioners)
Joel R. Marcus (on behalf of the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Scott Tucker owned several companies that provided high-interest, short-term loans via several websites. The loans allegedly required customers to agree to terms that were obscured in several long, cross-referenced agreements. In April 2012, the Federal Trade Commission (“Commission”) filed a lawsuit against Tucker and his businesses in federal court in Nevada. The Commission alleged that Tucker’s loan business violated § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”)’s prohibition against “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” The Commission asked the court to enjoin Tucker from engaging in consumer lending and to order him to disgorge his profits from the scheme.
The court granted the Commission’s requested relief, enjoined Tucker from providing loans, and ordered him to pay approximately $1.27 billion in equitable monetary relief to the Commission. The court instructed the Commission to direct “as much money as practicable” to “direct redress to consumers,” then to “other equitable relief” related to the practices described in the Commission’s complaint, and finally to the U.S. Treasury as disgorgement. Tucker appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. In relevant part, the Ninth Circuit rejected Tucker’s argument that the FTC Act authorizes district courts only to enter “injunctions,” and that the district court’s order to pay “equitable monetary relief” is not an injunction. The Ninth Circuit noted that its precedent squarely holds that § 13 of the FTC Act “empowers district courts to grant any ancillary relief necessa…
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[19-968] Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski
12 januari 2021 · 1 uur 32 min
Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 12, 2021.
Decided on Mar 8, 2021.Petitioner: Chike Uzuegbunam, et al..
Respondent: Stanley C. Preczewski, et al..Advocates:
Kristen Kellie Waggoner (on behalf of the Petitioners)
Hashim M. Mooppan (Counselor to the Solicitor General, for the United States, as amicus curiae)
Andrew A. Pinson (on behalf of the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In July 2016, Chike Uzuegbunam, a student at Georgia Gwinnett College (GGC), began distributing religious literature in an outdoor plaza on GGC’s campus. The campus police stopped him, however, citing GGC’s “Freedom of Expression Policy,” which stated that students were generally permitted to engage in expressive activities only in two designated speech zones, and only after reserving them.
Later, Uzuegbunam reserved one of the designated speech zones to speak to students about his religious beliefs, and campus police again stopped him. According to the police, he was exceeding the scope of his reservation by speaking in addition to handing out literature. After this incident, neither Uzuegbunam nor Joseph Bradford—another GGC student who wishes to speak publicly on campus about his religious beliefs—have attempted to speak publicly or distribute literature on campus.
Uzuegbunam and Bradford filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the school’s policies, both facially and as-applied, violate their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They also sought nominal damages for the violation of these rights. GGC filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and while that motion was pending, GGC revised its “Freedom of Expression Policy” to allow students to speak anywhere on campus without having to obtain a permit, except in limited circumstances. It also removed the portion of its student code of conduct that Uzuegbunam and Bradford had challenged. After making these changes, the sch…
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[19-897] Johnson v. Guzman Chavez
11 januari 2021 · 1 uur 5 min
Johnson v. Guzman Chavez Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Jan 11, 2021.
Decided on Jun 29, 2021.Petitioner: Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al..
Respondent: Maria Angelica Guzman Chavez, et al..Advocates:
Vivek Suri (Assistant to the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Petitioners)
Paul W. Hughes (on behalf of the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Respondents are a class of noncitizens subject to reinstated removal orders, which generally are not open to challenge. However, if a noncitizen has a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in the countries designated in their removal orders, the person may pursue withholding of removal. That is the remedy the respondents in this case sought, and they are being detained by the government while they await the outcome of those withholding-only proceedings.
The respondents requested individualized bond hearings, which could lead to their release during the withholding-only proceedings. The government argued that they are not entitled to individualized bond hearings because they were subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, and bond hearings were denied.
The noncitizens argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1226, rather than 8 U.S.C. § 1231, governs their detention. Section 1226 provides for detention "pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States" and allows for discretionary release on bond.
The district court ruled in favor of the noncitizens, finding that the text of the two statutes made clear that § 1226 applied. The court held that § 1231 does not come into play until the government has “the present and final legal authority to actually execute that order of removal.” A divided three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Are the respondents—who were subject to reinstated removal orders, but with pending claims for withholding of remova…
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[19-422] Collins v. Yellen
9 december 2020 · 1 uur 41 min
Collins v. Yellen Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Dec 9, 2020.
Decided on Jun 23, 2021.Petitioner: Patrick J. Collins, et al..
Respondent: Janet L. Yellen, Secretary of the Treasury, et al..Advocates:
Hashim M. Mooppan (on behalf of the federal parties)
Aaron L. Nielson (Court-appointed amicus curiae)
David H. Thompson (on behalf of the petitioners in 19-422 and the respondents in 19-563)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that purchase mortgages, buy and sell mortgage-backed securities, and guarantee many of the mortgages in the United States. In 2005 and 2006, as the housing market was reaching its peak, Fannie and Freddie over-invested in risky mortgages in an attempt to compete with large investment banks and mortgage lenders. In the aftermath of the 2008 housing crisis, during which Fannie and Freddie required billions of dollars in federal bailouts, Congress created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), an independent agency to oversee the two GSEs. FHFA was to be led by a single director who could be fired by the President “for cause.”
Upon its creation, FHFA placed Fannie and Freddie in a conservatorship with itself as the conservator and negotiated agreements with the Department of Treasury. Under the agreements, the Treasury would invest billions of dollars in the GSEs in return for compensation consisting in part of fixed dividends. For several years, the GSEs’ dividend obligations exceeded their total earnings, requiring them to draw even more money from the Treasury. FHFA and Treasury negotiated and came up with the “Third Amendment,” which replaced the fixed dividend with a variable quarterly dividend equal to the GSEs’ net worth minus a specified capital reserve.
Collins and others are shareholders in Fannie and Freddie. They filed a lawsuit challenging the actions of FHFA, claiming the agency had destroyed the value of th…
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[19-963] Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc.
8 december 2020 · 1 uur 10 min
Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc. Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Dec 8, 2020.
Decided on Jan 25, 2021.Petitioner: Henry Schein Inc..
Respondent: Archer and White Sales Inc..Advocates:
Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the petitioner)
Daniel L. Geyser (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2019, the Court unanimously held in Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc. that under the Federal Arbitration Act, a court may not decide whether an arbitration agreement applies to the particular dispute if the parties “clearly and unmistakably” delegated the question to an arbitrator, even if the court believes that the argument for arbitrability is “wholly groundless.” On remand the U.S. Court of Appeals again refused to compel arbitration, finding that the parties had delegated at least some questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator. Notably, the Fifth Circuit held that because the arbitration agreement included a provision exempting certain claims from arbitration, the agreement did not “clearly and unmistakably” delegate the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator.
Question
Does an arbitration agreement that exempts certain claims from arbitration negate an otherwise clear and unmistakable delegation of questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator?
Conclusion
The writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted.
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[19-511] Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid
8 december 2020 · 1 uur 23 min
Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Dec 8, 2020.
Decided on Apr 1, 2021.Petitioner: Facebook, Inc..
Respondent: Noah Duguid.Advocates:
Paul D. Clement (for the petitioner)
Jonathan Y. Ellis (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
Bryan A. Garner (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Noah Duguid brought this lawsuit because Facebook sent him numerous automatic text messages without his consent. Duguid did not use Facebook, yet for approximately ten months, the social media company repeatedly alerted him by text message that someone was attempting to access his (nonexistent) Facebook account.
Duguid sued Facebook for violating a provision of the Telephone and Consumer Protection Act of 1991 that forbids calls placed using an automated telephone dialing system (“ATDS”), or autodialer. Facebook moved to dismiss Duguid’s claims for two alternate reasons. Of relevance here, Facebook argued that the equipment it used to send text messages to Duguid is not an ATDS within the meaning of the statute. The district court dismissed the claim, and a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding Facebook’s equipment plausibly falls within the definition of an ATDS. TCPA defines an ATDS as a device with the capacity “to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator.” Ninth Circuit precedent further clarifies that an ATDS “need not be able to use a random or sequential generator to store numbers,” only that it “have the capacity to store numbers to be called and to dial such numbers automatically.”
Question
Does the definition of an "automatic telephone dialing system" in the Telephone and Consumer Protection Act of 1991 encompass any device that can “store” and “automatically dial” telephone numbers, even if the device does not “use a random or sequential number generator”?
Conclus…
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[19-351] Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp
7 december 2020 · 1 uur 28 min
Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Dec 7, 2020.
Decided on Feb 3, 2021.Petitioner: Federal Republic of Germany, et al..
Respondent: Alan Philipp, et al..Advocates:
Jonathan M. Freiman (for the petitioners)
Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Nicholas M. O'Donnell (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 1929, just weeks before the October 1929 global stock market crash, several Jewish art dealers in Germany purchased a collection of medieval reliquaries. During the ensuing global depression, the dealers sold about half the pieces and stored the remainder in the Netherlands. Nazi leaders negotiated with the dealers to buy the remaining pieces; the parties dispute whether this negotiation was made under coercive circumstances. After World War II, the collection was transferred to Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz (“SPK”), a German governmental institution that holds the cultural artifacts of former Prussia, and has been on display in a German museum nearly continuously since then.
In 2014, heirs of the Jewish art dealers—respondents in this case—participated in a non-binding mediation process before the Advisory Commission for the Return of Cultural Property Seized as a Result of Nazi Persecution, Especially Jewish Property (the “Advisory Commission”). In what the heirs describe as a “predetermined conclusion, and against the evidence,” the Advisory Commission recommended against restitution of the collection.
The respondents filed a lawsuit in federal court in the District of Columbia, invoking the expropriation exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which abrogates foreign sovereign immunity when “rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue,” as the jurisdictional basis for their claims. Germany and SPK moved to dismiss, and the district court largely denied the moti…
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[18-1447] Republic of Hungary v. Simon
7 december 2020 · 1 uur 21 min
Republic of Hungary v. Simon Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Dec 7, 2020.
Decided on Feb 3, 2021.Petitioner: Republic of Hungary, et al..
Respondent: Rosalie Simon, et al..Advocates:
Gregory Silbert (for the petitioners)
Benjamin W. Snyder (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Sarah E. Harrington (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Rosalie Simon and other respondents in this case are Jewish survivors of the Holocaust in Hungary. They sued the Republic of Hungary and other defendants in federal court in the United States seeking class certification and class-wide damages for property taken from them during World War II. Importantly, they did not first file a lawsuit in Hungary. Rather, they invoked the expropriation exemption of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in claiming the federal court had jurisdiction, though their substantive claims arose from federal and D.C. common law.
The district court dismissed the suit, holding that FSIA's treaty exception grants the Hungarian defendants immunity, that the 1947 Peace Treaty between the Allied Powers and Hungary set forth an exclusive mechanism for Hungarian Holocaust victims to obtain recovery for their property losses, and that permitting the plaintiffs' lawsuit to proceed under FSIA would conflict with the peace treaty's terms. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal as to the non-property claims and reversed as to the property-based claims. The court remanded the case for the district court to determine whether, as a matter of international comity, it should refrain from exercising jurisdiction over those claims until the plaintiffs exhaust domestic remedies in Hungary.
On remand, the district court again dismissed the case, holding that international comity required that the plaintiffs first exhaust their claims in Hungary. Again, the D.C. Circuit reversed, noting that its int…
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[19-5807] Edwards v. Vannoy
2 december 2020 · 1 uur 26 min
Edwards v. Vannoy Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Dec 2, 2020.
Decided on May 17, 2021.Petitioner: Thedrick Edwards.
Respondent: Darrel Vannoy, Warden.Advocates:
Andre Belanger (for the petitioner)
Elizabeth Murrill (for the respondent)
Christopher G. Michel (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Thedrick Edwards was sentenced to life in prison for the commission of several robberies and rape in 2006. At Edwards’s trial, the state used its challenges to exclude all but one African American juror from the jury, and at least one person voted to acquit Edwards, a black man, on each count. At the time, Louisiana permitted conviction by a 10-2 vote, so Edwards’s conviction became final in 2010.
On April 20, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ramos v. Louisiana, holding that the Sixth Amendment establishes a right to a unanimous jury in both federal and state courts. Edwards argues that he would not have been convicted if he had been prosecuted in one of 48 other states or by the federal government, rather than in Louisiana.
Question
Does the Court’s decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, holding that the Sixth Amendment establishes a right to a unanimous jury in both federal and state courts, apply retroactively to cases on federal collateral review?
Conclusion
The jury-unanimity rule announced in Ramos v. Louisiana does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court.
A decision announcing a new rule of criminal procedure ordinarily does not apply retroactively on federal collateral (habeas) review. Applying constitutional rules retroactively undermines the principle of finality, which is “critical to the operation of our criminal justice system.” However, two questions are relevant to the consideration whether a rule may be applied retroactively: (1) whether it is a new rule or ap…
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[19-930] CIC Services, LLC v. Internal Revenue Service
1 december 2020 · 1 uur 3 min
CIC Services, LLC v. Internal Revenue Service Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Dec 1, 2020.
Decided on May 17, 2021.Petitioner: CIC Services, LLC.
Respondent: Internal Revenue Service, et al..Advocates:
Cameron T. Norris (for the petitioner)
Jonathan C. Bond (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2004, Congress delegated authority to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to gather information about potential tax shelters, which the IRS does by requiring taxpayers their advisors to maintain and submit records pertaining to any "reportable transactions." IRS regulations define what constitutes reportable transactions. Failure to maintain and submit such records can result in substantial penalties for taxpayers and tax advisors.
On November 21, 2016, the IRS published Notice 2016-66, which identified certain “micro-captive transactions” as a subset of reportable transactions. As a result, taxpayers and those advising them who engaged in such transactions were required to report them or else be subject to substantial penalties.
On March 27, 2017, Petitioner CIC Services, an advisor to taxpayers engaging in micro-captive transactions, sued the IRS and the Treasury Department in federal court, alleging that the IRS promulgated Notice 2016-66 in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The Petitioner asked the court to stop the IRS from enforcing the Notice. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, and the federal defendants raised the defense that the lawsuit was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) and the tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, which divest federal district courts of jurisdiction over suits “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismiss…
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[19-416] Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe I
1 december 2020 · 1 uur 28 min
Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe I Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Dec 1, 2020.
Decided on Jun 17, 2021.Petitioner: Nestlé USA, Inc..
Respondent: John Doe I, et al..Advocates:
Neal Kumar Katyal (on behalf of the petitioners)
Curtis E. Gannon (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Paul L. Hoffman (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The plaintiff/respondents in this case are former enslaved children who were kidnapped and forced to work on cocoa farms in the Ivory Coast for up to fourteen hours without pay. They filed a class-action lawsuit against large manufacturers, purchasers, processors, and retail sellers of cocoa beans, including petitioner Nestle USA (and Cargill Inc., petitioner in a consolidated case).
Nestle USA, Inc., and Cargill, Inc., both domestic corporations, effectively control cocoa production in the Ivory Coast and operate “with the unilateral goal of finding the cheapest source of cocoa in the Ivory Coast,” resulting in a “system built on child slavery to depress labor costs.” The respondents allege that the defendants are aware that child slave labor is a problem in the Ivory Coast yet continue to provide financial support and technical farming aid to farmers who use forced child labor.
The children filed a proposed class action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that the defendant companies were liable under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for aiding and abetting child slavery in the Ivory Coast. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss based on its conclusion that corporations cannot be sued under the ATS, and that even if they could, the plaintiffs failed to allege the elements of a claim for aiding and abetting slave labor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that corporations are liable for aiding and abetting slavery, in part because it found that norms that are “universal and a…
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[19-783] Van Buren v. United States
30 november 2020 · 1 uur 6 min
Van Buren v. United States Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Nov 30, 2020.
Petitioner: Nathan Van Buren.
Respondent: United States of America.Advocates:
Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the petitioner)
Eric J. Feigin (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Nathan Van Buren was a sergeant with the Cumming, Georgia, Police Department. In that capacity, he came to know a man named Andrew Albo, who allegedly paid young prostitutes to spend time with him and then accused the women of stealing the money he gave them. Van Buren asked Albo for a loan, falsely claiming that he needed over $15,000 to settle his son’s medical bills. Unbeknownst to Van Buren, Albo recorded the conversation in which Van Buren requested the loan. Albo presented the recording to a detective in the Forsyth County Sheriff’s Office, alleging that Van Buren was “shaking him down for his money.” As a result, the FBI conducted a sting operation to test how far Van Buren was willing to go for money. As part of the sting operation, Albo asked Van Buren to look into a woman Albo named, to see whether she was an undercover officer before he would provide Van Buren with the full amount of money Van Buren requested. Van Buren searched the woman’s information in a government database maintained by the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) and the FBI. The next day, FBI and GBI agents confronted Van Buren, and Van Buren admitted to the fake story about his son to get the loan from Albo, his use of the government database to search for the woman Albo mentioned might be an undercover officer, and that he understood the purpose of searching the database was to discover and reveal to Albo whether the woman was an undercover officer.
A federal grand jury charged Van Buren with one count of honest-services wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1346, and one count of felony computer fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030. A jury convicted Van Buren on both counts, …
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[20-366] Trump v. New York
30 november 2020 · 1 uur 33 min
Trump v. New York Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Nov 30, 2020.
Decided on Dec 18, 2020.Appellant: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al..
Appellee: New York, et al..Advocates:
Jeffrey B. Wall (on behalf of the Appellants)
Barbara D. Underwood (on behalf of the State Appellees)
Dale E. Ho (on behalf of the private Appellees)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
On July 21, 2020, President Donald Trump announced that the population figures used to determine the apportionment of Congress would, in a reversal of long-standing practice, exclude non-citizens who are not lawfully present in the United States. To implement this new policy, the President ordered the Secretary of Commerce to provide him two sets of numbers for each state. The first number was the total population as determined in the 2020 census and the second, the total population as determined in the 2020 census minus the number of "aliens who are not in a lawful immigration status." The President left it to the Secretary to determine how to calculate the latter figure, but since the 2020 census did not not collect information regarding citizenship status, let alone legal immigration status in this country, it remained unclear how the Secretary would obtain that number.
Immediately after the President filed the memorandum, two sets of plaintiffs—a coalition of 22 States and D.C., 15 cities and counties, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors (the "Governmental Plaintiffs"); and a coalition of non-governmental organizations—challenged the decision to exclude illegal aliens from the apportionment base for Congress on the ground that it violates the Constitution, statutes governing the census and apportionment, and other laws.
The federal district court found for the plaintiffs, concluding that by directing the Secretary to provide two sets of numbers, one derived from the census and one not, and announcing that it is the policy of the United St…
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[19-840] California v. Texas
10 november 2020 · 2 uur 1 min
California v. Texas Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Nov 10, 2020.
Decided on Jun 17, 2021.Petitioner: The State of California, et al..
Respondent: The State of Texas, et al..Advocates:
Michael J. Mongan (for California, et al.)
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (for the U.S. House of Representatives)
Kyle D. Hawkins (for Texas, et al.)
Jeffrey B. Wall (for the United States, et al.)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) against a constitutional challenge by characterizing the penalty for not buying health insurance as a tax, which Congress has the power to impose. In 2017, the Republican-controlled Congress enacted an amendment to the ACA that set the penalty for not buying health insurance to zero, but it left the rest of the ACA in place. Texas and several other states and individuals filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the individual mandate again, arguing that because the penalty was zero, it can no longer be characterized as a tax and is therefore unconstitutional. California and several other states joined the lawsuit to defend the individual mandate.
The federal district court held that the individual mandate is now unconstitutional and that as a result, the entire ACA is invalidated because the individual mandate cannot be “severed” from the rest of the Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s conclusion but remanded the case for reconsideration of whether any part of the ACA survives in the absence of the individual mandate. The Supreme Court granted California’s petition for review, as well as Texas’s cross-petition for review.
Question
Do the plaintiffs in this case have standing to challenge the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which now has a penalty of zero for not buying health insurance?
If the plaintiffs have standing, is the individual mandate…