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495 afleveringen, van nieuw naar oud
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[21-439] Nance v. Ward
25 april 2022 · 1 uur 26 min
Nance v. Ward Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Apr 25, 2022.
Decided on Jun 23, 2022.Petitioner: Michael Nance.
Respondent: Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections and Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison.Advocates:
Matthew S. Hellman (for the Petitioner)
Masha G. Hansford (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Stephen J. Petrany (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 1993, Michael Wade Nance robbed a bank, and, in the process of fleeing, killed a person. In 1997, a jury convicted Nance of murder, and he was sentenced to death. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his death sentence and rejected a petition for collateral relief. Nance then filed a federal habeas petition; the district court denied the petition, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Then, in 2020, Nance filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the State’s lethal-injection protocol was unconstitutional as applied to him because of two medical issues. The district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss Nance’s complaint, concluding that it was untimely and failed to state a claim. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals concluded that because the relief Nance sought implied the invalidity of his death sentence, his complaint must be construed as a habeas petition, and because he had already filed an earlier habeas petition, it was properly considered a “successive” petition, over which a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
Question
What is the proper legal procedure for a death-row inmate’s challenge to the method by which the state intends to execute?
Conclusion
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the procedural vehicle appropriate for a prisoner’s method-of-execution claim even if an order granting the relief requested would necessitate a change in state law. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion of the Court.
Both …
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[21-499] Vega v. Tekoh
20 april 2022 · 1 uur 20 min
Vega v. Tekoh Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Apr 20, 2022.
Decided on Jun 23, 2022.Petitioner: Carlos Vega.
Respondent: Terence B. Tekoh.Advocates:
Roman Martinez (for the Petitioner)
Vivek Suri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Paul L. Hoffman (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Terence Tekoh worked as a patient transporter in a hospital in Los Angeles. After a patient accused him of sexual assault, hospital staff reported the allegation to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department. Deputy Carlos Vega went to the hospital to ask Tekoh some questions and to take Tekoh’s statement. Although the parties described vastly different accounts of the nature of the interaction between Tekoh and Vega, it is undisputed that Vega did not advise Tekoh of his Miranda rights prior to questioning him or taking his statement.
Tekoh was arrested and charged in California state court, but a jury returned a verdict of not guilty. Following the acquittal on the criminal charge, Tekoh sued Vega under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Vega violated Tekoh’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by taking his statement without first advising him of his Miranda rights.
Based on the district court’s instructions, a jury found for Vega. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the verdict, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial.
Question
Is the use of an un-Mirandized statement against a defendant in a criminal case sufficient to support a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action?
Conclusion
A violation of the Miranda rules does not provide a basis for a § 1983 claim. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court.
Miranda imposed a set of prophylactic rules requiring that police officers issue warnings before a custodial interrogation and disallowing the use of statements obtained in violation of those rules. A Miranda vi…
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[21-5726] Kemp v. United States
19 april 2022 · 44 min
Kemp v. United States Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Apr 19, 2022.
Decided on Jun 13, 2022.Petitioner: Dexter Earl Kemp.
Respondent: United States of America.Advocates:
Andrew L. Adler (for the Petitioner)
Benjamin W. Snyder (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Dexter Kemp and several co-defendants were charged and convicted of drug and firearms offenses. Kemp and some of the co-defendants appealed, but their sentences were affirmed. Some of the co-defendants, without Kemp, filed petitions for rehearings, rehearings en banc, and certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. Over a year later, Kemp moved to vacate his sentence under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The court denied his motion as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Kemp argued that his petition was timely under Supreme Court Rule 13.3, which provides that if a petition for rehearing is timely filed in the lower court, the time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari runs from the date of the denial of rehearing. The court denied his motion, finding that it fell under Rule 60(b)(1) because it alleged the court made a “mistake,” and that such motions must be filed within one year.
Question
Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) authorize relief based on a district court’s error of law?
Conclusion
The term “mistake” in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) includes a judge’s errors of law, but Kemp’s motion was untimely under Rule 60(c)’s 1-year limitations period. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court.
When the Rule was adopted in 1938 and revised in 1946, the word “mistake” applied to any “misconception,” “misunderstanding,” or “fault in opinion or judgment” as to any law or fact. The text, structure, and history of the Rule support the understanding that it applies to judicial mistakes, not just party mistakes.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a co…
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[21-234] George v. McDonough
19 april 2022 · 1 uur 15 min
George v. McDonough Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Apr 19, 2022.
Decided on Jun 15, 2022.Petitioner: Kevin R. George.
Respondent: Denis R. McDonough.Advocates:
Melanie L. Bostwick (for the Petitioner)
Anthony A. Yang (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Kevin R. George and Michael B. Martin are both military veterans who sought and were denied disability benefits several decades ago based on the straightforward application of a regulation. Since then, the regulation was overturned, so George and Martin sought revision of those denial decisions based on the “clear and unmistakable error” (CUE) by the VA.
The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the motions, holding that it was not clear and unmistakable error to faithfully apply a regulation that existed at the time. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.
Question
When the Department of Veterans Affairs denies a veteran’s claim for benefits in reliance on an agency interpretation later deemed invalid under the plain text of the statutory provisions in effect at the time of the denial, is that the kind of “clear and unmistakable error” that the veteran may invoke to challenge the VA’s decision?
Conclusion
The invalidation of a Department of Veterans Affairs regulation after a veteran’s benefits decision becomes final cannot support a claim for collateral relief permitting revision of that decision based on “clear and unmistakable error.” Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the majority opinion of the Court.
The “clean and unmistakable error” doctrine evolved over several decades. Its history reveals that this category of error does not encompass a subsequent change in law or in interpretation of law. Because the invalidation of a prior regulation constitutes a “change in interpretation of law,” this type of error does not encompass a claim like George’s.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the history of…
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[21-441] Siegel v. Fitzgerald
18 april 2022 · 1 uur 15 min
Siegel v. Fitzgerald Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Apr 18, 2022.
Decided on Jun 6, 2022.Petitioner: Alfred H. Siegel.
Respondent: John P. Fitzgerald, III.Advocates:
Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner)
Curtis E. Gannon (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Since 1978, bankruptcy courts in the United States have operated under two programs for the handling of their proceedings — the Trustee program and the Bankruptcy Administrator program. Eighty-eight of the 94 judicial districts operate within the Trustee program, while the other districts (in Alabama and North Carolina) are under the Bankruptcy Administrator program. The former is part of the Department of Justice, while the latter is overseen by the Judicial Council of the United States.
Each program is also funded differently. The Bankruptcy Administrator program is funded by the judiciary's general budget, whereas the bankruptcy debtors in Trustee districts primarily fund the Trustee program. All Chapter 11 debtors, regardless of district, paid quarterly fees under a consistent formula until January 1, 2018, at which time the Trustee program experienced a funding deficit. To remedy that deficit, Congress passed the 2017 Amendment, which increased the quarterly fees for larger Chapter 11 cases in the Trustee program.
In 2008, Circuit City—then a national chain of consumer electronics retail stores throughout the United States—filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the Eastern District of Virginia, which is a Trustee district. As part of its liquidation plan, Circuit City was to pay fees to the U.S. Trustee until the close of bankruptcy. However, after the quarterly fees increased, Circuit City refused to pay the increased fees, arguing that the 2017 Amendment is unconstitutional because it creates nonuniform bankruptcy laws in violation of the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of …
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[21-404] United States v. Washington
18 april 2022 · 1 uur 3 min
United States v. Washington Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Apr 18, 2022.
Decided on Jun 21, 2022.Petitioner: United States of America.
Respondent: State of Washington, et al..Advocates:
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Petitioner)
Tera M. Heintz (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Hanford site was a federal nuclear production site in Washington State that operated between 1944 and 1989, producing substantial amounts of radioactive and chemically hazardous waste. The U.S. Department of Energy now oversees cleanup of the site, which is largely conducted by private contractors and subcontractors.
In 2018, Washington amended its state workers’ compensation laws specifically for these cleanup workers. The amended law creates a rebuttable presumption that certain conditions and cancers are occupational diseases.
The federal government challenged the law as violating the principle of intergovernmental immunity. The district court granted summary judgment for Washington, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does a Washington state workers’ compensation law that applies exclusively to certain federal workers in that state violate the principle of intergovernmental immunity?
Conclusion
Washington’s workers’ compensation law is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause because it facially discriminates against the federal government and does not fall within the scope of the federal waiver of immunity. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
The Supremacy Clause prohibits states from interfering with or controlling the operations of the federal government, also known as the intergovernmental immunity doctrine. Washington’s law explicitly treats federal workers differently from state and private workers, and imposes costs upon the federal government that state and private entities do not bear. As such, it is unconstitutional under the Su…
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[20-1573] Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana
30 maart 2022 · 1 uur 21 min
Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Mar 30, 2022.
Decided on Jun 15, 2022.Petitioner: Viking River Cruises, Inc..
Respondent: Angie Moriana.Advocates:
Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner)
Scott L. Nelson (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Angie Moriana worked as a sales representative for Viking River Cruises, Inc., and agreed to submit any dispute arising out of her employment to binding arbitration. Notwithstanding that agreement, Moriana sued Viking on behalf of herself and similarly situated workers under California’s Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). Moriana relied on a 2014 decision by the California Supreme Court, Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, which held arbitration agreements that waive the right to bring PAGA representative actions in any forum (such as the one between Moriana and Viking) are unenforceable. Viking moved to compel Moriana’s claims to arbitration, arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis overruled Iskanian. The trial court denied Viking’s motion. The appellate court affirmed.
Question
Does the Federal Arbitration Act require enforcement of a bilateral arbitration agreement providing that an employee cannot raise representative claims?
Conclusion
The Federal Arbitration Act preempts a California law that invalidates contractual waivers of the right to bring representative claims. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion holding that the FAA preempts the rule in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles to the extent that Iskanian precludes division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate.
The California Supreme Court’s holding in Iskanian, holding unenforceable any arbitration agreement that waives the right to bring a PAGA representative action, presents parties with an impermissible choice: e…
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[20-603] Torres v. Texas Department of Public Safety
29 maart 2022 · 1 uur 41 min
Torres v. Texas Department of Public Safety Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Mar 29, 2022.
Decided on Jun 29, 2022.Petitioner: Le Roy Torres.
Respondent: Texas Department of Public Safety.Advocates:
Andrew T. Tutt (for the Petitioner)
Christopher G. Michel (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Judd E. Stone, II (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Leroy Torres enlisted in the U.S. Army Reserve in 1989. In 1998, he was employed by the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) as a trooper, where he served until his deployment to Iraq in 2007. In 2008, he was honorably discharged and sought reemployment by DPS. However, due to a lung condition he acquired in Iraq, Torres requested employment with DPS in a position different from the one he held before. Instead, DPS offered Torres only a “temporary duty offer,” which he declined.
Torres sued DPS in 2017, alleging that the agency’s failure to offer him a job that would accommodate his disability violated the federal Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), which prohibits adverse employment actions against an employee based on the employee’s military service. The trial court ruled in favor of Torres, finding that USERRA properly abrogated DPS’s sovereign immunity under Congress’s constitutional war powers. The appellate court reversed.
Question
Did Congress properly abrogate state sovereign immunity for claims arising under the federal Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA)?
Conclusion
Congress properly exercised its power to raise and support the Armed Forces when it authorized private damages suits against nonconsenting States, as in the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the majority opinion of the Court.
In PennEast, the Court held that Congress could, pursuant to its eminent dom…
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[21-309] Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon
28 maart 2022 · 1 uur 7 min
Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Mar 28, 2022.
Decided on Jun 6, 2022.Petitioner: Southwest Airlines Co..
Respondent: Latrice Saxon.Advocates:
Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioner)
Jennifer D. Bennett (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Latrice Saxon is a ramp supervisor, which entails managing and assisting workers to load and unload airplane cargo for Southwest Airlines. Unlike ramp agents, supervisors like Saxon are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement and instead are required to arbitrate wage disputes, in accordance with their employment contract.
Notwithstanding the arbitration requirement, Saxon, on behalf of herself and other ramp supervisors, sued Southwest under the Fair Labor Standards Act for failing to pay overtime work. Southwest moved to stay the suit pending arbitration, or to dismiss it altogether in light of the arbitration agreement. Saxon argued that the Arbitration Act did not apply to her lawsuit because she and other ramp supervisors were “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” and therefore exempt under Section 1 of the Act.
The district court ruled for Southwest, finding that a transportation worker must actually transport goods, not merely handle them at one end or the other of a network. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the act of loading cargo onto a vehicle to be transported interstate is itself commerce, and thus Saxon and the class of workers she represents are exempt from the Act.
Question
Is an airline employee who works as a ramp agent supervisor a “transportation worker” under Section 1 of the Arbitration Act and therefore exempt from the Act’s arbitration requirement?
Conclusion
An airline employee who works as a ramp agent supervisor, frequently loading and unloading airplane cargo, belongs to the “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” and is…
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[20-807] LeDure v. Union Pacific Railroad Company
28 maart 2022 · 1 uur 41 min
LeDure v. Union Pacific Railroad Company Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Mar 28, 2022.
Decided on Apr 28, 2022.Petitioner: Bradley LeDure.
Respondent: Union Pacific Railroad Company.Advocates:
David C. Frederick (for the Petitioner)
Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
J. Scott Ballenger (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Bradley LeDure is a conductor for Union Pacific Railroad Company. In August 2016, LeDure reported for work at a rail yard in Salem, Illinois, to assemble a train for a trip to Dexter, Missouri. Three locomotives were coupled together on a sidetrack, and LeDure decided only one locomotive would be powered on. On an exterior walkway on his way to shut down one of the locomotives, LeDure slipped and fell down the steps. Upon investigation, LeDure noticed a “slick” substance, which Union Pacific later reported to be a “small amount of oil” on the walkway.
LeDure sued Union Pacific for negligence under the Locomotive Inspection Act and the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, arguing that Union Pacific failed to maintain the walkway free of hazards. The district court dismissed LeDure’s claims, finding the locomotive was not “in use” and therefore not subject to the Locomotive Inspection Act, and LeDure’s injuries were not reasonably foreseeable because they resulted from a small “slick spot” unknown to Union Pacific. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Question
Is a train that makes a temporary stop in a railyard as part of its unitary journey in interstate commerce “in use” and therefore subject to the Locomotive Inspection Act?
Conclusion
The judgment of the Seventh Circuit, affirming that the train was not "in use" and therefore not subject to the Locomotive Inspection Act, was affirmed by an equally divided Court. Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
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[21-401] ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd.
23 maart 2022 · 1 uur 50 min
ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd. Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Mar 23, 2022.
Decided on Jun 13, 2022.Petitioner: ZS Automotive US, Inc., et al..
Respondent: Luxshare, Ltd..Advocates:
Roman Martinez (for the Petitioners in 21-401)
Joseph T. Baio (for the Petitioners in 21-518)
Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Andrew R. Davies (for the Respondent in 21-401)
Alexander A. Yanos (for the Respondent in 21-518)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In August 2017, Luxshare entered into a large-scale business deal with ZF Automotive US, and the deal closed in April 2018. Luxshare allegedly discovered that ZF fraudulently concealed certain material facts, inflating the purchase price.
The parties’ purchase agreement required that all disputes be settled by three arbitrators in Germany, and Luxshare intended to bring claims for the losses as a result of ZF’s allegedly wrongful conduct. However, it first sought to obtain discovery from ZF and its senior officers and asked a federal district court to compel discovery under 28 U.S.C. 1782(a).
Question
Does 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), which gives federal district courts authority to order litigants subject to their jurisdiction to give testimony or produce documents “for use in a foreign or international tribunal,” apply to private commercial arbitral tribunals?
Conclusion
Although 28 U.S.C. §1782(a) permits a district court to order discovery “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal,” only a governmental or intergovernmental adjudicative body may qualify as such a tribunal, and the arbitration panels in these cases are not such adjudicative bodies. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
The word “tribunal” in the context of § 1782, with modifiers “foreign or international” is best understood to refer to an adjudicative body that exercises governmental authority. The statut…
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[20-1034] Golan v. Saada
22 maart 2022 · 1 uur 20 min
Golan v. Saada Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Mar 22, 2022.
Decided on Jun 15, 2022.Petitioner: Narkis Aliza Golan.
Respondent: Isacco Jacky Saada.Advocates:
Karen R. King (for the Petitioner)
Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur)
Richard Min (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Isacco Saada and Narkis Golan married in Italy in 2015 and had a son. From the very start of their relationship, Saada was violently abusive toward Golan, including in front of their son (though allegedly not toward the son). In 2018, Golan and their son traveled to the United States and remained there.
Saada asked a court to return their son under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The district court found that Italy was the child’s country of habitual residence for the purposes of the Hague Convention. However, it also found that returning the child to Italy would subject him to a grave risk of psychological harm based on Saada’s abuse of Golan. Under binding precedent, the district court was also required to determine whether there were any ameliorative undertakings it could impose on Saada that would mitigate the risk of harm in returning the child to Italy. The district court ordered Saada to stay away from Golan, to pay her $30,000, and to visit their son only with Golan’s consent. After the district court coordinated with an Italian court to enforce the orders, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
Question
Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, musts courts consider all measures that might mitigate the grave risk of harm if the child were to return to their country of habitual residence?
Conclusion
A court is not required to examine all possible ameliorative measures before denying a Hague Convention petition for return of a child to a foreign country once the court …
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[21-328] Morgan v. Sundance, Inc.
21 maart 2022 · 1 uur 22 min
Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Mar 21, 2022.
Decided on May 23, 2022.Petitioner: Robyn Morgan.
Respondent: Sundance, Inc..Advocates:
Karla A. Gilbride (for the Petitioner)
Paul D. Clement (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In September 2018, Robyn Morgan sued Sundance, Inc. for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, alleging that Sundance failed to pay her for overtime work. The district court denied Sundance’s motion to dismiss. Sundance then answered Morgan's complaint but did not assert its right to arbitrate Morgan's claims. After filing its answer, Morgan participated in a settlement mediation with plaintiffs in another similar lawsuit in Michigan. The Michigan case settled, but Morgan's case moved forward. Nearly eight months after the filing of Morgan's complaint, Sundance moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion, concluding Sundance's participation in the litigation waived its right to arbitration. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.
Question
Does the arbitration-specific requirement that the proponent of a contractual waiver defense prove prejudice violate the Supreme Court’s instruction that lower courts must “place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts”?
Conclusion
Federal courts may not adopt an arbitration-specific rule conditioning a waiver of the right to arbitrate on a showing of prejudice. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
Outside of the arbitration context, a federal court assessing whether a party has waived a right does not generally ask about prejudice. Rather, waiver is “the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” It focuses on the actions of the person who held the right, not the effects on the opposing party. Although the FAA may express policy favoring arbitration, that policy does not authorize federal courts to invent sp…
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[21-248] Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP
21 maart 2022 · 1 uur 11 min
Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Mar 21, 2022.
Decided on Jun 23, 2022.Petitioner: Philip E. Berger.
Respondent: North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, et al..Advocates:
David H. Thompson (for the Petitioners)
Elisabeth S. Theodore (for the NAACP Respondents)
Sarah Boyce (for the State Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The North Carolina chapter of the NAACP challenged a North Carolina voter-ID law, arguing that it violates the Constitution and the federal Voting Rights Act. Although the state attorney general, a Democrat, is already is representing the State's interest in the validity of that law, defending its constitutionality in both state and federal court, Republicans Phil Berger, president pro tempore of the state senate, and Tim Moore, speaker of the state house representatives, sought to intervene to also represent the interests of the State.
The district court twice rejected their requests to intervene, and the full (en banc) U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also rejected their request.
Question
Do the two North Carolina legislators have a right to intervene in this case to defend a state voter-ID law?
Conclusion
North Carolina’s legislative leaders are entitled to intervene in this litigation. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) provides, in relevant part, that one has a right to intervene in litigation if they have an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and are “so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede” their ability to protect their interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.
When a State chooses to divide its sovereign authority among different officials and authorize their participation in a suit challenging state law, full…
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[21-147] Egbert v. Boule
2 maart 2022 · 1 uur 12 min
Egbert v. Boule Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Mar 2, 2022.
Decided on Jun 8, 2022.Petitioner: Erik Egbert.
Respondent: Robert Boule.Advocates:
Sarah M. Harris (for the Petitioner)
Michael R. Huston (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Felicia H. Ellsworth (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Erik Egbert, a Customs and Border Patrol Agent, went to the Smugglers Inn, which sits at the U.S.-Canada border, and approached a car carrying a guest from Turkey. The inn’s owner, Robert Boule, asked Egbert to leave, and when Egbert refused to do so, Egbert pushed Boule to the ground. After Boule complained to Egbert’s supervisors, Egbert suggested to the IRS that it investigate Boule.
Boule filed a Bivens lawsuit (so called because of the case Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, which first recognized the right of plaintiffs to sue federal officials for damages arising from violations of their constitutional rights) against Egbert arguing that the agent had violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court ruled against Boule, finding his claims beyond the scope of those permitted under Bivens. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, and the full (en banc) Ninth Circuit denied Egbert’s petition for rehearing.
Question
Does a plaintiff have a right to sue federal officers for First Amendment retaliation claims or for allegedly violating the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights while engaging in immigration-related functions?
Conclusion
A plaintiff does not have a right to sue Border Patrol officers engaged in immigration-related functions for First Amendment retaliation claims or for alleged excessive force. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the majority opinion of the Court.
Although Bivens permits suits against federal officials for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, its application to Border …
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[20-1410] Ruan v. United States
1 maart 2022 · 1 uur 35 min
Ruan v. United States Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Mar 1, 2022.
Decided on Jun 27, 2022.Petitioner: Xiulu Ruan.
Respondent: United States of America.Advocates:
Lawrence S. Robbins (for the Petitioner in 20-1410)
Beau B. Brindley (for the Petitioner in 21-5261)
Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
A federal jury in Alabama convicted Xiulu Ruan and several other pain management physicians of running a medical practice constituting a racketeering enterprise in violation of several federal statutes, including provisions of the Controlled Substances Act. Ruan allegedly prescribed medicines, including Schedule II drugs (many of which are opioids), outside the standard of care for his practice. At trial, prosecutors showed that Ruan and other physicians in his practice prescribed medications for their own financial gain rather than for the benefit of their patients. Ruan and other defendants challenged their convictions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Question
May a physician alleged to have prescribed controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice be convicted of unlawful distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) regardless of whether he “reasonably believed” or “subjectively intended” that his prescriptions fall within that course of professional practice?
Conclusion
The crime of prescribing controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, requires that the defendant “knowingly or intentionally” acted in an unauthorized manner. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the majority opinion of the Court.
In general, criminal law seeks to punish conscious wrongdoing. Thus, when a criminal statute is silent as to the mental state required, courts infer a requirement of knowledge or intent. When it is not silent, the general mental state provision applies to each term of the pro…
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[20-1641] Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan v. DaVita, Inc.
1 maart 2022 · 1 uur 28 min
Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan v. DaVita, Inc. Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Mar 1, 2022.
Decided on Jun 21, 2022.Petitioner: Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan, et al..
Respondent: DaVita, Inc., et al..Advocates:
John J. Kulewicz (for the Petitioners)
Matthew Guarnieri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting reversal)
Seth P. Waxman (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
DaVita is the leading provider of dialysis treatment in the United States. Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan is a self-funded plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). Patient A is an anonymous individual with end-stage renal disease who is a member of the plan and has been receiving treatment by DaVita since April 15, 2017.
The Plan defines three tiers of reimbursement, and dialysis providers are categorically in the lowest tier and are considered out of network, entitling them to the lowest level of reimbursement relative to all other providers.
DaVita challenged the Plan as violating the Medicare Secondary Payer Act, which prohibits health plans from treating individuals with kidney failure differently in eligibility or access to benefits. The district court dismissed all of DaVita’s claims, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding that DaVita had plausibly alleged that the Plan engaged in unlawful discrimination.
Question
Did the Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan violate the Medicare Secondary Payer Act’s non-discrimination provisions through its reimbursement structure for dialysis providers?
Conclusion
The Marietta Plan’s coverage terms for outpatient dialysis do not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(1)(C) because those terms apply uniformly to all covered individuals, and the Medicare Secondary Payer statute does not authorize disparate-impact liability. J…
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[20-1530] West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency
28 februari 2022 · 2 uur 3 min
West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Feb 28, 2022.
Decided on Jun 30, 2022.Petitioner: West Virginia, et al..
Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency, et al..Advocates:
Lindsay S. See (for the state Petitioners)
Jacob M. Roth (for the private Petitioners)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the federal Respondents)
Beth S. Brinkmann (for the power company Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Trump administration repealed the 2015 Clean Power Plan, which established guidelines for states to limit carbon dioxide emissions from power plants, and issued in its place the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule, which eliminated or deferred the guidelines. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the ACE Rule as arbitrary and capricious. One of the challengers, North American Coal Corporation, challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s authority to so broadly regulate greenhouse gas emissions.
Question
Does the Environmental Protection Agency have the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in virtually any industry, so long as it considers cost, non-air impacts, and energy requirements?
Conclusion
Congress did not grant the Environmental Protection Agency in Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act the authority to devise emissions caps based on the generation shifting approach the Agency took in the Clean Power Plan.
Under the “major questions doctrine,” there are “extraordinary cases” in which the “history and the breadth of the authority that [the agency] has asserted,” and the “economic and political significance” of that assertion, provide a “reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress” meant to confer such authority. This is one such case, so the EPA must point to “clear congressional authorization” for the authority it claims. It cannot do so.
The EPA has admitted that issues of electricity transmission, distribution, a…
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[20-1775] Arizona v. City and County of San Francisco
23 februari 2022 · 1 uur 21 min
Arizona v. City and County of San Francisco Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Feb 23, 2022.
Decided on Jun 15, 2022.Petitioner: Arizona, et al..
Respondent: City and County of San Francisco, California, et al..Advocates:
Mark Brnovich (for the Petitioners)
Brian H. Fletcher (for the federal Respondents)
Helen H. Hong (for the state Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Although federal immigration law uses the term “public charge,” referring generally to recipients of federal benefits, it lacks a precise and clear definition. Under the Clinton administration, it referred only to a noncitizen who received cash benefits (as opposed to other types of benefits). In 2019, the Trump administration issued a final rule defining “public charge” as a noncitizen who would likely need cash benefits and/or government-provided housing, food assistance, or medical insurance for more than twelve months.
The rule was subject to legal challenges, and the Biden administration stopped defending the rule and dismissed all the cases challenging the rule. The federal government also took additional steps to revert the definition to that of the Clinton administration. Several states sought to intervene in the litigation and take up the defense of the rule where the federal government left off. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the states’ motion to intervene.
Question
Can states with interests intervene to defend a rule when the United States ceases to defend it?
Conclusion
Dismissed as improvidently granted.
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[20-493] Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas
22 februari 2022 · 1 uur 32 min
Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Feb 22, 2022.
Decided on Jun 15, 2022.Petitioner: Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, et al..
Respondent: State of Texas.Advocates:
Brant C. Martin (for the Petitioners)
Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Lanora C. Pettit (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Ysleta del Sur Pueblo is a federally recognized tribe with a reservation near El Paso, Texas. Under the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act, passed by Congress in 1987, the Pueblo agreed that its gaming activities would comply with Texas law. Another law, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, also regulates tribal gaming operations. The Pueblo engaged in gaming activity that violated state law but not the IGRA, and Texas filed a lawsuit to enjoin the tribe’s gaming operations. The district court ruled in favor of the State of Texas, finding that the more restrictive Restoration Act controlled and prohibited the gaming operations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Which federal law governs the legality of the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo’s gaming operations, the Restoration Act or the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act?
Conclusion
The Ysleta del Sur and Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act applies to the case at hand and bans on tribal lands only those gaming activities also banned in Texas. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court
Section 107 of the Restoration Act directly addresses gaming on the lands of the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, providing that “gaming activities which are prohibited by [Texas law] are hereby prohibited on the reservation and on lands of the tribe.” Activities that Texas law merely regulates and does not prohibit are outside the scope of the Act.
Chief Justice John Roberts authored a dissenting opinion, in which Ju…
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[20-7622] Denezpi v. United States
22 februari 2022 · 1 uur 6 min
Denezpi v. United States Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Feb 22, 2022.
Decided on Jun 13, 2022.Petitioner: Merle Denezpi.
Respondent: United States of America.Advocates:
Michael B. Kimberly (for the Petitioner)
Erica L. Ross (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Merle Denezpi, a member of the Navajo tribe, pleaded guilty to an assault charge in the Court of Indian Offenses. That court is a trial court that exercises jurisdiction over Native Americans where there are no tribal courts to do so. Six months later, a federal grand jury indicted Denezpi on a charge of aggravated sexual assault based on the same underlying events. He was found guilty and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment.
Denezpi challenged his prosecution in federal court, arguing that it violated the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause because the Court of Indian Offenses is a federal agency. The district court ruled against Denezpi, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does a prosecution in the Court of Indian Offenses trigger the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause?
Conclusion
The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive prosecutions of distinct offenses arising from a single act, even if a single sovereign prosecutes them. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the majority opinion of the Court.
The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit prosecuting a person twice “for the same conduct or actions,” but for the same “offence.” Under the dual-sovereignty principle, two offenses arising from the same act can therefore be separately prosecuted without offending the Double Jeopardy Clause, even if they have identical elements and could not be separately prosecuted if enacted by a single sovereign. Denezpi’s single act constituted assault and battery under the Ute Mountain Ute Code and aggravated sexual abuse in Indian country under the U.S. Code. His prosecution for both crimes does not violate the Double Jeop…
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[20-1650] Concepcion v. United States
19 januari 2022 · 1 uur 15 min
Concepcion v. United States Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Jan 19, 2022.
Decided on Jun 27, 2022.Petitioner: Carlos Concepcion.
Respondent: United States of America.Advocates:
Charles L. McCloud (for the Petitioner)
Matthew Guarnieri (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2008, Carlos Concepcion pleaded guilty to crack cocaine charges, and in 2009 he was sentenced to 228 months in prison. While he was serving his sentence, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act, which reduced the statutory penalties for most federal crimes involving crack cocaine. In 2018, Congress made these changes retroactive, and Concepcion moved for resentencing. The district court denied his motion, and Concepcion appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the district court was not obligated to update and reevaluate the sentencing factors.
Question
Must or may a district court consider intervening legal and factual developments when deciding whether to “impose a reduced sentence” on an individual under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018?
Conclusion
The First Step Act allows district courts to consider intervening changes of law or fact in exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion of the Court.
District courts enjoy substantial discretion to consider all relevant information at a sentencing hearing. That discretion extends to subsequent hearings modifying sentencing, as well. The First Step Act preserves this discretion, allowing the district court to reduce sentences based not only on the changes to sentencing ranges, but also on other legal or factual changes that have occurred since the original sentencing.
Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito and Amy Coney Barrett. Justice Kavanaugh argued that the text of the First Step Act authorizes district courts to …
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[21-12] Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate
19 januari 2022 · 1 uur 28 min
Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 19, 2022.
Decided on May 16, 2022.Petitioner: Federal Election Commission.
Respondent: Ted Cruz for Senate, et al..Advocates:
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Appellant)
Charles J. Cooper (for the Appellees)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The day before Election Day in 2018, Senator Ted Cruz loaned Ted Cruz for Senate (“Cruz Committee”) two campaign finance loans totaling $260,000. After Election Day, the Cruz Committee used the funds it had on hand to pay vendors and meet other obligations instead of repaying the loans to Senator Cruz. Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act and its implementing regulations place a $250,000 limit on the amount of post-election contributions that may be used to pay back a candidate's pre-election loans more than 20 days after Election Day. After 20 days had elapsed, the balance of those loans that exceeded BCRA's $250,000 statutory cap on post-election contributions ($10,000)—converted into a campaign contribution. The Cruz Committee filed a lawsuit seeking to invalidate and enjoin enforcement of Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act and its implementing regulations as violating constitutional and administrative laws.
A three-judge court ruled for Cruz, finding that the restrictions place a burden on political speech without adequate justification.
Question
Do appellees have standing to challenge the statutory loan-repayment limit of 52 U.S.C. § 30116(j), and does the limit unconstitutionally burden political speech without justification?
Conclusion
Appellees have standing to challenge Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, and that section—which limits the amount of post-election contributions that may be used to repay a candidate who lends money to his own campaign—violates the First Amendment rights of candidates and their campaigns to engage in political spee…
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[20-1566] Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation
18 januari 2022 · 1 uur 4 min
Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 18, 2022.
Decided on Apr 21, 2022.Petitioner: David Cassirer.
Respondent: Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation.Advocates:
David Boies (for the Petitioners)
Masha G. Hansford (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Thaddeus J. Stauber (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
David Cassirer and others filed a lawsuit to recover a painting by French Impressionist painter Camille Pissarro, which was stolen from their ancestors by the Nazi regime in 1939. The district court originally granted summary judgment in favor of Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation (TBC), but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the court needed to determine, as a threshold matter, whether TBC had actual knowledge the painting was stolen. If it had such knowledge, then it could be an accessory after the fact under Spanish Civil Code Article 1956.
On remand, the district court determined that TBC did not have actual knowledge that the painting was stolen when it purchased the painting in 1993. Cassirer again appealed, arguing among other things the Ninth Circuit’s earlier decision erred in holding that Spanish law governs the substantive claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court, finding no factual or legal developments that would justify revisiting its original holding.
Question
Should a federal court hearing state law claims under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act apply the forum state’s choice-of-law rules or federal common law to determine what substantive law governs the claims at issue?
Conclusion
A federal court hearing state-law claims under the FSIA should determine the substantive law by using the same choice-of-law rule applicable in a similar suit against a private party. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion holding that, in thi…
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[20-1800] Shurtleff v. Boston
18 januari 2022 · 1 uur 23 min
Shurtleff v. Boston Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Jan 18, 2022.
Decided on May 2, 2022.Petitioner: Harold Shurtleff, et al..
Respondent: City of Boston, Massachusetts, et al..Advocates:
Mathew D. Staver (for the Petitioners)
Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting reversal)
Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The City of Boston owns and manages three flagpoles in front of City Hall, the seat of Boston’s municipal government. Ordinarily, the City raises the United States flag and the POW/MIA flag on one flagpole, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts flag on the second flagpole, and its own flag on the third flagpole. Upon request and after approval, the City will occasionally fly another flag for a limited period of time instead of its own flag.
Gregory T. Rooney, Commissioner of Boston’s Property Management Department, reviews applications for flag-raising events to ensure the flag is consistent with the City’s message, policies, and practices. The City has approved 284 flag-raising events over a 12-year period, and Rooney had never denied a flag-raising application.
Camp Constitution is an organization that seeks “to enhance the understanding of the country’s Judeo-Christian moral heritage” and applied to fly a “Christian flag” for its event. Rooney denied Camp Constitution’s flag-raising request, finding it was the first time any entity or organization had requested to fly a religious flag. Camp Constitution sued, and the district court found for the City. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does Boston’s refusal to fly a private religious organization’s flag depicting a cross on a city flagpole violate the organization’s First Amendment rights?
Conclusion
Boston’s flag-raising program does not constitute government speech, so its refusal to fly the private religious organization’s flag violates the orga…
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[20-1472] Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
12 januari 2022 · 1 uur 7 min
Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 12, 2022.
Decided on Apr 21, 2022.Petitioner: Boechler, P.C..
Respondent: Commissioner of Internal Revenue.Advocates:
Melissa Arbus Sherry (On behalf of the Petitioner)
Jonathan C. Bond (On behalf of the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
On June 5, 2015, the Internal Revenue Service sent Boechler, P.C., a letter noting a discrepancy between prior tax document submissions. After not receiving a response, the IRS imposed a 10% intentional disregard penalty, which Boechler did not pay. The IRS mailed Boechler a notice of intent to levy. Boechler timely responded but failed to establish grounds for relief. On July 28, 2017, the Office of Appeals mailed a determination sustaining the levy to Boechler's last known address in Fargo, North Dakota. The notice of determination, delivered on July 31, stated that Boechler had 30 days from the date of determination, i.e. until August 28, 2017, to submit a petition for review.
Boechler mailed a petition for a CDP hearing on August 29, 2017, one day after the 30-day filing deadline had expired. The Tax Court received Boechler's untimely petition, and the IRS moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Boechler argued that the 30-day time limit in 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1) is not jurisdictional, the time limit should be equitably tolled, and calculating the time limit from issuance rather than receipt violates due process. The tax court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, and Boechler appealed.
Question
Is the 30-day time limit to file a petition for review in the Tax Court of a notice of determination from the commissioner of internal revenue in 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1) a jurisdictional requirement or a claim-processing rule subject to equitable tolling?
Conclusion
The 30-day time limit of 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1) is a nonjurisdictional deadline subject to equitable tolling. Justice …
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[20-322] Garland v. Gonzalez
11 januari 2022 · 1 uur 4 min
Garland v. Gonzalez Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 11, 2022.
Decided on Jun 13, 2022.Petitioner: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General, et al..
Respondent: Esteban Aleman Gonzalez, et al..Advocates:
Curtis E. Gannon (for the Petitioners)
Matthew H. Adams (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Esteban Aleman Gonzalez and Gutierrez Sanchez are natives and citizens of Mexico who reside in the United States. The federal government had initiated removal proceedings against them, but asylum officers determined that each had a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in Mexico. Gonzalez and Sanchez both requested a bond hearing before an immigration judge after they had been detained for 180 days, but both requests were denied.
Question
Is a noncitizen who has spent more than six months in immigration detention awaiting resolution of their deportation withholding claim entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge to determine whether they can be released on bond?
Conclusion
District courts lack jurisdiction to entertain the respondents’ requests for class-wide injunctive relief. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion reversing the judgment of the lower court.
Section 1252(f)(1) generally strips lower courts of “jurisdiction or authority” to “enjoin or restrain the operation of ” certain provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Although that section includes one exception, to “enjoin or restrain the operation of” the relevant statutory provisions “with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated,” that exception does not apply to claims on behalf of an entire class.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan, dissenting from the Court’s holding as to the interpretation of Section 1252(f)(1) but concurring in the judgment insofa…
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[19-896] Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez
11 januari 2022 · 1 uur 5 min
Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 11, 2022.
Decided on Jun 13, 2022.Petitioner: Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al..
Respondent: Antonio Arteaga-Martinez.Advocates:
Austin L. Raynor (for the Petitioners)
Pratik A. Shah (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Antonio Arteaga-Martinez is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection. In May 2018, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested and detained him and initiated removal proceedings. Arteaga-Martinez applied for withholding and deferral of removal based on fear of violence in Mexico. Six months after the start of his detention, he requested a bond hearing and challenged his continued detention without one.
Question
Is a noncitizen who has spent more than six months in immigration detention awaiting resolution of their deportation withholding claim entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge to determine whether they can be released on bond?
Conclusion
The Government is not required to provide noncitizens detained for six months with bond hearings in which the Government bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the noncitizen poses a flight risk or a danger to the community.
No plausible construction of the text of 9 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) requires the Government to provide bond hearings with the procedures mandated by the Third Circuit. It says nothing about bond hearings before immigration judges or burdens of proof.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurrring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in part, arguing that while the majority reached the correct conclusion, he would hold that the Court lacks jurisdiction, the Due Process Clause does not apply to removal of noncitizens, and Zadvydas v. Davis should be overruled.
Justice Stephen Breyer authored an opinion concurring in …
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[20-1263] Gallardo v. Marstiller
10 januari 2022 · 1 uur 45 min
Gallardo v. Marstiller Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 10, 2022.
Decided on Jun 6, 2022.Petitioner: Gianinna Gallardo, an Incapacitated Person, By and Through her Parents and Co-Guardians Pilar Vassallo and Walter Gallardo.
Respondent: Simone Marstiller, In Her Official Capacity as Secretary of the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration.Advocates:
Bryan S. Gowdy (for the Petitioner)
Vivek Suri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Henry C. Whitaker (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Gianinna Gallardo suffered catastrophic injuries when she was hit by a truck after getting off her school bus, and she remains in a persistent vegetative state. She eventually recovered $800,000 in a court-approved settlement, which applied to her past medical expenses, future medical expenses, lost wages, and other damages. However, the settlement amount covered only a fraction of each type of damages.
Medicaid had paid $862,688.77 toward her past medical expenses, so in an attempt to recover reimbursement for its payments, pursuant to Florida law, the State of Florida asserted a lien over the compensation for past medical expenses, which Medicaid had paid, as well as the compensation for future medical expenses.
Gallardo’s counsel filed a lawsuit asking the court to enjoin the state from asserting its lien over the portion of her tort recovery compensating for future medical expenses and to declare that Florida’s reimbursement statute violates the Medicaid Act. The district court ruled for Gallardo, finding that the Medicaid Act preempted the Florida law to the extent that the law allows the State to satisfy its lien for past medical expenses from the portion of the beneficiary’s tort recovery that compensates for future medical expenses. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed.
Question
Does the federal Medicaid Act provide for a state Medicaid pr…
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[21A240] Biden v. Missouri
7 januari 2022 · 1 uur 26 min
Biden v. Missouri Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 7, 2022.
Decided on Jan 13, 2022.Petitioner: Joseph R. Biden.
Respondent: Missouri, et al..Advocates:
Brian H. Fletcher (On behalf of the Applicants)
Jesus A. Osete (On behalf of the Respondents in No. 21A240)
Elizabeth Murrill (On behalf of the Respondents in No. 21A241)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
None
Question
Does the Department of Health and Human Services have the authority to enforce a rule requiring health care workers at facilities that participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they qualify for a medical or religious exemption?
Conclusion
The Department of Health and Human Services has the authority to enforce its rule requiring health care workers at facilities that participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they qualify for a medical or religious exemption. In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court granted the applications to stay the two injunctions barring the Secretary of Health and Human Services from enforcing the regulation.
The Court reasoned that a core function of HHS is to ensure that the healthcare providers who care for Medicare and Medicaid patients protect their patients’ health and safety, and the interim rule at issue here seeks to do precisely that.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett joined. The dissenters found no statutory support for such an exercise of authority.
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[21A244] National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration
7 januari 2022 · 2 uur 8 min
National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 7, 2022.
Decided on Jan 13, 2022.Petitioner: National Federation of Independent Business, et al..
Respondent: Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration.Advocates:
Scott A. Keller (On behalf of the Applicants in No. 21A244)
Benjamin M. Flowers (On behalf of the Applicants in No. 21A247)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (On behalf of the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
None
Question
Did the Occupational Safety & Health Administration exceed its authority in promulgating a rule mandating that employers with at least 100 employees require covered workers to receive a COVID–19 vaccine or else wear a mask and be subject to weekly testing?
Conclusion
The challengers to the OSHA rule requiring that employers with at least 100 employees require covered workers to receive a COVID–19 vaccine or else wear a mask and be subject to weekly testing are likely to succeed on the merits. In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court granted the application to stay the OSHA rule.
Congress created OSHA to set workplace safety standards. The challenged rule goes well beyond that and is effectively a broad public health measure. Even the exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic do not justify such an expansion in the agency's authority.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined, reiterating that the States and Congress—not OSHA—have the authority to decide how to respond to the pandemic.
Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan filed a joint dissent, arguing that the pandemic directly affects the safety of workplaces and thus that OSHA has the authority to issue regulations to curb the effects of the pandemic in workplaces. The dissenters argue that by grantin…
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[20-1009] Shinn v. Ramirez
8 december 2021 · 54 min
Shinn v. Ramirez Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Dec 8, 2021.
Decided on May 23, 2022.Petitioner: David Shinn, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry.
Respondent: David Martinez Ramirez.Advocates:
Brunn W. Roysden III (for the Petitioner)
Robert M. Loeb (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
David Ramirez was convicted by a jury and sentenced to death by a judge for the 1989 murders of his girlfriend and her daughter. On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentence, including the trial court’s assessment of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and imposition of the death sentence. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Ramirez filed a petition for post-conviction relief in state court, alleging various claims, but did not claim ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The state court denied his petition, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for review. Ramirez then filed a petition for habeas relief in federal district court. The court substituted his counsel “due to concerns regarding the quality of representation” and allowed Ramirez to amend his petition to add the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. However, the court ultimately found the claim procedurally defaulted because Ramirez had not raised it earlier.
In 2012, while Ramirez’s appeal was pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court held in Martinez v. Ryan that a federal court cannot consider evidence outside the state-court record when reviewing the merits of a claim for habeas relief if a prisoner or his attorney failed to diligently develop the claim’s factual basis in state court, but “a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that …
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[20-1088] Carson v. Makin
8 december 2021 · 1 uur 55 min
Carson v. Makin Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Dec 8, 2021.
Decided on Jun 21, 2022.Petitioner: David Carson, as Parent and Next Friend of O. C., et al..
Respondent: A. Pender Makin.Advocates:
Michael Bindas (for the Petitioner)
Christopher C. Taub (for the Respondent)
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The State of Maine relies on local school administrative units (SAUs) to ensure that every school-age child in the state has access to a free education. Not every SAU operates its own public secondary school. To meet the state requirements, an SAU without its own public secondary school may either (1) contract with a secondary school to provide school privileges or (2) pay the tuition of a secondary school at which a particular student is accepted. In either circumstance, the secondary school must be either a public school or an “approved” private school.
To be an “approved” school, a private school must meet the state’s compulsory attendance requirements (which can be demonstrated by accreditation by a New England association of schools and colleges or by approval by the Maine Department of Education), and it must be “nonsectarian in accordance with the First Amendment.”
The Carsons, Gillises, and Nelsons live in SAUs that do not operate a public secondary school of their own but instead provide tuition assistance to parents who send their children to an “approved” private school. The three families opted to send their children to private schools that are accredited but do not meet the nonsectarian requirement because they are religiously affiliated. Because the schools are not “approved,” they do not qualify for tuition assistance. The families filed a lawsuit in federal court arguing that the “nonsectarian” requirement violates the Constitution on its face and as applied. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district…
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[20-1459] United States v. Taylor
7 december 2021 · 1 uur 26 min
United States v. Taylor Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Dec 7, 2021.
Decided on Jun 21, 2022.Petitioner: United States of America.
Respondent: Justin Eugene Taylor.Advocates:
Rebecca Taibleson (for the Petitioner)
Michael R. Dreeben (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Justin Eugene Taylor and a co-conspirator intended to rob a drug dealer, who ended up being shot during the transaction. The Government’s indictment charged Taylor on seven counts, including conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, attempted Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and use of a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
The indictment also alleged two predicate crimes of violence: the conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and the attempted Hobbs Act robbery. Taylor pled guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and use of a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence,” and the Government agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. Taylor was convicted of using a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
On habeas review, Taylor asked the court to vacate his conviction and remand for resentencing based on the argument that the two predicate offenses are not “crimes of violence” under § 924(c). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated Taylor’s § 924(c) conviction, finding that because the elements of attempted Hobbs Act robbery do not invariably require “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,” the offense does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c).
Question
Does the definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) exclude attempted Hobbs Act robbery, which may be completed through an attempted threat alone?
Conclusion
Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A) because no element o…
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[20-979] Patel v. Garland
6 december 2021 · 1 uur 31 min
Patel v. Garland Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Dec 6, 2021.
Decided on May 16, 2022.Petitioner: Pankajkumar S. Patel, et al..
Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General.Advocates:
Mark C. Fleming (for the Petitioners)
Austin L. Raynor (for the Respondent supporting reversal)
Taylor A.R. Meehan (for the judgment below)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Pankajkumar Patel is a citizen of India who entered the United States without inspection. In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security charged Patel as removable for being present without inspection. At a hearing, Patel conceded that he was removable but sought discretionary relief from removal on the grounds that he had an approved I-140 employment authorization document. To be eligible for discretionary relief from removal, a noncitizen must show, among other things, “clearly and beyond doubt” that he is not inadmissible. However, Patel’s admissibility is in doubt because, when he applied for a Georgia driver’s license in 2008, he falsely represented himself when he checked a box indicating he is a U.S. citizen. At his removal hearing, Patel argued that it was simply a mistake and was immaterial since citizenship was not required to obtain the driver’s license.
The immigration judge (IJ) rejected Patel’s arguments and denied his application for adjustment of status. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, finding no clear error in the factual findings. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the factual findings of the IJ, based on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), which provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review” “any judgment regarding the granting of relief” for certain enumerated categories of discretionary relief, including the relief for which Patel applied.
Question
Does 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) preserve the jurisdiction of federal courts to review a nondiscretionary de…
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[19-1401] Hughes v. Northwestern University
6 december 2021 · 1 uur 31 min
Hughes v. Northwestern University Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Dec 6, 2021.
Decided on Jan 24, 2022.Petitioner: April Hughes, et al..
Respondent: Northwestern University, et al..Advocates:
David C. Frederick (for the Petitioners)
Michael R. Huston (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Gregory G. Garre (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Northwestern University offers two employee investment plans that are at issue in this case, a Retirement Plan in which Northwestern makes a matching contribution and a Voluntary Savings plan in which the University does not match. Laura Divane and other plaintiffs are beneficiaries of one or both of the employee investment plans.
The plaintiffs sued Northwestern University for allegedly breaching its fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. The plaintiffs alleged that Northwestern breached its fiduciary duty by offering a stock account option with excessive fees and a history of underperformance. The district court found no breach, noting that participants could have avoided any problems with the undesirable funds by simply choosing other options. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Question
Are allegations that a defined-contribution retirement plan paid or charged its participants fees that substantially exceeded fees for alternative available investment products or services sufficient to state a claim against plan fiduciaries for breach of the duty of prudence under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)?
Conclusion
An allegation that fiduciaries breached their duty of prudence requires a context-specific inquiry involves assessing the fiduciaries’ duty to monitor all plan investments and remove any imprudent ones, which the Seventh Circuit below failed to do.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the opinion for the unanimous (8…
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[19-1392] Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization
1 december 2021 · 1 uur 53 min
Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Dec 1, 2021.
Decided on Jun 24, 2022.Petitioner: Thomas E. Dobbs, State Health Officer of the Mississippi Department of Health, et al..
Respondent: Jackson Women's Health Organization, et al..Advocates:
Scott G. Stewart (for the Petitioners)
Julie Rikelman (for the Respondents)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2018, Mississippi passed a law called the “Gestational Age Act,” which prohibits all abortions, with few exceptions, after 15 weeks’ gestational age. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the only licensed abortion facility in Mississippi, and one of its doctors filed a lawsuit in federal district court challenging the law and requesting an emergency temporary restraining order (TRO). After a hearing, the district court granted the TRO while the litigation proceeded to discovery. After discovery, the district court granted the clinic’s motion for summary judgment and enjoined Mississippi from enforcing the law, finding that the state had not provided evidence that a fetus would be viable at 15 weeks, and Supreme Court precedent prohibits states from banning abortions prior to viability. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Is Mississippi’s law banning nearly all abortions after 15 weeks’ gestational age unconstitutional?
Conclusion
The Constitution does not confer a right to abortion; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, are overruled. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court.
The Constitution does not mention abortion. The right is neither deeply rooted in the nation’s history nor an essential component of “ordered liberty.” The five factors that should be considered in deciding whether a precedent should be overruled suppor…
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[20-1114] American Hospital Association v. Becerra
30 november 2021 · 1 uur 13 min
American Hospital Association v. Becerra Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Nov 30, 2021.
Decided on Jun 15, 2022.Petitioner: American Hospital Association, et al..
Respondent: Xavier Becerra, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al..Advocates:
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (for the Petitioners)
Christopher G. Michel (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The federal government reimburses hospitals for providing outpatient care to patients insured by Medicare Part B. Until recently, the government reimbursed all hospitals at a uniform rate for providing covered drugs. In 2018, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) reduced the reimbursement rates for certain types of hospitals (known as “340B hospitals”) because those hospitals can obtain the covered drugs far more cheaply than other hospitals can. HHS reasoned that it should not reimburse hospitals more than they paid to acquire the drugs.
Several 340B hospitals and hospital associations affected by the decision filed a lawsuit challenging HHS’s decision to lower reimbursement rates. The district court ruled that HHS had exceeded its statutory authority by reducing drug reimbursement rates for 340B hospitals, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that HHS’s decision is based on a reasonable interpretation of the statute.
Question
1. Is the Department of Health and Human Services’ decision to lower drug reimbursement rates for certain hospitals based on a reasonable interpretation of the Medicare statute?
2. Does 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(12) preclude the petitioners’ challenge to HHS’s adjustments?
Conclusion
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 does not preclude judicial review of the reimbursement rates set by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for certain outpatient prescription drugs that hospitals provide to Medicare patients. Here, because HHS did n…
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[20-219] Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C.
30 november 2021 · 1 uur 20 min
Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C. Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Nov 30, 2021.
Decided on Apr 28, 2022.Petitioner: Jane Cummings.
Respondent: Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C..Advocates:
Andrew Rozynski (for the Petitioner)
Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Jane Cummings has been deaf since birth and is legally blind. In 2016, she contacted Premier Rehab Keller to treat her chronic back pain and requested that Premier provide an ASL interpreter. Premier refused and told her she could communicate with her therapist using written notes, lipreading, gesturing, or provide her own ASL interpreter. Cummings ultimately went to another physical therapy provider but found the alternate provider “unsatisfactory.”
Cummings sued Premier for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, and the Texas Human Resources Code § 121.003. In her complaint, she sought injunctive relief and damages. The district court granted Premier’s motion to dismiss, finding that “[t]he only compensable injuries that Cummings alleged Premier caused were ‘humiliation, frustration, and emotional distress,’" and emotional distress damages are unavailable under the statutes Cummings relied on. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Do the compensatory damages available under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the statutes that incorporate its remedies for victims of discrimination, such as the Rehabilitation Act and the Affordable Care Act, include compensation for emotional distress?
Conclusion
Emotional distress damages are not recoverable in a private action to enforce either the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the Affordable Care Act. Chief Justice John…
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[20-1312] Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation
29 november 2021 · 1 uur 9 min
Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Nov 29, 2021.
Decided on Jun 24, 2022.Petitioner: Xavier Becerra, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
Respondent: Empire Health Foundation, for Valley Hospital Medical Center.Advocates:
Jonathan C. Bond (for the Petitioner)
Daniel J. Hettich (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2005, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services promulgated a rule eliminating the word “covered” from 42 C.F.R. § 412.106(b)(2)(i), effectively amending HHS’s interpretation of the phrase “entitled to [Medicare]” in a subsection of the Medicare Act. This amendment affects the way HHS calculates its reimbursement to certain hospitals that serve low-income patients.
Plaintiff Empire Health Foundation challenged the 2005 Rule as part of a larger challenge to HHS’s calculation of its 2008 reimbursement. The district court granted partial summary judgment for Empire based on a finding that HHS did not follow correct procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because of numerous mistakes that occurred during the notice-and-comment process. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds, concluding that HHS did follow the correct procedures under the APA, but the rule is substantively invalid because it directly conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent holding that the phrase “entitled to [Medicare] is unambiguous.”
Question
Did the Department of Health and Human Services follow the correct procedures when it promulgated a rule changing the way it calculates Medicare reimbursement rates for hospitals?
Conclusion
HHS followed the correct procedures; in calculating the Medicare fraction, individuals “entitled to [Medicare Part A] benefits” are all those qualifying for the program, regardless of whether they receive Medicare payments for part or all of a hospital stay. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 5-4 majority opinion of t…
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[20-1029] City of Austin, Texas v. Reagan National Advertising of Texas Inc.
10 november 2021 · 1 uur 37 min
City of Austin, Texas v. Reagan National Advertising of Texas Inc. Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Nov 10, 2021.
Decided on Apr 21, 2022.Petitioner: City of Austin, Texas.
Respondent: Reagan National Advertising of Texas Inc., et al..Advocates:
Michael R. Dreeben (for the Petitioner)
Benjamin W. Snyder (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Reagan National Advertising of Austin and Lamar Advantage Outdoor Company own and operate signs and billboards that display commercial and non-commercial messages. They filed applications with the City of Austin to digitize existing billboards, but the City denied the applications because its sign code does not allow the digitization of off-premises signs.
Reagan and Lamar sued, arguing that the code’s distinction between on-premise signs and off-premise signs violates the First Amendment. The district court held that the sign code was content-neutral and thus that it need only satisfy intermediate scrutiny—it must further an important government interest through means that are substantially related to that interest. The court found the code satisfied this test and entered judgment for the City. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the code’s distinction is content-based, therefore subject to scrutiny, and that it cannot withstand strict scrutiny.
Question
Does the Austin city code’s distinction between on-premise signs, which may be digitized, and off-premise signs, which may not, constitute facially unconstitutional content-based regulation?
Conclusion
The City of Austin’s on-/off-premises distinction is facially content-neutral under the First Amendment. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion of the Court.
When the government regulates speech based on its content, the regulation is subject to strict scrutiny, which requires that the…
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[20-303] United States v. Vaello-Madero
9 november 2021 · 1 uur 13 min
United States v. Vaello-Madero Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Nov 9, 2021.
Decided on Apr 21, 2022.Petitioner: United States.
Respondent: Jose Luis Vaello-Madero.Advocates:
Curtis E. Gannon (for the Petitioner)
Hermann Ferré (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Congress established the Supplemental Security Income program in 1972 to provide cash benefits to low-income people who are 65 or older and have disabilities. The program extends to residents of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the unincorporated territory of the Northern Mariana Islands, but not to those living in Puerto Rico.
Jose Luis Vaello-Madero was born in Puerto Rico in 1954 and moved to New York in 1985. In 2012, he started receiving SSI payments after he experienced severe health problems, and in 2013, he moved back to Puerto Rico to help care for his wife. In 2016, the Social Security Administration (SSA) informed Vaello-Madero that because he had moved back to Puerto Rico, it was terminating his SSI benefits. Moreover, the federal government filed a lawsuit in federal court in Puerto Rico to recover over $28,000 in benefits it had paid Vaello-Madero between 2013 and 2016 when he was living in Puerto Rico. The district court ruled for Vaello-Madero, finding, among other things, that the exclusion of Puerto Rico violated the equal-protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.
Question
Did Congress violate the Fifth Amendment by establishing the Supplemental Security Income program in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the Northern Mariana Islands, but not in Puerto Rico?
Conclusion
The Constitution does not require Congress to make Supplemental Security Income benefits available to the residents of Puerto Rico. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court reversing the lower court.
Two preceden…
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[21-5592] Ramirez v. Collier
9 november 2021 · 1 uur 38 min
Ramirez v. Collier Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Nov 9, 2021.
Decided on Mar 24, 2022.Petitioner: John H. Ramirez.
Respondent: Bryan Collier, Executive Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, et al..Advocates:
Seth Kretzer (for the Petitioner)
Eric J. Feigin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Judd E. Stone, II (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
State laws differ and have vacillated as to whether and to what extent spiritual advisers may be present in the execution chamber. In 2019, the Court upheld Alabama’s refusal to allow an imam present at the execution of a Muslim man, even though the state at the time permitted a Christian chaplain to be present. A month later, the Court prohibited Texas from executing a Buddhist inmate unless he was allowed to have a Buddhist priest present. As a result, Texas passed a law prohibiting all spiritual advisers from the execution chamber but then after another legal challenge reversed course to allow their presence. The Court subsequently prohibited another Alabama death-row inmate’s execution without his pastor present, so the state executed him eight months later with his pastor at his side, praying with him and touching his leg.
John Ramirez, a Texas death-row inmate, brought a lawsuit asking that he be permitted to have his pastor present at his execution and that his pastor be allowed to pray audibly and touch him while he is being executed.
Question
Does Texas’s decision to allow Ramirez’s pastor to enter the execution chamber but not to lay hands on the parishioner as he dies, sing, pray, or read scripture violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act?
Conclusion
Texas’s restrictions on religious touch and audible prayer in the execution chamber violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) because they bu…
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[20-915] Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P.
8 november 2021 · 1 uur 18 min
Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P. Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Nov 8, 2021.
Decided on Feb 24, 2022.Petitioner: Unicolors, Inc..
Respondent: H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P..Advocates:
E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for the Petitioner)
Melissa N. Patterson (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Peter K. Stris (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Unicolors, Inc., a company that creates art designs for use on fabrics, created and copyrighted as part of a collection of designs a two-dimensional artwork called EH101 in 2011. In 2015, retail clothing store H&M began selling a jacket and skirt with an art design called “Xue Xu.” Unicolors sued H&M for copyright infringement, alleging that the Xue Xu design is identical to its EH101 design.
The district court rejected H&M’s argument that Unicolors’ copyright was invalid because it had improperly used a single copyright registration to register 31 separate works. The court noted that invalidation of a copyright requires an intent to defraud, and no such evidence was presented in this case. Further, it concluded that the application contained no inaccuracies because the separate designs in the single registration were published on the same day. A jury returned a verdict for Unicolors, finding that it owned a valid copyright in EH101, that H&M had infringed on that copyright, and that the infringement was willful.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that there is no intent-to-defraud requirement for registration invalidation, and the district court failed to refer the matter to the Copyright Office, as required under 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(2), when it was informed of inaccuracies in the copyright registration.
Question
Does 17 U.S.C. § 411 require a district court to request advice from the Copyright Office when there are questions about the validity of a copyright registration but no …
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[20-828] Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fazaga
8 november 2021 · 2 uur 7 min
Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fazaga Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Nov 8, 2021.
Decided on Mar 4, 2022.Petitioner: Federal Bureau of Investigation, et al..
Respondent: Yassir Fazaga, et al..Advocates:
Edwin S. Kneedler (for the Petitioners)
Catherine M.A. Carroll (for the Agent Respondents)
Ahilan T. Arulanantham (for Respondents Fazaga, et al.)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Respondents Sheikh Yassir Fazaga, Ali Uddin Malik, and Yasser AbdelRahim are three Muslim residents of Southern California who regularly attended religious services at the Islamic Center of Irvine. They filed a lawsuit in federal court alleging that the FBI had used a confidential informant to conduct a covert surveillance program for at least fourteen months to gather information at the Islamic Center based solely on their Muslim religious identity. Their claims included violations of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clauses; the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.; the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause; the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; the Fourth Amendment; the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1810; and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346.
The U.S. Attorney General asserted the state secrets privilege with respect to evidence in the case and moved to dismiss the discrimination claims based on that privilege. It did not move to dismiss the Fourth Amendment or FISA claims based on privilege, but on other grounds. The district court dismissed all but one of the claims on the basis of the state secrets privilege. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court should have reviewed any state secrets evidence in camera to determine whether the alleged surveillance was unlawful under FISA. The appellate court then denied a petition for a rehearing en banc.
Question
Do…
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[20-843] New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Bruen
3 november 2021 · 1 uur 57 min
New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Bruen Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Nov 3, 2021.
Decided on Jun 23, 2022.Petitioner: New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc., et al..
Respondent: Kevin P. Bruen, in His Official Capacity as Superintendent of New York State Police, et al..Advocates:
Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners)
Barbara D. Underwood (for the Respondents)
Brian H. Fletcher (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The state of New York requires a person to show a special need for self-protection to receive an unrestricted license to carry a concealed firearm outside the home. Robert Nash and Brandon Koch challenged the law after New York rejected their concealed-carry applications based on failure to show “proper cause.” A district court dismissed their claims, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does New York's law requiring that applicants for unrestricted concealed-carry licenses demonstrate a special need for self-defense violate the Second Amendment?
Conclusion
New York’s proper-cause requirement violates the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms in public for self-defense.
The right to carry a firearm in public for self-defense is deeply rooted in history, and no other constitutional right requires a showing of “special need” to exercise it. While some “sensitive places” restrictions might be appropriate, Manhattan is not a “sensitive place.” Gun restrictions are constitutional only if there is a tradition of such regulation in U.S. history.
Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion arguing that the effect of guns on American society is irrelevant to the issue.
Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts joined, n…
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[20-804] Houston Community College System v. Wilson
2 november 2021 · 1 uur 25 min
Houston Community College System v. Wilson Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Nov 2, 2021.
Decided on Mar 24, 2022.Petitioner: Houston Community College System.
Respondent: David Buren Wilson.Advocates:
Richard A. Morris (for the Petitioner)
Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Michael B. Kimberly (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Houston Community College (HCC) System operates community colleges throughout the greater Houston area. HCC is run by a Board of nine trustees, each of which is elected by the public to serve a six-year term without remuneration. David Wilson was elected to the Board as a trustee on November 5, 2013. Starting in 2017, Wilson criticized the other trustees, alleging that they had violated the Board’s bylaws, and made various other criticisms of the Board. As a result, the Board censured Wilson and barred him from holding officer positions on the Board or from receiving travel reimbursements.
Wilson sued HCC, alleging that the censure violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The district court ruled against him, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. In holding for Wilson, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the First Amendment precludes community college boards from censuring members for their speech.
Question
Does the First Amendment restrict the authority of an elected body to issue a censure resolution in response to a member’s speech?
Conclusion
A purely verbal censure does not give rise to an actionable First Amendment claim. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion for a unanimous Court, holding that Wilson lacked an actionable First Amendment claim against the Houston Community College System.
The First Amendment prohibits laws “abridging the freedom of speech,” which includes a prohibition on “retaliatory actions” for engaging in protected speech. However, elected bodies have lon…
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[20-1143] Badgerow v. Walters
2 november 2021 · 52 min
Badgerow v. Walters Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Nov 2, 2021.
Decided on Mar 31, 2022.Petitioner: Denise A. Badgerow.
Respondent: Greg Walters, et al..Advocates:
Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner)
Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Denise Badgerow was employed as an associate financial advisor with REJ Properties, Inc., a Louisiana corporation, from January 2014 until July 2016, when she was terminated. During her employment with REJ, Badgerow signed an agreement to arbitrate any disputes that may arise between her and the three principals of the corporation.
After her termination, Badgerow initiated an arbitration proceeding against the three principals before an arbitration panel of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), seeking damages for tortious interference of contract and for violation of Louisiana’s whistleblower law. The panel dismissed all of her claims with prejudice.
Badgerow then brought a new action in Louisiana state court, asking the court to vacate the dismissal because the whistleblower claim was obtained by fraud. The principals removed the action to federal court, and Badgerow filed a motion to remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court held that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the petition to vacate and denied remand. On the merits, the court found no fraud and denied vacatur of the FINRA arbitration panel’s dismissal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Circuit affirmed.
Question
Do federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitration award when the only basis for jurisdiction is that the underlying dispute involved a federal question?
Conclusion
Federal courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitration award because the “look-through” approach recognized in the context of Section 4 does not apply in the context of Sections 9…
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[21-463] Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson
1 november 2021 · 1 uur 23 min
Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Nov 1, 2021.
Decided on Dec 10, 2021.Petitioner: Whole Woman's Health, et al..
Respondent: Austin Reeve Jackson, Judge, District Court of Texas, 114th District, et al..Advocates:
Marc A. Hearron (for the Petitioners)
Judd E. Stone, II (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Texas legislature passed a law, SB 8, that prohibits abortions after about six weeks of pregnancy. Additionally, the law criminalizes any person who "aids or abets" any such abortion and permits any private citizen (as opposed to the state itself), to file a lawsuit for damages against such persons. Abortion providers challenged the law, and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the providers’ initial request to block enforcement of the law. After the law went into effect, the providers filed another legal challenge.
Question
Can the petitioners in this case pursue a pre-enforcement challenge to Texas Senate Bill 8 (SB 8), which prohibits providers from performing or inducing an abortion after a fetal heartbeat is detected and which allows for direct enforcement of the law through private civil actions?
Conclusion
The petitioners in this case may proceed past the motion-to-dismiss stage only as to the defendants who are state medical licensing officials. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court.
Writing for himself and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett, Justice Gorsuch concluded that the petitioners cannot sue defendants Penny Clarkston and Austin Jackson (a state-court clerk and state-court judge, respectively) because states are generally immune from lawsuits under the Eleventh Amendment, and even the limited exception recognized in Ex Parte Young does not permit an ex-ante injunction preventing state courts from hearing cases. Additionally, state-court clerks and judges are not “adverse litiga…
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[21-588] United States v. Texas
1 november 2021 · 1 uur 28 min
United States v. Texas Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Nov 1, 2021.
Decided on Dec 10, 2021.Petitioner: United States.
Respondent: Texas, et al..Advocates:
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioner)
Judd E. Stone, II (for the state Respondent)
Jonathan F. Mitchell (for the private Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Texas legislature passed a law, SB 8, that prohibits abortions after about six weeks of pregnancy. Additionally, the law criminalizes any person who "aids or abets" any such abortion and permits any private citizen (as opposed to the state itself), to file a lawsuit for damages against such persons. Abortion providers challenged the law, and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the providers’ initial request to block enforcement of the law. After the law went into effect, the providers filed another legal challenge, as did the federal government. A federal district court temporarily enjoined enforcement of the law, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the lower court's injunction. The Department of Justice asked the Court to reinstate the district court's judgment.
Question
Can the United States sue the State of Texas in federal court to prohibit enforcement of an unconstitutional abortion law?
Conclusion
The court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted and denied the application to vacate the stay.