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495 afleveringen, van nieuw naar oud
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[21-757] Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi
27 maart 2023 · 1 uur 39 min
Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 27, 2023.
Decided on May 18, 2023.Petitioner: Amgen, Inc., et al..
Respondent: Sanofi, et al..Advocates:
Jeffrey A. Lamken (for the Petitioners)
Paul D. Clement (for the Respondents)
Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Amgen owns two patents that describe cholesterol-lowering drugs that share a common written description. In 2014, Amgen filed suit against Sanofi alleging infringement of multiple patents, including the two at issue in this case. Among the jury’s conclusions in that case was that the patents were not invalid for lack of written description and enablement.
To satisfy the written description requirement, a patent specification must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail that a “skilled artisan” can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention. To satisfy the enablement requirement, a patent specification must contain sufficient information that a “skilled artisan” would be enabled to make and use the claimed invention.
The U.S. Court for the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, finding the jury instructions regarding enablement were erroneous.
On remand, the court ruled in favor of Sanofi on the issue of lack of enablement and for Amgen on the issue of lack of written description. Amgen appealed, and the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the asserted claims were invalid for lack of enablement.
Question
Do Amgen’s two patents satisfy the Patent Act’s enablement clause—that is, describing the invention with sufficient particularity that would enable a “skilled artisan” to “make and use” the claimed invention?
Conclusion
Amgen’s two patent applications—purporting to cover all antibodies that bind and block the PCSK9 receptor involved in LDL cholesterol metabolism—fail to satisfy the Patent Act’s…
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[22-179] United States v. Hansen
27 maart 2023 · 1 uur 22 min
United States v. Hansen Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 27, 2023.
Decided on Jun 23, 2023.Petitioner: United States.
Respondent: Helaman Hansen.Advocates:
Brian H. Fletcher (for the Petitioner)
Esha Bhandari (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Helaman Hansen ran an immigration-advising service charging undocumented immigrants for (incorrect) advice on how to achieve U.S. citizenship. Hansen was convicted and sentenced for, among other federal crimes, two counts of encouraging or inducing illegal immigration for private financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i).
Two years earlier, in United States v. Sineneng-Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed a Ninth Circuit decision striking down those two statutory provisions. Its reversal was based not on the merits of the constitutional challenge, but on the procedure the Ninth Circuit had used to entertain the challenge. Hansen’s case again raises the constitutional challenge.
Question
Does the federal prohibition on encouraging or inducing unlawful immigration for commercial advantage or private financial gain violate the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution?
Conclusion
The federal law criminalizing “encouraging or inducing” illegal immigration—forbids only the purposeful solicitation and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law and is not unconstitutionally overbroad. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.
A law is unconstitutionally overbroad if it prohibits a significant amount of protected speech compared to its legitimate applications. The federal laws at issue, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i) prohibit “encouraging or inducing” illegal immigration, but in this context, they refer to the specialized legal terms of solicitation and facilitation, not their colloquial meanings. Because (A)(iv) targets only the intentional solicitation and facilit…
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[22-148] Jack Daniel's Properties v. VIP Products LLC
22 maart 2023 · 1 uur 23 min
Jack Daniel's Properties v. VIP Products LLC Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 22, 2023.
Decided on Jun 8, 2023.Petitioner: Jack Daniel's Properties, Inc..
Respondent: VIP Products LLC.Advocates:
Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner)
Matthew Guarnieri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Bennett E. Cooper (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
VIP Products LLC, a company that manufactures dog toys, created a plastic toy that resembles Jack Daniel’s iconic bottle. Instead of “Jack Daniel’s,” the toy’s “label” says “Bad Spaniels”; and instead of “Old No. 7” and “Tennessee Sour Mash Whiskey” it says “The Old No. 2 on your Tennessee Carpet.”
Jack Daniel’s sued the toy company alleging violation of its trademark. The district court held that the toy is a humorous parody entitled to First Amendment protection, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Is humorous use of another’s trademark as one’s own on a commercial product subject to the Lanham Act’s likelihood-of-confusion analysis, or instead entitled to heightened First Amendment protection?
Conclusion
The parodic use of another’s trademark as one’s own on a commercial product is subject to the Lanham Act’s likelihood-of-confusion analysis, not the threshold Rogers test, and is not automatically excluded from a claim of trademark dilution. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
The Lanham Act creates federal causes of action for trademark infringement and trademark dilution. In a typical infringement case, the question is whether the defendant’s use of a mark is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” In a typical dilution case, the question is whether the defendant “harm[ed] the reputation” of a famous trademark. However, even before answering these questions, courts apply a threshold test developed by the Second Circuit in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d …
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[21-1043] Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, Inc.
21 maart 2023 · 1 uur 27 min
Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, Inc. Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 21, 2023.
Decided on Jun 29, 2023.Petitioner: Abitron Austria GmbH, et al..
Respondent: Hetronic International, Inc..Advocates:
Lucas M. Walker (for the Petitioners)
Masha G. Hansford (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Matthew S. Hellman (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Hetronic International, Inc., a U.S. company, manufactures radio remote controls heavy-duty construction equipment. By agreement, Abitron, a foreign corporation, distributed Hetronic’s products, mostly in Europe.
The relationship deteriorated when Abitron decided that it, not Hetronic, owned the rights to Hetronic’s trademarks and other intellectual property. Abitron began manufacturing products identical to Hetronic’s and selling them under the Hetronic brand, mostly in Europe. Hetronic terminated their contractual relationship, but Abitron continued to manufacture and sell the products, making tens of millions of dollars.
Hetronic sued Abitron, and a jury sitting in the Western District of Oklahoma awarded Hetronic over $100 million in damages based on infringement of Hetronic’s trademarks. The district court entered a worldwide injunction barring Abitron from selling the infringing products. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the court’s conclusion that the Lanham Act applies extraterritorially but limited the court’s injunction.
Question
Does the Lanham Act permit the owner of a U.S.-registered trademark to recover damages for the use of that trademark when the infringement occurred outside the United States and is not likely to cause confusion in the United States?
Conclusion
The Lanham Act extends trademark protection only to claims where the infringing “use in commerce” is domestic. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court.
Unless Congress explicit…
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[22-105] Coinbase v. Bielski
21 maart 2023 · 1 uur 22 min
Coinbase v. Bielski Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 21, 2023.
Decided on Jun 23, 2023.Petitioner: Coinbase, Inc..
Respondent: Abraham Bielski.Advocates:
Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Petitioner)
Hassan A. Zavareei (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Coinbase operates an online currency and crypto-currency exchange platform. Abraham Bielski created a Coinbase account in 2021, and shortly after opening it, he alleges that a scammer fraudulently accessed his account and stole more than $30,000 from him. Bielski alleged that Coinbase ignored his attempts at communication until he filed this lawsuit.
Bielski alleged in his lawsuit—on behalf of himself and other similarly situated persons—that Coinbase, is a “financial institution” within the meaning of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA), and that it fails to comply with its responsibilities under the EFTA, including conducting a timely and good-faith investigation of fraudulent transfers. Coinbase moved to compel arbitration based on its user agreement, and the district court denied the motion to compel on the grounds that the arbitration clause and delegation clause were unconscionable. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Coinbase’s motion to stay.
Question
Does a non-frivolous appeal of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration oust a district court’s jurisdiction to proceed with litigation pending appeal?
Conclusion
A district court must stay its proceedings while an interlocutory appeal taken pursuant to 9 U. S. C. §16(a) on the question of arbitrability is ongoing. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.
The Court recognized in Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56 (1982) that an appeal, including an interlocutory appeal, “divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” The Griggs principle controls the outcome of this case.…
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[21-1484] Arizona v. Navajo Nation
20 maart 2023 · 1 uur 50 min
Arizona v. Navajo Nation Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 20, 2023.
Decided on Jun 22, 2023.Petitioner: State of Arizona, et al..
Respondent: Navajo Nation, et al..Advocates:
Frederick Liu (On behalf of the Federal parties)
Rita P. Maguire (On behalf of the State parties)
Shay Dvoretzky (On behalf of the Navajo Nation)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Navajo Reservation is the “permanent home” of the Navajo Nation, under the 1868 Treaty, and subsequent expansions by executive orders and acts of Congress. The Reservation includes parts of Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, and lies almost entirely within the drainage basin of the Colorado River. Due to water scarcity, rights to the Colorado River’s waters are allocated through federal treaties, statutes, regulations, common law rulings, Supreme Court decrees, and interstate compacts—collectively known as the “Law of the River.”
In 2003, the Navajo Nation sued the U.S. Department of the Interior and other federal agencies under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and a breach of trust claim for failure to consider their water rights in managing the Colorado River. Arizona, Nevada, and several other entities intervened to protect their interests in the Colorado River waters. The district court dismissed their claim, finding the Supreme Court retained original jurisdiction over allocation of rights to the Colorado River. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.
Question
Does the 1868 Treaty between the Navajo Nation and the United States impose an affirmative duty on the United States to secure water for the tribe?
Conclusion
The 1868 treaty establishing the Navajo Reservation reserved necessary water to accomplish the purpose of the Navajo Reservation but did not require the United States to take affirmative steps to secure water for the Tribe. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court.
To succeed on a breach-of-tru…
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[156-orig] New York v. New Jersey
1 maart 2023 · 1 uur 29 min
New York v. New Jersey Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 1, 2023.
Decided on Apr 18, 2023.Petitioner: New York.
Respondent: New Jersey.Advocates:
Judith N. Vale (for New York)
Jeremy M. Feigenbaum (for New Jersey)
Austin L. Raynor (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting New Jersey)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
New York and New Jersey entered into an interstate compact called the Waterfront Commission Compact to fight corruption in the Port of New York and New Jersey. New Jersey then sought to withdraw unilaterally from the compact. New York objected to New Jersey’s withdrawal.
Question
May New Jersey unilaterally withdraw from the Waterfront Commission Compact with New York?
Conclusion
New Jersey may unilaterally withdraw from the 1953 Waterfront Commission Compact. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
The Waterfront Commission Compact does not address unilateral withdrawal. Other principles of law in effect at the time the compact was entered would have informed their understanding of the Compact. One such principle is that a contract that contemplates “continuing performance for an indefinite time is to be interpreted as stipulating only for performance terminable at the will of either party.” Thus, with this understanding, either state may unilaterally withdraw. The principle of state sovereignty further supports this conclusion.
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[22-506] Biden v. Nebraska
28 februari 2023 · 2 uur 3 min
Biden v. Nebraska Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Feb 28, 2023.
Decided on Jun 30, 2023.Petitioner: Joseph R. Biden, President of the United States, et al..
Respondent: Nebraska, et al..Advocates:
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioners)
James A. Campbell (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2020, then-presidential candidate Joseph Biden promised to cancel up to $10,000 of federal student loan debt per borrower. After winning the election, the Biden administration announced its intent to forgive, via executive action, $10,000 in student loans for borrowers with an annual income of less than $125,000.
Nebraska and five other states challenged the forgiveness program, arguing that it violated the separation of powers and the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court dismissed the challenge, finding that the states lacked judicial standing to sue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit enjoined the forgiveness program pending the appeal.
Question
1. Do Nebraska and other states have judicial standing to challenge the student-debt relief program?
2. Does the student-debt relief program exceed the statutory authority of the U.S. Secretary of Education, or does it violate the Administrative Procedure Act?
Conclusion
The Secretary of Education does not have authority under the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2003 (HEROES Act) to establish a student loan forgiveness program that will cancel roughly $430 billion in debt principal and affect nearly all borrowers. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court.
First, the Court concluded that Missouri has standing to challenge the student-debt relief program. Article III requires a plaintiff to have suffered an injury in fact—a concrete and imminent harm to a legally protected interest, like property or money—that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and likely to be redressed by…
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[22-535] Department of Education v. Brown
28 februari 2023 · 1 uur 16 min
Department of Education v. Brown Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Feb 28, 2023.
Decided on Jun 30, 2023.Petitioner: United States Department of Education, et al..
Respondent: Mayra Brown, et al..Advocates:
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioners)
J. Michael Connolly (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Fulfilling one of then-presidential candidate Joseph Biden’s campaign promises, the Secretary of Education invoked its authority under the HEROES Act to create a loan forgiveness program in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and national emergency. Under the program, a student borrower qualified for loan forgiveness if (1) they made less than $125,000 individually or $250,000 if married and filing jointly, and (2) they had Direct, Perkins, or FFEL loans that were not commercially held. Qualified borrowers could receive $20,000 if they received a Pell Grant and $10,000 if they did not.
Myra Brown and Alexander Taylor both have student loans. Brown is ineligible for debt forgiveness under the Program because her loans are commercially held, while Taylor is ineligible for the full $20,000 in debt forgiveness because he did not receive a Pell Grant.
They challenged the loan forgiveness program, arguing that if the Biden administration had followed proper procedures in adopting the plan, they would have been able to weigh in on the plan and urge for a plan that would have been more beneficial to them. The district court found that the program was an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power vested in Congress and issued a nationwide injunction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declined to stay the injunction.
Question
Do these two student-loan borrowers have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Education’s Student Loan Debt Relief Plan?
Is the Plan an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power by the Secretary of the Department of Education?
Conclusion
Respondents l…
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[22-10] Dubin v. United States
27 februari 2023 · 1 uur 32 min
Dubin v. United States Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Feb 27, 2023.
Decided on Jun 8, 2023.Petitioner: David Fox Dubin.
Respondent: United States.Advocates:
Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioner)
Vivek Suri (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
William Joseph Dubin was a licensed psychologist in Texas and ran a psychology practice called “Psychological A.R.T.S., P.C.” (PARTS). His son, David Dubin, worked for PARTS in a business capacity. PARTS was an enrolled Medicaid provider, which means it is required to comply with Medicaid laws and regulations. Among other alleged violations, David Dubin used patients’ Medicaid reimbursement numbers—to obtain reimbursements for services PARTS did not provide those patients. This conduct formed the basis of a charge of identity theft under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1028A, which requires a two-year sentence for “[w]hoever ... knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person" during the commission of an enumerated felony.” William and David Dubin were convicted, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court granted rehearing en banc to consider the sufficiency of the evidence and affirmed the panel.
Question
Does a person commit aggravated identity theft any time they mention or otherwise recite someone else’s name while committing a predicate offense?
Conclusion
A person commits “aggravated identity theft,” if he “uses” another person’s means of identification “in relation to” a predicate offense when the use is at the crux of—rather than merely peripheral to—what makes the conduct criminal. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion of the Court.
The meaning of each of the two key phrases—”uses” and “in relation to”—depends heavily on context. First, the very title of Section 1028A(a)(1), “Aggravated identity theft,” suggests that identity theft is at the core of that prov…
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[21-1496] Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh
22 februari 2023 · 2 uur 30 min
Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Feb 22, 2023.
Decided on May 18, 2023.Petitioner: Twitter, Inc., et al..
Respondent: Mehier Taamneh, et al..Advocates:
Seth P. Waxman (for the Petitioner)
Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting reversal)
Eric Schnapper (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
This case arises from the same set of facts as Gonzalez v. Google.
Nohemi Gonzalez, a U.S. citizen, was killed by a terrorist attack in Paris, France, in 2015—one of several terrorist attacks that same day. The day afterwards, the foreign terrorist organization ISIS claimed responsibility by issuing a written statement and releasing a YouTube video. Gonzalez’s father filed an action against Google, Twitter, and Facebook, claiming, among other things, all three platforms were liable for aiding and abetting international terrorism by failing to take meaningful or aggressive action to prevent terrorists from using its services, even though they did not play an active role in the specific act of international terrorism that actually injured Gonzalez.
The district court dismissed the claims based on aiding-and-abetting liability under the Anti-Terrorism Act, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.
Question
1. Does an internet platform “knowingly” provide substantial assistance under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 merely because it allegedly could have taken more “meaningful” or “aggressive” action to prevent such use?
2. May an internet platform whose services were not used in connection with the specific “act of international terrorism” that injured the plaintiff still be liable for aiding and abetting under Section 2333?
Conclusion
Twitter did not “knowingly” provide substantial assistance under 18 U.S.C. § 2333, and thus cannot be said to have aided and abetted ISIS in its terrorist attack on a nightclub in Istanbul, Turkey. Justice Clarence Thomas auth…
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[21-1333] Gonzalez v. Google LLC
21 februari 2023 · 2 uur 41 min
Gonzalez v. Google LLC Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Feb 21, 2023.
Decided on May 18, 2023.Petitioner: Reynaldo Gonzalez, et al..
Respondent: Google LLC.Advocates:
Eric Schnapper (for the Petitioners)
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur)
Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
This case arises from the same set of facts as Twitter v. Taamneh.
Nohemi Gonzalez, a U.S. citizen, was killed by a terrorist attack in Paris, France, in 2015—one of several terrorist attacks that same day. The day afterwards, the foreign terrorist organization ISIS claimed responsibility by issuing a written statement and releasing a YouTube video. Gonzalez’s father filed an action against Google, Twitter, and Facebook, claiming, among other things, that Google aided and abetted international terrorism by allowing ISIS to use its platform—specifically YouTube—“to recruit members, plan terrorist attacks, issue terrorist threats, instill fear, and intimidate civilian populations.” Specifically, the complaint alleged that because Google uses computer algorithms that suggest content to users based on their viewing history, it assists ISIS in spreading its message.
Gonzalez claimed that all three platforms were also liable for aiding and abetting international terrorism by failing to take meaningful or aggressive action to prevent terrorists from using its services, even though they did not play an active role in the specific act of international terrorism that actually injured Gonzalez.
The district court granted Google’s motion to dismiss the claim based on Section 230, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act immunize interactive computer services when they make targeted recommendations of information provided by another information content provider?
Conclusion
Citing its decision in T…
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[21-887] Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, et al.
18 januari 2023 · 1 uur 29 min
Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, et al. Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Jan 18, 2023.
Decided on Mar 21, 2023.Petitioner: Miguel L.V. Perez.
Respondent: Sturgis Public Schools, et al..Advocates:
Roman Martinez (for the Petitioner)
Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Shay Dvoretzky (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Miguel Perez is a 23-year-old deaf student in Michigan. Although the school assigned him a classroom aide, the aide was not trained to work with deaf students and did not know sign language. Shortly before Perez was supposed to graduate, the school notified his parents that he did not qualify for a diploma.
Perez filed a complaint with the Michigan Department of Education alleging that the school denied him an adequate education and violated numerous federal and state education laws: the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and two Michigan disabilities laws. Before a hearing on the IDEA claim, the parties settled. As part of the settlement, the school agreed to pay for Perez to attend the Michigan School for the Deaf, for any post-secondary compensatory education, and for sign language instruction for Perez and his family.
Perez then sued the school district and board of education in federal court, claiming that the school discriminated against him by not providing the resources necessary for him to participate in class. The district court dismissed the ADA claim based on failure to exhaust administrative proceedings because he settled his IDEA claim before the hearing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Do the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) require a student to exhaust his administrative proceedings against the school district even when such proceedings would be futile?
C…
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[21-1436] Santos-Zacaria v. Garland
17 januari 2023 · 1 uur 4 min
Santos-Zacaria v. Garland Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Jan 17, 2023.
Decided on May 11, 2023.Petitioner: Leon Santos-Zacaria.
Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General.Advocates:
Paul W. Hughes (for the Petitioner)
Yaira Dubin (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Santos is a native and citizen of Guatemala seeking asylum in the United States based on the likelihood of persecution due to her sexual orientation and transgender identity. An immigration judge denied her application for withholding removal, finding one prior assault was insufficient to establish past persecution. The immigration judge also denied her claim for relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Santos appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed her appeal. Although the Board concluded her past assault was sufficient to establish past persecution and thus a presumption of future persecution, the government had rebutted that presumption. The Board affirmed the immigration judge’s determination that Santos had not established eligibility for relief under the CAT.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Santos’s petition to review the Board’s determination that she was not eligible for relief under CAT and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction her challenge to the adequacy of the Board’s analysis because she failed to raise that argument in a motion for reconsideration.
Question
Does 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) bar a court of appeals from reviewing an immigrant’s claim that the Board of Immigration Appeals had engaged in impermissible factfinding because the immigrant had not exhausted that claim through a motion to reconsider?
Conclusion
Title 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) is not a jurisdictional provision; it does not require an immigrant to seek a motion to reconsider, which is a discretionary form of review, only remedies available as a matter of right. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the majority opini…
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[21-1450] Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States
17 januari 2023 · 1 uur 36 min
Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Jan 17, 2023.
Decided on Apr 19, 2023.Petitioner: Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S..
Respondent: United States of America.Advocates:
Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner)
Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Turkiye Halk Bankasi (“Halkbank”) is a commercial bank that is majority-owned by the Government of Turkey. A 2019 grand jury charged Halkbank with participating in a money-laundering scheme involving billions of dollars’ worth of Iranian oil and natural gas proceeds, in violation of U.S. sanctions against Iran.
Halkbank moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) immunizes it from criminal prosecution because it is majority-owned by the Government of Turkey. Further, it argued that FSIA’s exceptions to immunity apply only to civil, not criminal, cases, and even if they include criminal cases, it is nevertheless entitled to immunity under common law.
The district court rejected Halkbank’s arguments, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that even if FSIA confers immunity from criminal prosecutions, the conduct at issue falls within FSIA’s commercial activity exception.
Question
May the district courts properly exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the criminal prosecution against Halkbank in this case based on the commercial activity exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?
Conclusion
The district court has jurisdiction in this criminal prosecution; the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s comprehensive scheme governing claims of immunity in civil actions against foreign states and their instrumentalities does not cover criminal cases. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.
18 U.S.C. § 3231 contains a broad jurisdictional grant: it gives district courts original jurisdiction over “all offenses aga…
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[22-96] Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc.
11 januari 2023 · 56 min
Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Jan 11, 2023.
Decided on May 11, 2023.Petitioner: Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico.
Respondent: Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc..Advocates:
Mark D. Harris (for the Petitioner)
Aimee W. Brown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur)
Sarah M. Harris (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Centro de Periodismo Investigativo (“CPI”) is a nonprofit media organization based in Puerto Rico. It seeks disclosure of documents relating to Puerto Rico’s fiscal situation from the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (“the Board”). The Board has declined to release the requested documents, and CPI asked the district court to compel production. The Board asked the district court to dismiss the litigation, arguing that it is immune from suit pursuant to both the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”).
The district court disagreed with the Board, finding PROMESA abrogated any possible Eleventh Amendment immunity the Board might have enjoyed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA)’s general grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts over claims against the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico and claims otherwise arising under PROMESA abrogate the Board’s sovereign immunity with respect to all federal and territorial claims?
Conclusion
Nothing in the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) categorically abrogates any sovereign immunity the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico enjoys from legal claims. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 8-1 majority opinion of t…
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[21-1449] Glacier Northwest, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters
10 januari 2023 · 1 uur 26 min
Glacier Northwest, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Jan 10, 2023.
Decided on Jun 1, 2023.Petitioner: Glacier Northwest, Inc..
Respondent: International Brotherhood of Teamsters.Advocates:
Noel J. Francisco (for the Petitioner)
Vivek Suri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Darin M. Dalmat (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Glacier Northwest is a Washington corporation that sells and delivers ready-mix concrete to businesses in the state. It employs approximately 80-90 truck drivers to deliver concrete, and Local 174 is the exclusive union representative for Glacier’s truck drivers in King County. In 2017, during negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA), Glacier truck drivers went on strike, resulting in the loss of some of Glacier’s concrete.
Glacier sued Local 174 in state court for six tort claims arising from Local 174’s alleged role that resulted in Glacier’s loss of concrete. The trial court dismissed the claims arising before the CBA was reached, finding they were preempted by the federal National Labor Relations Act, and it granted summary judgment dismissal of the remaining claims primarily on state law grounds. The appellate court reversed as to the pre-CBA claims, finding the NLRA did not preempt those claims. The state supreme court reversed as to the preemption issue.
Question
Does the National Labor Relations Act preempt a state-court lawsuit against a union for intentionally destroying an employer’s property during a labor dispute?
Conclusion
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) did not preempt Glacier’s state-court lawsuit alleging that the union intentionally destroyed the company’s property during a labor dispute. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the majority opinion of the Court.
The position of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is that while the NLRA generally recognizes the right …
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[21-1397] In re Grand Jury
9 januari 2023 · 1 uur 8 min
In re Grand Jury Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Jan 9, 2023.
Decided on Jan 23, 2023.Petitioner: In re Grand Jury.
Advocates:
Daniel B. Levin (for the Petitioner)
Masha G. Hansford (for the United States)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
A grand jury issued subpoenas to two parties—“Company” and “Law Firm”—requesting documents and communications related to a criminal investigation into the owner of Company and client of Law Firm. In response to the subpoenas, Company and Law Firm refused to disclose certain documents, citing attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine because the primary purpose of the documents at issue was to seek legal advice, not to obtain tax advice. The government moved to compel production, and the district court granted the government’s motion in part. Company and Law Firm disagreed with the district court’s ruling and continued to withhold the documents. The district court then held Company and Law Firm in contempt. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding the primary purpose of the communications was to obtain legal advice.
Question
If a communication involves both legal and non-legal advice, when is it protected from disclosure by attorney-client privilege?
Conclusion
The Court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted.
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[21-1454] The Ohio Adjutant General’s Department v. Federal Labor Relations Authority
9 januari 2023 · 1 uur 30 min
The Ohio Adjutant General’s Department v. Federal Labor Relations Authority Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Jan 9, 2023.
Decided on May 18, 2023.Petitioner: The Ohio Adjutant General’s Department, et al..
Respondent: Federal Labor Relations Authority, et al..Advocates:
Benjamin M. Flowers (for the Petitioners)
Nicole F. Reaves (for the federal Respondent)
Andres M. Grajales (for the union Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2016, the Ohio National Guard and its Adjutant General (the “Guard”) decided to end its 45-year-long relationship with the union that represents its technicians, who are civilian federal employees but are described as dual-status employees because of their hybrid civilian and military roles.
As it was terminating the relationship, the Guard informed the union that it did not have Standard Form 1187s, which federal-sector bargaining-unit members are required to submit and which the Guard was obligated to maintain. The union filed four Unfair Labor Practice charges (ULPs) with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). The FLRA’s regional general counsel investigated and found that the Guard had refused to negotiate in good faith. The Guard responded that it was not an “agency” and that the technicians were not “employees” within the meaning of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. An administrative law judge (ALJ) disagreed, and a three-member FLRA panel adopted the ALJ’s recommended decision in full. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied the Guard’s petition for review, finding the FLRA has jurisdiction to adjudicate the collective-bargaining dispute.
Question
Does the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 empower the Federal Labor Relations Authority to regulate the labor practices of state militias?
Conclusion
The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) had jurisdiction over this labor dispute because the state militia was acting as a federal agency when it hire…
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[21-1271] Moore v. Harper
7 december 2022 · 2 uur 54 min
Moore v. Harper Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Dec 7, 2022.
Decided on Jun 27, 2023.Petitioner: Timothy K. Moore, in His Official Capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, et al..
Respondent: Rebecca Harper, et al..Advocates:
David H. Thompson (for the Petitioners)
Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Private Respondents)
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (for the State Respondents)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
After the 2020 Census, in which North Carolina gained an additional seat in the U.S. House of Representatives and thus required redistricting of the state, North Carolina’s Republican-majority state legislature passed a partisan gerrymander.
The map was challenged in state court, and in February 2022, the North Carolina Supreme Court struck down the map for violating the state constitution’s “free elections clause” and other provisions. The legislature proposed a second gerrymandered map, so the court ordered a special master to create a map for the 2022 congressional elections. The legislators asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review based on an argument that the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution gives state legislatures alone the authority to regulate federal elections—the so-called Independent State Legislature theory.
Question
Under the U.S. Constitution, does the state legislative body, independent of any constraints by state courts or other laws, have sole authority to regulate federal elections?
Conclusion
The Federal Elections Clause does not vest exclusive and independent authority in state legislatures to set the rules regarding federal elections. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
First, the Court confirmed that it had jurisdiction to review the case. The North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision to overrule its previous judgment did not moot the case b…
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[21-908] Bartenwerfer v. Buckley
6 december 2022 · 1 uur 13 min
Bartenwerfer v. Buckley Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Dec 6, 2022.
Decided on Feb 22, 2023.Petitioner: Kate M. Bartenwerfer.
Respondent: Kieran Buckley.Advocates:
Sarah M. Harris (for the Petitioner)
Zachary D. Tripp (for the Respondent)
Erica L. Ross (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
David and Kate Bartenwerfer renovated a house in San Francisco, California, and sold it to Kieran Buckley. After the sale, Buckley discovered defects in the house and sued the Bartenwerfers. A jury found for Buckley on several claims and awarded damages. The Bartenwerfers then filed for bankruptcy.
In the bankruptcy court, Buckley initiated an adversary proceeding against the Bartenwerfers arguing that the state-court judgment could not be discharged in bankruptcy because the debt was obtained through fraud. The bankruptcy court agreed, finding that the Bartenwerfers had intended to deceive Buckley, that Mr. Bartenwerfer had actual knowledge of the factual misrepresentations, and that Mr. Bartenwerfer’s fraudulent conduct could be imputed onto Mrs. Bartenwerfer because of their partnership relationship.
The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) remanded the imputed liability finding with the instructions that the bankruptcy court determine whether Mrs. Bartenwerfer “knew or should have known” of Mr. Bartenwerfer’s fraud. On remand, the court held that Mrs. Bartenwerfer did not know of the fraud and thus was not liable for Mr. Bartenwerfer’s fraudulent conduct, and the BAP affirmed. Buckley appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the bankruptcy court applied the incorrect legal standard for imputed liability in a partnership relationship. The correct standard, based on binding Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, is whether the fraud was performed “on behalf of the partnership and in the ordinary cour…
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[21-1052] U.S., ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources
6 december 2022 · 1 uur 21 min
U.S., ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Dec 6, 2022.
Decided on Jun 16, 2023.Petitioner: United States, ex rel. Jesse Polansky, M.D., M.P.H..
Respondent: Executive Health Resources, Inc., et al..Advocates:
Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner)
Frederick Liu (for Respondent the United States)
Mark W. Mosier (for Respondent Executive Health Resources, Inc.)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Dr. Jesse Polansky was an official at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) before consulting for Executive Health Resources (EHR). EHR is a company that provides review and billing certification services to hospitals and physicians that bill Medicare.
While employed as a consultant, Polansky became concerned that EHR was systematically enabling its client hospitals to over-admit patients by certifying inpatient services that should have been provided on an outpatient basis. As a result, hospitals were billing the government for care that was not “reasonable and necessary,” in violation of CMS’s guidance and regulations.
Polansky filed a lawsuit under the False Claims Act, and it remained under seal for two years while the government investigated. The government ultimately decided it would not participate in the case, at which point the case was unsealed and Polansky proceeded as plaintiff. Seven years after the initiation of the proceedings, and after considerable time and resources by the court and parties, the government notified the parties that it intended to dismiss the entire action. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does the government have the authority to dismiss a False Claims Act lawsuit brought by an individual on behalf of the government if it initially declined to take over the case, and if so, what standard applies?
Conclusion
In a qui tam action filed under the False Cla…
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[21-476] 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis
5 december 2022 · 2 uur 22 min
303 Creative LLC v. Elenis Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Dec 5, 2022.
Decided on Jun 30, 2023.Petitioner: 303 Creative LLC.
Respondent: Aubrey Elenis, et al..Advocates:
Kristen Kellie Waggoner (for the Petitioners)
Eric R. Olson (for the Respondents)
Brian H. Fletcher (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Lorie Smith is the owner and founder of a graphic design firm, 303 Creative LLC. She wants to expand her business to include wedding websites. However, she opposes same-sex marriage on religious grounds so does not want to design websites for same-sex weddings. She wants to post a message on her own website explaining her religious objections to same-sex weddings.
The Colorado AntiDiscrimination Act (“CADA”) prohibits businesses that are open to the public from from discriminating on the basis of numerous characteristics, including sexual orientation. The law defines discrimination not only as refusing to provide goods or services, but also publishing any communication that says or implies that an individual’s patronage is unwelcome because of a protected characteristic.
Even before the state sought to enforce CADA against her, Smith and her company challenged the law in federal court, alleging numerous constitutional violations. The district court granted summary judgment for the state, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does application of the Colorado AntiDiscrimination Act to compel an artist to speak or stay silent violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?
Conclusion
The First Amendment prohibits Colorado from forcing a website designer to create expressive designs that convey messages with which the designer disagrees. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
The First Amendment exists to protect an “uninhibited marketplace of ideas” and individual liberty,…
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[21-1270] MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC
5 december 2022 · 1 uur 10 min
MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Dec 5, 2022.
Decided on Apr 19, 2023.Petitioner: MOAC Mall Holdings LLC.
Respondent: Transform Holdco LLC.Advocates:
Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (for the Petitioner)
Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Sears formerly occupied a space in the Mall of America in Minneapolis, Minnesota, under a lease with MOAC. In 2019, the bankruptcy court permitted Transform to assign the Sears lease to its wholly-owned subsidiary. MOAC moved to stay assignment of the lease, but the bankruptcy court denied the motion. MOAC appealed to federal district court but did so without first obtaining from the district court a stay of the assignment pending resolution of the appeal. Transform challenged the district court’s review of the bankruptcy court’s assignment order, claiming that Bankruptcy Code Section 363(m) “creates a rule of statutory mootness” barring appellate review of a sale “made to a good-faith purchaser” and not stayed pending appeal. Because MOAC had not obtained a stay, the district court dismissed as moot MOAC’s appeal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does Bankruptcy Code Section 363(m) limit the jurisdiction of appellate courts over an order approving the sale of a debtor’s assets or instead simply limit the remedies available on appeal from such an order?
Conclusion
Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code—which restricts the effects of certain successful appeals of judicially authorized sales or leases of bankruptcy-estate property—is not a jurisdictional provision. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
Congressional statutes often contain restrictions and conditions on relief, but absent a “clear statement” that a provision is jurisdictional, courts must n…
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[21-1164] Wilkins v. United States
30 november 2022 · 1 uur 6 min
Wilkins v. United States Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 30, 2022.
Decided on Mar 28, 2023.Petitioner: Larry Steven Wilkins, et al..
Respondent: United States.Advocates:
Jeffrey W. McCoy (for the Petitioners)
Benjamin W. Snyder (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Robbins Gulch Road runs between Highway 93 and the Bitterroot National Forest, crossing the private properties of Larry Wilkins and Jane Stanton near Connor, Montana. The previous owners of each of their properties had granted the United States an easement for Robbins Gulch Road in 1962.
In 2018, Wilkins and Stanton sued the United States under the Quiet Title Act (QTA) to confirm that the easement does not permit public use of the road and to enforce the government’s obligations to patrol and maintain the road against unrestricted public use. The district court granted the federal government’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Is the Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations a jurisdictional requirement or a claim-processing rule?
Conclusion
The Quiet Title Act’s 12-year statute of limitations is a claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court holding that Wilkins's and Stanton's lawsuit may proceed.
Jurisdictional rules tend to disrupt litigation, whereas procedural rules (including claim-processing rules) seek to facilitate the litigation process. Given the risk of disruption and waste that accompanies the jurisdictional label, courts will view a procedural requirement as jurisdictional only if Congress “clearly states” that it is. As a general rule, most statutes of limitations are nonjurisdictional.
The 12-year statute of limitations described in 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g) lacks a jurisdictional clear statement, and nothing in its text or context supports departing from the …
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[22-58] United States v. Texas
29 november 2022 · 2 uur 16 min
United States v. Texas Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 29, 2022.
Decided on Jun 23, 2023.Petitioner: United States of America, et al..
Respondent: State of Texas and State of Louisiana.Advocates:
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioners)
Judd E. Stone, II (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In September 2021, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued the Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law in an effort to allocate limited resources that could not feasibly deport every removable non-citizen presently in the United States. Texas and Louisiana challenged the Guidelines in federal court. The court concluded Texas had Article III standing to challenge the Guidelines because, as a result of the Guidelines, Texas would have to spend more money on law enforcement and social services. The court further concluded that the Guidelines violate the Administrative Procedure Act because they granted DHS discretion to decide who will be detained and when, and because they were issued without notice and comment. The court vacated the Guidelines nationwide, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a stay pending appeal.
Question
1. Do the state plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Homeland Security’s Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law?
2. Do the Guidelines violate the Administrative Procedure Act?
3. Does 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) prevent the entry of an order to “hold unlawful and set aside” the guidelines under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)?
Conclusion
Texas and Louisiana lack Article III standing to challenge immigration-enforcement guidelines promulgated by the Secretary of Homeland Security that prioritize the arrest and removal of certain noncitizens from the United States. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court.
For a plaintiff to establish standing, they must show that they have suffered a real, specif…
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[21-1158] Percoco v. United States
28 november 2022 · 1 uur 8 min
Percoco v. United States Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 28, 2022.
Decided on May 11, 2023.Petitioner: Joseph Percoco.
Respondent: United States.Advocates:
Jacob M. Roth (for the Petitioner)
Nicole F. Reaves (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2012, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo launched an initiative, known as the “Buffalo Billion” initiative, to develop the greater Buffalo area. Alain Kaloyeros strategically secured a highly influential role in the initiative and used that role to award contracts to certain developers of his choosing based on his knowledge and control over the process. Once the scheme came to light, the participants were charged and convicted of conspiracy to engage in wire fraud. In 2018, a jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts, and the defendants were sentenced to prison terms of varying lengths.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the wire fraud convictions, relying on a “right-to-control theory” of wire fraud that allows for conviction on “a showing that the defendant, through the withholding or inaccurate reporting of information that could impact on economic decisions, deprived some person or entity of potentially valuable economic information.”
Question
Can a private citizen who has informal political or other influence over governmental decisionmaking owe a fiduciary duty to the general public such that he can be convicted of honest-services fraud?
Conclusion
A private citizen who has informal political or other influence over governmental decisionmaking can be convicted of honest-services fraud, but in this case, the jury instructions leading to Percoco’s conviction were insufficiently definite. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court.
The jury instruction in this case required the jury to determine whether Percoco had a “special relationship” with the government and had “dominated and controlled” government b…
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[21-1170] Ciminelli v. United States
28 november 2022 · 1 uur 18 min
Ciminelli v. United States Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 28, 2022.
Decided on May 11, 2023.Petitioner: Louis Ciminelli.
Respondent: United States.Advocates:
Michael R. Dreeben (for the Petitioner)
Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2012, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo launched an initiative, known as the “Buffalo Billion” initiative, to develop the greater Buffalo area. Alain Kaloyeros strategically secured a highly influential role in the initiative and used that role to award contracts to certain developers of his choosing based on his knowledge and control over the process. Once the scheme came to light, the participants were charged and convicted of conspiracy to engage in wire fraud. In 2018, a jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts, and the defendants were sentenced to prison terms of varying lengths.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the wire fraud convictions, relying on a “right-to-control theory” of wire fraud that allows for conviction on “a showing that the defendant, through the withholding or inaccurate reporting of information that could impact on economic decisions, deprived some person or entity of potentially valuable economic information.”
Question
Does the Second Circuit’s “right to control” theory of fraud state a valid basis for liability under the federal wire fraud statute?
Conclusion
The Second Circuit’s right-to-control theory cannot form the basis for a conviction under the federal fraud statutes because the right to control is not grounded in a traditional property interest. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
The federal wire fraud statute prohibits the use of interstate wires for “any scheme or orifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” When the statute was enacted, the common understanding of the…
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[21-376] Haaland v. Brackeen
9 november 2022 · 3 uur 12 min
Haaland v. Brackeen Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 9, 2022.
Petitioner: Deb Haaland, Secretary of the Interior, et al..
Respondent: Chat Everet Brackeen.Advocates:
Matthew D. McGill (for Chad Everet Brackeen, et al.)
Judd E. Stone, II (for Texas)
Edwin S. Kneedler (for the federal parties)
Ian H. Gershengorn (for the tribal parties)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), a federal law enacted in 1978, restricts the removal of Native American children from their families and establishes a preference that Native children who are removed from their families be placed with extended family members or Native foster homes.
Several individuals and states filed a lawsuit challenging the law as violating constitutional anti-commandeering principles of the Tenth Amendment. The plaintiffs include several couples who wished to adopt or foster Native children, a woman who wished for her Native biological child to be adopted by non-Natives, and the states of Texas, Louisiana, and Indiana.
The district court ruled for the plaintiffs, striking down portions of the ICWA. The defendants appealed, and a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. In a fractured ruling, the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc upheld portions of the district court’s decision and reversed other portions.
Question
Do the Indian Child Welfare Act’s restrictions on placement of Native American children violate anti-commandeering principles of the Tenth Amendment?
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[21-1168] Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.
8 november 2022 · 1 uur 48 min
Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 8, 2022.
Decided on Jun 27, 2023.Petitioner: Robert Mallory.
Respondent: Norfolk Southern Railway Co..Advocates:
Ashley C. Keller (for the Petitioner)
Carter G. Phillips (for the Respondent)
Curtis E. Gannon (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Robert Mallory sued Norfolk Southern Railway Co. in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas for claims arising under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA). According to his complaint, Mallory was exposed to harmful carcinogens while employed by Defendant in Ohio and Virginia between 1988 through 2005. He did not allege that he suffered any harmful occupational exposures in Pennsylvania but sued in Pennsylvania court on a theory that the court could exercise jurisdiction over the Virginia company because it had registered to do business in Pennsylvania.
Under Pennsylvania law, a foreign corporation “may not do business in this Commonwealth until it registers” with the Department of State of the Commonwealth. State law further establishes that registration constitutes a sufficient basis for Pennsylvania courts to exercise general personal jurisdiction over that foreign corporation. Norfolk Southern Railway objected to the exercise of personal jurisdiction, arguing that the exercise violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court agreed and held Pennsylvania’s statutory scheme unconstitutional. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed.
Question
Does a state registration statute for out-of-state corporations that purports to confer general personal jurisdiction over the registrant violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion
A Pennsylvania law requiring out-of-state companies that register to do business in Pennsylvania to agree to appear in Pennsylvania courts on “any cause of…
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[21-806] Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County v. Talevski
8 november 2022 · 1 uur 34 min
Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County v. Talevski Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 8, 2022.
Decided on Jun 8, 2023.Petitioner: Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, et al..
Respondent: Gorgi Talevski.Advocates:
Lawrence S. Robbins (for the Petitioners)
Thomas M. Fisher (for Indiana, et al., as amicus curiae supporting the Petitioners)
Benjamin W. Snyder (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Andrew T. Tutt (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Gorgi Talevski was living with dementia and receiving care at Valparaiso Care and Rehabilitation, a state-run nursing facility in Indiana. His wife, Ivanka Talevski, filed a lawsuit on behalf of her husband alleging that Valparaiso Care failed to provide Gorgi with adequate medical care, used psychotropic medications as unnecessary chemical restraint, and improperly discharged and transferred him, among other practices, in violation of the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA).
The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, finding that FNHRA does not provide a private right of action that may be redressed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Section 1983 has a broad purpose of providing a remedy for federal statutory and constitutional violations.
Question
May a plaintiff file a federal civil rights claim for violation of the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act, which was enacted under Congress’s Spending Clause power?
Conclusion
A plaintiff may file a federal civil rights claim for violation of the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA). Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.
The Court first considered whether FNHRA can create rights enforceable through Section 1983. Section 1983 allows private parties to sue for deprivations of any any “rights, privileges, or immunities sec…
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[21-86] Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission
7 november 2022 · 1 uur 32 min
Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 7, 2022.
Decided on Apr 14, 2023.Petitioner: Axon Enterprise, Inc..
Respondent: Federal Trade Commission, et al..Advocates:
Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner)
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Axon Enterprises manufactures personal body cameras for law enforcement. In 2018, it acquired a competitor body camera company called Vievu. After the acquisition, the Federal Trade Commission informed Axon that the transaction raised antitrust concerns and that the Commission would be investigating.
At the end of 2019, the FTC informed Axon of its demands, which it could either accede or face administrative proceedings. Axon filed a lawsuit in federal district court alleging that (1) the FTC’s administrative proceeding violates Axon’s Fifth Amendment due process rights, (2) the FTC’s structure violates Article II by providing improper insulation from the President, and (3) Axon’s acquisition of Vievu did not violate antitrust law.
The district court dismissed Axon’s complaint, holding that the FTC’s statutory scheme required Axon to raise its constitutional challenge first in the administrative proceeding. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that Congress impliedly barred jurisdiction in federal district court.
Question
Do federal courts have jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to the Federal Trade Commission’s structure, procedure, and existence, or must such challenges be raised first in the administrative proceeding?
Conclusion
Federal courts have federal-question jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to the structure or existence of the SEC or FTC notwithstanding statutory review schemes set out in the Securities Exchange Act and Federal Trade Commission Act. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion holding that the Federal Trade Commissio…
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[21-1239] Securities and Exchange Commission v. Cochran
7 november 2022 · 1 uur 9 min
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Cochran Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 7, 2022.
Decided on Apr 14, 2023.Petitioner: Securities and Exchange Commission, et al..
Respondent: Michelle Cochran.Advocates:
Gregory G. Garre (for Michelle Cochran)
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the SEC, et al.)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In April 2016, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought an enforcement action against Michelle Cochran, a certified public accountant, alleging that she had failed to comply with federal auditing standards. After a hearing, an SEC administrative law judge (ALJ) agreed that Cochran had violated federal law, fined her $22,500, and banned her from practicing before the SEC for five years. The SEC adopted the ALJ’s decision, and Cochran objected.
Before the SEC could rule on Cochran’s objection, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lucia v. SEC, in which it held that SEC ALJs are officers of the United States under the Appointments Clause, who must be appointed by the President, a court of law, or a department head. In response to that ruling, the SEC remanded all pending administrative cases for new proceedings before constitutionally appointed ALJs, including Cochran’s.
Cochran filed a lawsuit in federal district court arguing that while Lucia may have addressed one constitutional issue with ALJs, it left uncorrected another problem: because SEC ALJs enjoy multiple layers of "for-cause" removal protection, they are unconstitutionally insulated from the President's Article II removal power. The district court dismissed Cochran’s case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on a reading of the Exchange Act as implicitly stripping district courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to ongoing SEC enforcement proceedings. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, but the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc reversed as to that interpretation of the Exchange Act.
Question
Does a federal d…
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[21-1195] Bittner v. United States
2 november 2022 · 1 uur 13 min
Bittner v. United States Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 2, 2022.
Decided on Feb 28, 2023.Petitioner: Alexandru Bittner.
Respondent: United States.Advocates:
Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner)
Matthew Guarnieri (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Alexandru Bittner erroneously failed to report his interests in foreign bank accounts on annual FBAR forms, as required by the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (BSA). The government fined him $2.72 million—$10,000 for each unreported account each year from 2007 to 2011. Bittner challenged the fine, and the district court reduced the assessment to $50,000, holding that the $10,000 maximum penalty attaches to each failure to file an annual FBAR, not to each failure to report an account. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed on this issue, holding that each failure to report a qualifying foreign account constitutes a separate reporting violation subject to penalty.
Question
Is a “violation” under the Bank Secrecy Act the failure to file an annual Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (no matter the number of foreign accounts), or is there a separate violation for each individual account that was not properly reported?
Conclusion
The Bank Secrecy Act’s $10,000 maximum penalty for the nonwillful failure to file a compliant report accrues on a per-report, not a per-account, basis. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 5-4 majority opinion holding that Bittner was subject to a fine only for each report he failed to file, not for each account he failed to report over that five-year period.
The plain language of Section 5321 addresses the legal duty to file reports, not of individual accounts or their number. The penalty the statute prescribes for nonwillful violations must therefore be based on the number of reports, not on the number of accounts. In contrast, for willful violations, the statute expressly considers a penalty on a per-account basis. The gov…
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[21-846] Cruz v. Arizona
1 november 2022 · 1 uur 2 min
Cruz v. Arizona Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 1, 2022.
Decided on Feb 22, 2023.Petitioner: John Montenegro Cruz.
Respondent: Arizona.Advocates:
Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Petitioner)
Joseph A. Kanefield (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2005, a jury convicted John Montenegro Cruz of first-degree murder for the 2003 killing of a Tucson police officer and sentenced Cruz to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Cruz’s conviction and sentence, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari.
In 2012, Cruz filed a petition in state court for post-conviction relief, which the court dismissed, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review.
In 2014, Cruz initiated federal habeas proceedings. In 2016, while those proceedings were ongoing, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lynch v. Arizona (Lynch II), holding that the Arizona Supreme Court had misapplied precedent. Cruz then filed a second petition for post-conviction relief. Ordinarily that second petition would be barred, but state law provides for an exception if there was an intervening “significant change in the the law.” Cruz argued that the decision in Lynch II was a signficant change in the law, that it applies retroactively, and would probably overturn his sentence.
The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that Lynch II was not a significant change in the law and was instead based on precedent well established at the time the defendant was convicted and sentenced.
Question
Is the Arizona Supreme Court’s ruling that a state rule of criminal procedure precluded post-conviction relief an adequate and independent state-law ground for the judgment against him, thereby precluding review by a federal court?
Conclusion
The Arizona Supreme Court’s holding below is not an adequate state-law ground supporting that judgment and thus does not preclude federal court review. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 5-4 majority opinion of …
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[21-857] Jones v. Hendrix
1 november 2022 · 1 uur 20 min
Jones v. Hendrix Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 1, 2022.
Decided on Jun 22, 2023.Petitioner: Marcus DeAngelo Jones.
Respondent: Dewayne Hendrix.Advocates:
Daniel R. Ortiz (for the Petitioner)
Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent, supporting affirmance)
Morgan L. Ratner (court-appointed amicus curiae, supporting the judgment below)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
A jury convicted Marcus DeAngelo Jones of one count of making false statements to acquire a firearm and two counts of possessing a firearm as a felon. Jones appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Jones then filed a motion to vacate his sentence on the grounds that it was illegally imposed. The district court denied his motion, but the Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that Jones’s counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the two felon-in-possession counts as duplicative. The district court vacated one of his felon-in-possession convictions and resentenced him.
In 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, to convict someone under § 922(g), the government must prove that the defendant knew both that he had a prohibited status and that he possessed a firearm. Because Jones had been convicted of this offense without proof that he knew he had a prohibited status, he filed a habeas petition challenging his conviction. The district court dismissed his petition, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Question
May a federal inmate who did not challenge their conviction on the ground that the statute did not criminalize their activity subsequently apply for habeas relief after the Supreme Court retroactively invalidates the circuit precedent on which the inmate relied in not challenging their conviction?
Conclusion
Section 2255(e) does not allow a prisoner asserting an intervening change in interpretation of a criminal statute to circumvent the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s (AEDPA) restrictions on second or …
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[20-1199] Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College
31 oktober 2022 · 1 uur 55 min
Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 31, 2022.
Petitioner: Students for Fair Admissions, Inc..
Respondent: President & Fellows of Harvard College.Advocates:
Cameron T. Norris (for the Petitioner)
Seth P. Waxman (for the Respondent)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Petitioner Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) sued Harvard College over its admissions process, alleging that the process violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by discriminating against Asian American applicants in favor of white applicants. Harvard admits that it uses race as one of many factors in its admissions process but argues that its process adheres to the requirements for race-based admissions outlined in the Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger.
After a 15-day bench trial, the district court issued a detailed opinion in favor of Harvard. SFFA appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.
The case was originally consolidated for oral argument with a similar case challenging the admissions policies at the University of North Carolina under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, but the Court severed the cases.
Question
May institutions of higher education use race as a factor in admissions?
If so, does Harvard College’s race-conscious admissions process violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?
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[21-707] Students for Fair Admissions v. University of North Carolina
31 oktober 2022 · 2 uur 45 min
Students for Fair Admissions v. University of North Carolina Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 31, 2022.
Decided on Jun 29, 2023.Petitioner: Students for Fair Admissions, Inc..
Respondent: University of North Carolina, et al..Advocates:
Patrick Strawbridge (for the Petitioner)
Ryan Y. Park (for the University Respondents)
David G. Hinojosa (for the Student Respondents)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Petitioner Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) sued the University of North Carolina (UNC) over its admissions process, alleging that the process violates the Fourteenth Amendment by using race as a factor in admissions. UNC admits that it uses race as one of many factors in its admissions process but argues that its process adheres to the requirements for race-based admissions outlined in the Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger.
After an eight-day bench trial and litigation that spanned nearly seven years, the district court ruled that UNC’s admissions policy survived strict scrutiny and was consistent with Grutter v. Bollinger. SFFA appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed to hold the case in abeyance after the U.S. Supreme Court granted review.
The case was originally consolidated for oral argument with a similar case challenging the admissions policies at Harvard University under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but the Court subsequently severed the two cases.
Question
May institutions of higher education use race as a factor in admissions?
If so, does UNC’s race-conscious admissions process violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution?
Conclusion
The University of North Carolina admissions program violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion.
First the Court concluded that Studen…
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[21-869] Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith
12 oktober 2022 · 1 uur 42 min
Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 12, 2022.
Decided on May 18, 2023.Petitioner: Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc..
Respondent: Lynn Goldsmith, et al..Advocates:
Roman Martinez (for the Petitioner)
Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondents)
Yaira Dubin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Artist Andy Warhol created a series of silkscreen prints and pencil illustrations (“Prince Series”) based on a copyrighted 1981 photograph of the musician Prince, taken by Lynn Goldsmith. Warhol made some aesthetic changes to Goldsmith’s original photograph, but they remained “recognizably derived” from the original.
Goldsmith sued the Andy Warhol Foundation, successor to Warhol’s copyright in the Prince Series, for copyright infringement. The Foundation raised fair use as a defense. The district court granted summary judgment for the Foundation, concluding that Warhol had “transformed” the original photograph by giving it a new “meaning and message.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, holding that because the Prince Series remained “recognizably derived” from the original, it failed to transform and was thus not fair use.
Question
What is the proper test for whether a work is “transformative” under the first factor of the Copyright Act’s fair use doctrine?
Conclusion
The “purpose and character” of the Andy Warhol Foundation (AWF)’s particular commercial use of Lynn Goldsmith’s photograph of the musician Prince does not favor AWF’s fair use defense to copyright infringement. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.
The fair use defense to copyright infringement promotes creativity by recognizing that some secondary works make unauthorized use of original works but serve a different purpose, add new expression, or convey new ideas. Andy Warhol’s “Orange…
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[21-984] Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc. v. Hewitt
12 oktober 2022 · 1 uur 34 min
Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc. v. Hewitt Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 12, 2022.
Decided on Feb 22, 2023.Petitioner: Helix Energy Solutions, et al..
Respondent: Michael J. Hewitt.Advocates:
Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners)
Edwin Sullivan (for the Respondent)
Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Michael J. Hewitt worked on an offshore oil rig managing other employees. His employer, Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc., paid Hewitt based solely on a daily rate, and he often was required to work well over forty hours per week.
Hewitt sued Helix for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Helix argued that it was not required to pay Hewitt overtime because Hewitt was a “highly compensated employee,” and highly compensated employees are exempt from overtime pay. Hewitt argued that because his pay was calculated on a daily rate, he was not paid on a salary basis and thus was entitled to overtime pay regardless of the dollar amount he was paid.
The district court ruled for Helix, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.
Question
Is a supervisor who makes over $200,000 annually, calculated on a daily basis, entitled to overtime pay, despite a regulation that carves out an exception for highly paid executives?
Conclusion
Daily-rate workers, of whatever income level, qualify as paid on a salary basis only if they satisfy the three conditions outlined in the Fair Labor Standards Act. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court holding that Hewitt was not an executive exempt from the FLSA’s overtime pay guarantee.
Under the FLSA, an employee is considered a bona fide executive excluded from the FLSA’s protections if the employee meets three tests: (1) the salary basis test, which requires that the employee receive a predetermined and fixed salary that does not vary with the a…
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[21-468] National Pork Producers Council v. Ross
11 oktober 2022 · 2 uur 12 min
National Pork Producers Council v. Ross Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 11, 2022.
Decided on May 11, 2023.Petitioner: National Pork Producers Council, et al..
Respondent: Karen Ross, in Her Official Capacity as Secretary of the California Department of Food & Agriculture, et al..Advocates:
Timothy S. Bishop (for the Petitioners)
Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Michael J. Mongan (for the State Respondents)
Jeffrey A. Lamken (for the Humane Society of the United States, et al., Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2018, California voters passed Proposition 12, which amends the California Health and Safety Code to prohibit the sale of pork from animals confined in a manner inconsistent with California standards. Trade associations representing the pork industry and farmers challenged the law as violating the dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits states from discriminating against interstate commerce or imposing undue burdens on interstate commerce.
According to the challengers, Proposition 12 places an undue burden on interstate commerce and that it causes an impermissible “extraterritorial effect” because it effectively forces all or most hog farmers, regardless of their location, to comply with the California requirements yet mostly affects non-California transactions (because 87% of the pork produced in the country is consumed outside of California).
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding the complaint did not plausibly plead that Proposition 12 violates the dormant Commerce Clause under either theory.
Question
Does a California law that prohibits the in-state sale of pork from animals confined in a manner inconsistent with California standards violate the “dormant” component of the Constitution’s Commerce Clause?
Conclusion
California’s P…
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[21-442] Reed v. Goertz
11 oktober 2022 · 1 uur
Reed v. Goertz Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 11, 2022.
Decided on Apr 18, 2023.Petitioner: Rodney Reed.
Respondent: Bryan Goertz, et al..Advocates:
Parker Rider-Longmaid (for the Petitioner)
Judd E. Stone, II (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Rodney Reed was sentenced to death in Texas for the 1996 rape and murder of Stacey Stites. He unsuccessfully sought federal post-conviction relief, and when the state asked to set an execution date, Reed requested to have DNA testing conducted on several items on or near the victim’s body. A state trial court declined his request. Reed then filed a federal civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the constitutionality of the Texas law governing post-conviction DNA testing. The district court dismissed his claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on the grounds that Reed’s claims are barred by the state’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, which begins to run as soon as the plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered an injury.”
Question
When does the statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim seeking DNA testing of crime-scene evidence begin to run?
Conclusion
When a prisoner pursues state post-conviction DNA testing through the state-provided litigation process, the statute of limitations a procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 begins to run when the state litigation ends. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion holding that, in Reed’s case, the statute of limitations on his § 1983 claim began when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied his motion for rehearing, not when the state trial court denied DNA testing.
A statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff has “a complete and present cause of action.” When that occurs depends on the cause of action. The violation of procedural due process rights, as Reed alleged in th…
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[21-432] Arellano v. McDonough
4 oktober 2022 · 48 min
Arellano v. McDonough Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 4, 2022.
Decided on Jan 23, 2023.Petitioner: Adolfo R. Arellano.
Respondent: Dennis McDonough, Secretary of Veterans Affairs.Advocates:
James R. Barney (for the Petitioner)
Sopan Joshi (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Adolfo R. Arellano served honorably in the Navy from November 1977 to October 1981. On June 3, 2011—more than 30 years after he was discharged—he applied for disability benefits on the basis of psychiatric disorders that rendered him 100% disabled. He sought retroactive benefits from the day after his discharge, arguing that the one-year filing deadline to submit disability claims should be extended in his case because his mental illness had prevented him from filing his claim earlier.
The VA Regional Office granted his claim, but only from the date the claim was received. The Board of Appeals rejected his argument, and the Veterans Court affirmed that decision, concluding that Mr. Arellano's claim was “squarely foreclosed by binding precedent” in Andrews v. Principi, 351 F.3d 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2003), which held that principles of equitable tolling are not applicable to the time period in 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1).
Question
Can the one-year filing deadline for veterans to submit disability claims after they are discharged be extended under principles of equitable tolling?
Conclusion
The one-year filing deadline for veterans to submit disability claims after they are discharged cannot be extended under principles of equitable tolling. Justice Amy Coney Barret authored the unanimous opinion of the Court holding that the effective date of Arellano’s award of disability compensation was the day the VA received his claim.
Equitable tolling can extend a deadline when a litigant diligently pursues their rights but is nonetheless prevented from bringing a timely action due to extraordinary circumstances. Courts presume that equitable toll…
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[21-1086] Allen v. Milligan
4 oktober 2022 · 1 uur 54 min
Allen v. Milligan Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 4, 2022.
Decided on Jun 8, 2023.Appellant: Wes Allen, Alabama Secretary of State, et al..
Appellee: Evan Milligan, et al..Advocates:
Edmund G. Lacour, Jr. (for the Appellants/Petitioners)
Deuel Ross (for the Appellees)
Abha Khanna (for the Respondents)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Appellees/Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
After the 2020 census, Alabama created a redistricting plan for its seven seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. One of the districts in the plan is a majority-Black district. Registered voters and several organizations challenged the map, arguing that the state had illegally packed Black voters into a single district while dividing other clusters of Black voters across multiple districts. The challengers alleged that the map effectively minimizes the number of districts in which Black voters can elect their chosen candidates, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which bans racial discrimination in voting policies.
A three-judge district court agreed with the challengers that the map likely violated Section 2 of the VRA, granting a preliminary injunction that ordered the state to draw a new map. Alabama asked the U.S. Supreme Court to freeze the district court’s injunction, which the Court did by a 5-4 decision pending a merits decision.
Question
Does Alabama’s 2021 redistricting plan for its seven U.S. House seats violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?
Conclusion
The district court correctly applied binding Supreme Court precedent to conclude that Alabama’s redistricting map likely violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court.
The Court’s decision in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) sets out a three-part framework for evaluating claims brought under Section 2 of the Voting Rights…
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[21-454] Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency
3 oktober 2022 · 1 uur 48 min
Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 3, 2022.
Decided on May 25, 2023.Petitioner: Michael Sackett and Chantelle Sackett.
Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency.Advocates:
Damien M. Schiff (for the Petitioners)
Brian H. Fletcher (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Michael and Chantall Sackett own a residential lot near Priest Lake, Idaho, and want to build a home there. However, shortly after they began placing sand and gravel, the federal Environmental Protection Agency told them that they could not build on their lot because construction on the land violated the Clean Water Act. According to the EPA, the Sacketts’ lot contained wetlands that qualify as “navigable waters” regulated by the Act, so they needed to remove the sand and gravel and restore the property to its natural state.
Litigation ensued, and in 2012, the Supreme Court permitted the Sacketts to litigate their challenge to the EPA’s order in federal court. During the litigation, the EPA removed its compliance order.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the EPA’s withdrawal of the compliance order did not render the Sacketts’ challenge moot and that the EPA does have jurisdiction over their property under the Clean Water Act. The court reasoned that, under binding circuit precedent, “jurisdiction over wetlands depends upon the existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in question and navigable waters in the traditional sense.”
Question
What is the proper test for determining whether wetlands are “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act?
Conclusion
The Clean Water Act extends only to wetlands that have a continuous surface connection with “waters” of the United States—i.e., with a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court that was unan…
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[22O145] Delaware v. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin
3 oktober 2022 · 1 uur 9 min
Delaware v. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Oct 3, 2022.
Decided on Feb 28, 2023.Petitioner: State of Delaware.
Respondent: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and State of Wisconsin.Advocates:
Neal Kumar Katyal (for Delaware)
Nicholas J. Bronni (for Arkansas et al.)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
MoneyGram Payments Systems, which is headquartered in Delaware, returns unclaimed checks to that state. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin argue that the checks are “money orders” or “similar written instruments,” which federal law requires to go to the states where they were purchased.
Invoking the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over interstate disputes, Delaware filed the case directly in the Supreme Court. The Court appointed a special master, who concluded that MoneyGram’s checks are “money orders” or “similar written instruments” and thus should go to the states where they were purchased. Delaware asked the Court to review the Special Master’s findings for error.
Question
Are unclaimed MoneyGram checks “money orders” or “similar written instruments” and thus subject to a federal law that remits them to the states where they were purchased?
Conclusion
Unclaimed MoneyGram checks are “money orders” or “similar written instruments” and thus subject to the Federal Disposition Act, which remits them to the states where they were purchased. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the opinion of the Court, which was unanimous as to its conclusion (but only 5-4 as to the discussion of legislative history supporting that conclusion).
The unclaimed checks at issue in this case are sufficiently similar to “money orders” to fall within the Federal Disposition Act (FDA) for two main reasons. First, they are similar in function in operation because they are prepaid financial instruments used to transmit a specified amount of money to a named payee. Second, because of the recordkeeping practices of the entity issuing and holding o…
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[21-429] Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta
27 april 2022 · 2 uur 10 min
Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Apr 27, 2022.
Decided on Jun 29, 2022.Petitioner: State of Oklahoma.
Respondent: Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta.Advocates:
Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioner)
Zachary C. Schauf (for the Respondent)
Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta, a non-Native, was convicted in Oklahoma state court of child neglect, and he was sentenced to 35 years. The victim, his stepdaughter, is Native American, and the crime was committed within the Cherokee Reservation.
Castro-Huerta challenged his conviction, arguing that under the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma, which held that states cannot prosecute crimes committed on Native American lands without federal approval. Oklahoma argued that McGirt involved a Native defendant, whereas Castro-Huerta is non-Native, so McGirt does not bar his prosecution by the state.
Question
Do states have the authority to prosecute non-Natives who commit crimes against Natives on Native American lands?
Conclusion
The federal government and the state have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Natives against Natives on Native American land. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court.
The Court has held that States have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Natives against non-Natives on Native American lands. Native American land is not separate from state territory. And States have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed on Native American land unless preempted. Preemption may occur either under ordinary principles of federal preemption, or when the exercise of state jurisdiction would unlawfully infringe on tribal self-government. Neither is present in this case, so states have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Natives against Nati…
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[21-511] Shoop v. Twyford
26 april 2022 · 59 min
Shoop v. Twyford Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Apr 26, 2022.
Decided on Jun 21, 2022.Petitioner: Tim Shoop, Warden.
Respondent: Raymond Twyford.Advocates:
Benjamin M. Flowers (for the Petitioner)
Nicole F. Reaves (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
David A. O'Neil (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 1993, an Ohio jury convicted Raymond Twyford of aggravated murder and sentenced him to death. Twyford unsuccessfully pursued direct appeals and also filed a federal habeas petition. In November 2018, Twyford asked the federal district court to allow him to undergo neurological imaging to substantiate allegations of neurological problems due to childhood abuse, neglect, and injuries. The district court granted Twyford’s motion and ordered the prison warden to transport Twyford for his neurological imaging because the results might assist the court in exercising its habeas review. The warden appealed the order, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Question
May a federal district court order the transportation of a state prisoner to help him develop evidence for his habeas petition, even before determining the admissibility of the evidence?
Conclusion
A transportation order that allows a prisoner to search for new evidence is not “necessary or appropriate in aid of” a federal court’s adjudication of a habeas corpus action when the prisoner has not shown that the desired evidence would be admissible in connection with a particular claim for relief. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court.
A federal court may never needlessly prolong a habeas case. For that reason, before a federal court may admit new evidence, either the claim must rely on a new and previously unavailable rule of constitutional law made retroactively available by the Supreme Court, or it must rely on a factual predicate that could not have b…
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[21-954] Biden v. Texas
26 april 2022 · 1 uur 47 min
Biden v. Texas Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Apr 26, 2022.
Decided on Jun 30, 2022.Petitioner: Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President of the United States, et al..
Respondent: State of Texas, et al..Advocates:
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioners)
Judd E. Stone, II (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2018, the Trump administration announced the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPPs), under which policy certain noncitizens arriving at the southwest border of the United States were returned to Mexico during their immigration proceedings. Known as the “remain in Mexico” policy, the MPPs faced legal challenges shortly after their enactment, but the Supreme Court allowed the Trump administration to enforce it.
In June 2021, the Biden administration sought to end the policy, but Texas and Missouri challenged that effort, arguing that rescinding the policy violated federal immigration law and that the policy change violated the Administrative Procedure Act. A federal district court agreed with the challengers and ordered the Biden administration to implement the MPPs in good faith or initiate new agency action in compliance with the APA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declined to block the lower court’s ruling, as did the Supreme Court.
In October 2021, the Department of Homeland Security issued a new decision ending the policy supported by a memorandum explaining the decision. A district court again ordered DHS to continue the CPPs, and the Fifth Circuit upheld the order. The Biden administration sought expedited review as to whether federal immigration law requires it to maintain the policy and whether the October decision to end the policy has any legal effect.
Question
Must the Biden administration continue to enforce the Trump administration’s Migrant Protection Protocols, or does the Biden Department of Homeland Security decision ending the policy have legal effect?
Conclu…
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[21-418] Kennedy v. Bremerton School District
25 april 2022 · 1 uur 48 min
Kennedy v. Bremerton School District Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Apr 25, 2022.
Decided on Jun 27, 2022.Petitioner: Joseph A. Kennedy.
Respondent: Bremerton School District.Advocates:
Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner)
Richard B. Katskee (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Joseph Kennedy, a high school football coach, engaged in prayer with a number of students during and after school games. His employer, the Bremerton School District, asked that he discontinue the practice in order to protect the school from a lawsuit based on violation of the Establishment Clause. Kennedy refused and instead rallied local and national television, print media, and social media to support him.
Kennedy sued the school district for violating his rights under the First Amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court held that because the school district suspended him solely because of the risk of constitutional liability associated with his religious conduct, its actions were justified. Kennedy appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Is a public school employee’s prayer during school sports activities protected speech, and if so, can the public school employer prohibit it to avoid violating the Establishment Clause?
Conclusion
The Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment protect an individual engaging in a personal religious observance from government reprisal; the Constitution neither mandates nor permits the government to suppress such religious expression. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court.
The District disciplined Coach Kennedy after three games in October 2015, in which he “pray[ed] quietly without his students.” In forbidding Mr. Kennedy’s prayers, the District sought to restrict his actions because of their religious character, thereby burdening his right to free exercise. As to h…