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495 afleveringen, van nieuw naar oud
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[22-529] Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A.
27 februari 2024 · 1 uur 48 min
Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A. Lees meer
Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Feb 27, 2024.
Petitioner: Alex Cantero, et al.
Respondent: Bank of America, N.A.Advocates:
Jonathan E. Taylor (for the Petitioners)
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur)
Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The National Bank Act of 1864 (NBA) established a dual banking system in the United States, allowing both federal and state governments to charter and regulate banks. National banks are subject to federal authority and have broad powers, including the ability to make real estate loans and provide escrow services. Alongside the NBA, other significant federal statutes regulate national banks: The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) limits the amount banks can require borrowers to deposit into escrow accounts related to home mortgages; the Dodd-Frank Act sets the standards for when state consumer financial laws are preempted by federal law; and it also amends the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) to require the creation of escrow accounts for certain mortgages and mandates interest payment on those accounts if prescribed by state or federal law. The state law in question, New York General Obligations Law (GOL) § 5-601, mandates a minimum interest rate for escrow accounts held by mortgage institutions, which was later adjusted in 2018 to create “parity” between state-chartered and national banks.
Alex Cantero purchased a house in Queens Village, New York, with a mortgage from Bank of America (BOA) in August 2010. His mortgage required him to deposit money into an escrow account for property taxes and insurance premiums, and BOA paid no interest on these funds. Cantero’s mortgage specified that it is governed by federal law and the law of the property’s jurisdiction. Cantero alleged that BOA refused to pay interest on escrow funds, contrary to New York State law.
The district court determined that N…
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[22-277] Moody v. NetChoice, LLC
26 februari 2024 · 2 uur 22 min
Moody v. NetChoice, LLC Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Feb 26, 2024.
Petitioner: Attorney General, State of Florida, et al.
Respondent: NetChoice, LLC, et al.Advocates:
Henry C. Whitaker (for the Petitioners)
Paul D. Clement (for the Respondents)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Social-media platforms collect third-party posts, including text, photos, and videos, and distribute them to other users. Importantly, they are private enterprises, not governmental entities, and thus are not subject to constitutional requirements for free speech. Users have no obligation to consume or contribute to the content on these platforms. And unlike traditional media, social-media platforms primarily host content created by individual users rather than the companies themselves (although they do engage in some speech of their own, such as publishing terms of service and community standards). They are not merely conduits of that content, however; they curate and edit the content that users see, which involves removing posts that violate community standards and prioritizing posts based on various factors.
The State of Florida enacted S.B. 7072 to address what it perceives as bias and censorship by large social media platforms against conservative voices. The legislation imposes various restrictions and obligations on social media platforms, such as prohibiting the deplatforming of political candidates and requiring detailed disclosures about content moderation policies. It aims to treat social media platforms like common carriers and focuses on those platforms that either have annual gross revenues exceeding $100 million or at least 100 million monthly individual participants globally. Enforcement mechanisms include substantial fines and the option for civil suits.
NetChoice and the Computer & Communications Industry Association (together, “NetChoice”)—a…
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[22-555] NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton
26 februari 2024 · 1 uur 20 min
NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Feb 26, 2024.
Petitioner: NetChoice, LLC, et al.
Respondent: Ken Paxton, In His Official Capacity as Attorney General of Texas.Advocates:
Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Aaron L. Nielson (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The State of Texas enacted HB 20 to regulate large social media platforms, such as Facebook, X (formerly known as Twitter), and YouTube. The law purports to prohibit large social media platforms from censoring speech based on the viewpoint of the speaker.
NetChoice and the Computer & Communications Industry Association filed a lawsuit against the Attorney General of Texas, challenging two provisions of the law as unconstitutional: (1) Section 7, which prohibits viewpoint-based censorship of users’ posts, except for content that incites criminal activity or is unlawful. (2) Section 2, which requires platforms to disclose how they moderate and promote content, publish an "acceptable use policy," and maintain a complaint-and-appeal system for their users.
The district court issued a preliminary injunction, holding that Section 7 and Section 2 are facially unconstitutional. The court argued that social media platforms have some level of editorial discretion protected by the First Amendment, and HB 20 interferes with that discretion. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, rejecting the idea that large corporations have a “freewheeling” First Amendment right to censor what people say. It reasoned that HB 20 does not regulate the platforms’ speech but protects other people’s speech and regulates the platforms’ conduct.
Question
Do Texas HB 20’s provisions prohibiting social media platforms from censoring users’ content and imposing stringent disclosure requirements violate the First Amendment?
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[22-1078] Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy
21 februari 2024 · 53 min
Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy Lees meer
Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Feb 21, 2024.
Petitioner: Warner Chappell Music, Inc., et al.
Respondent: Sherman Nealy, et al.Advocates:
Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioners)
Joe Wesley Earnhardt (for the Respondents)
Yaira Dubin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In the early 1980s, Sherman Nealy and Tony Butler formed Music Specialist, Inc. (MSI), a Florida corporation involved in the music industry. Nealy, a newcomer to the sector, financed the operation while Butler, an experienced disc jockey, authored or co-authored the musical works at the heart of the case. MSI released an album and several singles from 1983 to 1986 before dissolving as a corporation, although its business activities continued until 1989. During Nealy’s subsequent incarceration for drug offenses, Butler formed a new company, 321 Music, LLC, and began licensing rights to MSI’s musical works. This included an agreement in 2008 with Atlantic to interpolate one of MSI’s works into a song by artist Flo Rida.
Upon his release, Nealy discovered third-party usage of MSI’s catalog but took no decisive action. He was unaware of ensuing litigation over the works among various entities including Warner Chappell Music, Inc., Artist Publishing Group, LLC, Atlantic Recording Corporation, and Butler's 321 Music. It wasn't until post-release from a second prison term that he learned of the prior litigation and alleged unauthorized transfers of rights. Finally, in December 2018, Nealy and MSI filed a lawsuit alleging copyright infringement by Atlantic, Artist, and Warner for activities dating back to 2008. Following a pre-trial stipulation framing the case as an “ownership dispute,” the defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted in part and denied in part. On an interlocutory appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that w…
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[23A349] Ohio v. Environmental Protection Agency
21 februari 2024 · 1 uur 29 min
Ohio v. Environmental Protection Agency Lees meer
Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Feb 21, 2024.
Petitioner: Ohio, et al.
Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency, et al.Advocates:
Mathura J. Sridharan (for the State Applicants)
Catherine E. Stetson (for the Industry Applicants)
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Federal Respondents)
Judith N. Vale (for the State Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
None
Question
None
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[22-1008] Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
20 februari 2024 · 1 uur 10 min
Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Feb 20, 2024.
Petitioner: Corner Post, Inc.
Respondent: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.Advocates:
Bryan K. Weir (for the Petitioner)
Benjamin W. Snyder (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The case concerns the interchange fees associated with debit card transactions, which generate billions of dollars in revenue for issuing banks. The regulatory agency, the Board of the Federal Reserve System, promulgated a rule (“Regulation II”) to govern these fees. Regulation II caps the fees that banks can charge for each debit card transaction. Petitioners in the case include Corner Post, a convenience store, the North Dakota Retail Association (NDRA), and the North Dakota Petroleum Marketers Association (NDPMA), all of whom accept debit card payments and are thus affected by interchange fees.
On April 29, 2021, the North Dakota Retail Association (NDRA) and the North Dakota Petroleum Marketers Association (NDPMA) challenged Regulation II as arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). After the Board moved to dismiss the case based on the statute of limitations, NDRA and NDPMA amended their complaint to add Corner Post, Inc. as an additional plaintiff. The district court dismissed the case, ruling that the 2015 clarification to Regulation II did not reset the statute of limitations, that Corner Post's statute of limitations began in 2011 with the original publication of Regulation II, and that none of the plaintiffs’ claims warranted equitable tolling. The Merchants appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does a plaintiff’s claim under the Administrative Procedure Act “first accrue” under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) when an agency issues a rule, or when the rule first causes harm to the plaintiff?
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[23-51] Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC
20 februari 2024 · 1 uur
Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC Lees meer
Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Feb 20, 2024.
Petitioner: Neal Bissonnette, et al.
Respondent: LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC, et al.Advocates:
Jennifer D. Bennett (for the Petitioners)
Traci L. Lovitt (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Flowers Foods, Inc. is a holding company that owns subsidiaries responsible for producing and distributing baked goods like breads, buns, rolls, and snack cakes. Two of the independent distributors for Flowers in Connecticut are Neal Bissonnette and Tyler Wojnarowski. Both entered into Distributor Agreements with Flowers in 2017 and 2018, respectively. According to these agreements, they pick up baked goods from local warehouses and distribute them to stores and restaurants, earning the difference between the acquisition and selling prices. They are also responsible for sales promotion, stock management, and other operational tasks. While they can sell non-competitive products, they primarily work full-time for Flowers.
The Distributor Agreement includes an appended Arbitration Agreement, which states that any disputes must be submitted to binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, except for certain specified issues. Pursuant to that arbitration agreement, the district court compelled arbitration. Bissonnette and Wojnarowski claimed that they are not subject to the FAA because they are “transportation workers” within the meaning of Section 1 of the FAA, which excludes contracts with “seamen, railroad employees, [and] any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision ordering arbitration and dismissing Plaintiff’s lawsuit against Defendant for unpaid or withheld wages, unpaid overtime wages, and unjust enrichment, concluding that Bissonnette and Wojnarowski did not qualify as transportation workers because they were not emplo…
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[23-719] Trump v. Anderson
8 februari 2024 · 2 uur 9 min
Trump v. Anderson Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Feb 8, 2024.
Petitioner: Donald J. Trump.
Respondent: Norma Anderson, et al.Advocates:
Jonathan F. Mitchell (for the Petitioner)
Jason C. Murray (for Respondents Anderson, et al.)
Shannon W. Stevenson (for Respondent Griswold)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Donald Trump was elected as the 45th President, serving for four years. In the 2020 election, Joe Biden was elected as the 46th President, despite Trump's refusal to accept the results. The Electoral College confirmed Biden's victory with 306 votes to Trump's 232. Trump continued to challenge the outcome in court and media. On January 6, 2021, during a Congressional session to certify the election, Trump held a rally, claiming victory and urging supporters to protest at the Capitol. The next day, Vice President Pence certified Biden's win. Trump is currently seeking the Colorado Republican Party’s nomination for the 2024 presidential election.
A group of Colorado electors, consisting of both registered Republicans and unaffiliated voters, filed a petition in the Denver District Court to prevent Trump from appearing on the Colorado Republican presidential primary ballot. Citing Colorado’s Uniform Election Code, they requested the court to direct Secretary of State Jena Griswold to exclude Trump’s name. Their argument centered on Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment, claiming Trump was disqualified due to his involvement in the January 6, 2021, insurrection, violating his presidential oath to support the U.S. Constitution.
The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Trump engaged in insurrection as those terms are used in Section Three but that Section Three does not apply to the president. Thus, the court denied the petition. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed in part, concluding that Section Three disqualifies Trump from holding the office of President of …
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[22-1219] Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce
17 januari 2024 · 2 uur 12 min
Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 17, 2024.
Petitioner: Relentless, Inc., et al.
Respondent: Department of Commerce, et al.Advocates:
Roman Martinez (for the Petitioners)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Atlantic herring fishery is regulated by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), aimed at preventing overfishing and promoting conservation. The MSA sets up regional councils, including the New England Fishery Management Council, which oversees the Atlantic herring fishery. These councils create fishery management plans (FMPs) to set conservation measures, which must align with ten National Standards and other laws.
The Secretary of Commerce, through the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), reviews and publishes these plans for public comment. In 2000, the New England Council established an FMP for Atlantic herring, updated with an industry-funded monitoring program in 2020. The program partially shifts the cost of at-sea monitoring to vessel owners but aims for a 50% target of monitored herring trips, which will cause reduced profits for the fishing industry and communities.
Owners of two fishing vessels, Relentless Inc., Huntress Inc., and Seafreeze Fleet LLC, challenged the Rule, arguing that the monitoring requirement disproportionately burdens them because of their longer trips and inability to qualify for exemptions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Agency, ruling that the MSA’s ambiguity on industry-paid monitors allows for agency interpretation under Chevron deference, that the Rule complies with the MSA’s National Standards and the Regulatory Flexibility Act, and does not violate the Commerce Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.
Question
1. Should Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council be overruled?
2. Does statutory silence conce…
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[22-451] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo
17 januari 2024 · 1 uur 16 min
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 17, 2024.
Petitioner: Loper Bright Enterprises, et al.
Respondent: Gina Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, et al.Advocates:
Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
A group of commercial fishermen who regularly participate in the Atlantic herring fishery sued the National Marine Fisheries Service after the Service promulgated a rule that required industry to fund at-sea monitoring programs at an estimated cost of $710 per day. The fisherman argued that the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 did not authorize the Service to create industry-funded monitoring requirements and that the Service failed to follow proper rulemaking procedure.
The district court granted summary judgment for the government based on its reasonable interpretation of its authority and its adoption of the rule through the required notice-and-comment procedure. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed.
Question
1. Does the Magnuson-Stevens Act authorize the National Marine Fisheries Service to promulgate a rule that would require industry to pay for at-sea monitoring programs?
2. Should the Court overrule Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council or at least clarify whether statutory silence on controversial powers creates an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency?
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[22-1165] Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P.
16 januari 2024 · 1 uur 6 min
Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P. Lees meer
Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 16, 2024.
Petitioner: Macquarie Infrastructure Corp., et al.
Respondent: Moab Partners, L.P., et al.Advocates:
Linda T. Coberly (for the Petitioners)
David C. Frederick (for the Respondent)
Ephraim McDowell (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
For years, Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. had been lauded as a “total return opportunity” thanks to its strong dividend history, diversified business operations, and favorable growth rates. One of its most significant assets, International-Matex Tank Terminals (“IMTT”), was a substantial driver of its profit, with a major focus on storing No. 6 fuel oil. However, Macquarie and its leadership allegedly hid crucial information from investors, specifically about IMTT’s heavy reliance on No. 6 fuel oil, a commodity facing stringent upcoming regulations and declining demand. Even after international regulations on sulfur levels in fuel were confirmed to drastically affect the market for No. 6 fuel oil, the company continued to misrepresent its exposure, allegedly misleading investors about IMTT's flexibility and downplaying the impending effects on revenue.
On February 21, 2018, Macquarie first announced a sharp decline in IMTT utilization, earnings falling short of analysts’ expectations, and a 31% cut to the company’s dividend. The company admitted for the first time that it would need to spend hundreds of millions to repurpose IMTT's storage tanks due to the declining demand for No. 6 fuel oil. As a result, the stock price plummeted, and Macquarie’s management faced a credibility crisis. Questions arose about the company’s transparency and honesty, harming investor trust and the company’s overall reputation.
On behalf of a class of plaintiffs, Moab Partners, L.P., sued Macquarie, alleging that it made material omissions and false and misleading stateme…
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[22-913] Devillier v. Texas
16 januari 2024 · 1 uur 12 min
Devillier v. Texas Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 16, 2024.
Petitioner: Richard Devillier.
Respondent: State of Texas.Advocates:
Robert J. McNamara (for the Petitioners)
Aaron L. Nielson (for the Respondent)
Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Petitioners Devillier and others own property in Texas along Interstate Highway 10 (IH-10). The State of Texas, through the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT), elevated IH-10 and installed a solid concrete median barrier, which acted as a “weir” to obstruct natural water flow and led to the flooding of the petitioners’ properties. Despite being aware of the potential for flooding, the State proceeded with the construction and even extended the barrier, causing extensive damage to the petitioners’ properties.
The petitioners sued the state, directly invoking the Taking Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which they argued applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied Texas’s motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated, finding the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a right of action for takings claims against the state.
Question
May a party sue a state directly under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment?
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[22-899] Smith v. Arizona
10 januari 2024 · 1 uur 29 min
Smith v. Arizona Lees meer
Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 10, 2024.
Petitioner: Jason Smith.
Respondent: State of Arizona.Advocates:
Hari Santhanam (for the Petitioner)
Eric J. Feigin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Alexander W. Samuels (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In December 2019, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at Jason Smith's father's property, which had multiple structures. They detected a strong odor of marijuana from a shed, where they found Smith and later discovered various drugs and paraphernalia. Smith was charged with multiple felonies related to drug possession. During the trial, a forensic scientist testified that the seized substances were indeed illegal drugs. Smith's defense argued he was merely at the property to care for his ill father and was not involved in any illegal activities. Smith was found guilty on several counts, including possession of marijuana for sale, and was sentenced to four years in prison.
Smith appealed the decision, claiming, among other things, that the admission of drug-analysis testimony violated his confrontation rights because the testifying expert relied on data generated by a non-testifying expert. The appellate court affirmed.
Question
Does the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment permit the prosecution in a criminal trial to present testimony by a substitute expert conveying the testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst?
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[22-1074] Sheetz v. County of El Dorado, California
9 januari 2024 · 1 uur 29 min
Sheetz v. County of El Dorado, California Lees meer
Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 9, 2024.
Petitioner: George Sheetz.
Respondent: County of El Dorado, California.Advocates:
Paul J. Beard II (for the Petitioner)
Aileen M. McGrath (for the Respondent)
Erica L. Ross (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The County of El Dorado, California, has a Traffic Impact Mitigation (TIM) Fee Program that imposes a traffic-impact fee on any property owner applying for a building permit. The fee consists of two components: the “Highway 50 Component” and the “Local Road Component,” and is determined by the geographic zone in which the project is located and the type of construction proposed. The fee is mandatory regardless of the actual impact the project may have on existing or future roads. The TIM Fee Program stipulates that new developments bear the full cost of road construction and widening, even though these roads are used and benefitted from by existing residents and non-residents alike. In 2012, the County Board passed a resolution establishing new TIM Fee rates, which were subsequently applied to George Sheetz’s project.
Sheetz applied for a building permit in July 2016 to construct a 1,854-square-foot manufactured house for his family. The County required him to pay $23,420 in traffic-mitigation fees based on the type and location of his project, even though no individualized assessment was made to correlate the fee with the project’s actual impact on local or state roads. Sheetz paid the fee under protest and later filed a legal action against the County, alleging the fee was an unconstitutional condition under the Nollan and Dolan standards and seeking a refund of the fee paid.
Under the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, “the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right.” The U.S. Supreme Court in Nollan (1987) and Dolan (1994) recogn…
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[22-1238] Office of the United States Trustee v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC
9 januari 2024 · 1 uur 3 min
Office of the United States Trustee v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 9, 2024.
Petitioner: Office of the United States Trustee.
Respondent: John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC, et al.Advocates:
Masha G. Hansford (for the Petitioner)
Daniel L. Geyser (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In the U.S., bankruptcy proceedings are administered through two systems: the Trustee Program managed by the Department of Justice for 88 judicial districts, and the Bankruptcy Administrator Program for six districts in Alabama and North Carolina, overseen directly by the courts. This dual system originated in 1978, with Alabama and North Carolina eventually gaining a permanent exemption from the Trustee Program in 2000. Both programs have different funding models, with the Trustee Program financed primarily through debtor fees and the Administrator Program funded through the general judicial budget. Over the years, Congress has enacted various amendments to balance the fee structures between the two systems, but disparities have remained, most notably with the 2017 Amendment which significantly raised fees in Trustee districts.
Seventy-six Chapter 11 debtors associated with John Q. Hammons Hotels & Resorts (Debtors) filed for bankruptcy in the District of Kansas, a Trustee district, in June 2016. Their cases were still pending when a 2017 Amendment took effect in January 2018, which significantly increased their quarterly Chapter 11 disbursement fees. By the end of December 2019, they had paid over $2.5 million more in fees than they would have if they had filed in a Bankruptcy Administrator district, such as those in North Carolina and Alabama.
The Debtors challenged the fee increase in bankruptcy court, arguing it was unequally applied and retroactive without clear congressional intent. The bankruptcy court rejected these arguments, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed.
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[22-674] Campos-Chaves v. Garland
8 januari 2024 · 1 uur 40 min
Campos-Chaves v. Garland Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 8, 2024.
Petitioner: Moris Esmelis Campos-Chaves.
Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General.Advocates:
Charles L. McCloud (for the United States)
Easha Anand (for the Petitioner in 22-674 and the Respondent in 22-884)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Moris Campos-Chaves, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States illegally on January 24, 2005, and was served with a Notice to Appear (NTA) on February 10, 2005. He was charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). When Campos-Chaves did not appear for his hearing, he was ordered removed in absentia.
Years later, on September 18, 2018, Campos-Chaves moved to reopen his case, arguing that the NTA he had initially received was defective. The immigration judge concluded that the NTA was not defective, and Campos-Chaves had actually received both the NTA and the Notice of Hearing. Thus, the immigration judge denied his petition for review and also denied all pending motions. The Board of Immigration Appeals issued a final order of removal, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied his petition for rehearing.
Question
Does the government provides adequate notice under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) when it serves an initial notice document that does not include the “time and place” of proceedings followed by an additional document containing that information?
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[22-1178] Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fikre
8 januari 2024 · 1 uur 22 min
Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fikre Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Jan 8, 2024.
Petitioner: Federal Bureau of Investigation, et al.
Respondent: Yonas Fikre.Advocates:
Sopan Joshi (for the Petitioners)
Gadeir Abbas (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2010, Yonas Fikre, a U.S. citizen of Eritrean descent, was placed on the FBI’s No Fly List while he was traveling to Sudan. FBI agents questioned him about his ties to a mosque in Portland, Oregon, and informed him he was a flight risk. Fikre was offered removal from the list in exchange for becoming an FBI informant, an offer he declined. Subsequently, Fikre was imprisoned and tortured in the United Arab Emirates, allegedly at the request of the FBI. Unable to return to the U.S., Fikre sought asylum in Sweden, but was ultimately denied and returned to Portland via private jet after his petition to be removed from the No Fly List was also denied. While still in Sweden, Fikre filed a lawsuit against the FBI, claiming violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process. While the lawsuit was pending, the FBI removed him from the No Fly List.
A federal district court in Oregon dismissed Fikre's case as moot, given that he had been removed from the No Fly List. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reinstated the lawsuit, stating that under the voluntary cessation doctrine, it was not “absolutely clear” that Fikre would not be placed back on the list for the same reasons. The case returned to the district court where an FBI official filed a declaration that Fikre would not be put back on the list based on current information. Despite this declaration, the court once again dismissed the case. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit again reversed, reasoning that the FBI’s declaration did not indicate a change in the policies or procedures that put Fikre on the list in the first place.
Question
Are respondent’s claims challenging his placement on the No Fly L…
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[22-193] Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri
6 december 2023 · 1 uur 37 min
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Dec 6, 2023.
Petitioner: Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow.
Respondent: City of St. Louis, Missouri, et al.Advocates:
Brian Wolfman (for the Petitioner)
Aimee W. Brown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Robert M. Loeb (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Sergeant Muldrow, initially assigned to the Intelligence Division where she worked on various high-profile cases and was deputized by the FBI, was transferred to the Fifth District by Interim Police Commissioner Lawrence O'Toole's appointee, Captain Deeba. This change led to a different work schedule, responsibilities, and loss of special FBI-related privileges including a potential $17,500 in annual overtime pay. After her transfer, Sergeant Muldrow was asked to return FBI-issued equipment, which she did, and her Task Force Officer status was revoked. She filed a discrimination charge with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights against the City of St. Louis and Captain Deeba, later filing an action in Missouri state court alleging Title VII violations.
The case was removed to federal court, where the district court granted summary judgment against her Title VII claims and dismissed her state law claims. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the employment decisions she alleged did not constitute “adverse employment action” and thus did not establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination under Title VII, nor were they “materially adverse action” as required for a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII.
Question
Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibit discrimination in transfer decisions absent a separate court determination that the transfer decision caused a signification disadvantage?
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[22-800] Moore v. United States
5 december 2023 · 2 uur 5 min
Moore v. United States Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Dec 5, 2023.
Petitioner: Charles G. Moore and Kathleen F. Moore.
Respondent: United States of America.Advocates:
Andrew M. Grossman (for the Petitioners)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2005, the Moores invested $40,000 in KisanKraft, an Indian company that supplies tools to small farmers, in exchange for 11% of the common shares. KisanKraft is a Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC), meaning it is majority-owned by U.S. persons but operates abroad. Prior to 2017, U.S. shareholders of CFCs were typically taxed on foreign earnings only when those earnings were repatriated to the United States, according to a provision called Subpart F. However, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017 significantly changed this, introducing a one-time Mandatory Repatriation Tax (MRT) that retroactively taxed CFC earnings after 1986, regardless of repatriation. This increased the Moores’ 2017 tax liability by approximately $15,000 based on their share of KisanKraft’s retained earnings. The Moores challenged the constitutionality of this tax, but the district court dismissed their suit, holding that the MRT taxed income and, although it was retroactive, did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does the 16th Amendment authorize Congress to tax unrealized sums without apportionment among the states?
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[23-124] Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P.
4 december 2023 · 1 uur 44 min
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Argued on Dec 4, 2023.
Petitioner: William K. Harrington, United States Trustee, Region 2.
Respondent: Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.Advocates:
Curtis E. Gannon (for the Petitioner)
Gregory G. Garre (for Respondents Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.)
Pratik A. Shah (for Respondents The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Sackler family, who purchased Purdue Pharma in the 1950s, heavily influenced the company’s direction and was instrumental in the development and marketing of OxyContin. Despite initial claims of low addiction risk, growing evidence of widespread abuse led to legal battles across the United States, with multiple stakeholders including individuals, state governments, and federal agencies suing Purdue. In 2004, the board of Purdue entered into an expansive Indemnity Agreement to protect its directors and officers from financial liability related to lawsuits. This protection was especially broad, extending even after their official tenure at Purdue, but contained a bad faith carveout. From 2007 onwards, the Sacklers began shielding assets, anticipating litigation against them personally. By 2019, Purdue faced weakened financial prospects, and the Sacklers had stepped down from the board.
In the same year, the DOJ brought criminal and civil charges against Purdue, resulting in a plea agreement in 2020 that prioritized the DOJ’s claims in Purdue’s bankruptcy proceedings. The plea stipulated a $2 billion forfeiture judgment but allowed for the release of $1.775 billion if certain conditions were met. Although Purdue declared bankruptcy in 2019, the Sacklers did not, and litigation against both parties was temporarily halted. The estate of Purdue is estimated to be around $1.8 billion, while claims against both Purdue and the Sacklers are estimated to exceed $40 trillion.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for…
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[22-859] Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy
29 november 2023 · 2 uur 17 min
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Argued on Nov 29, 2023.
Petitioner: Securities and Exchange Commission.
Respondent: George R. Jarkesy, Jr., et al.Advocates:
Brian H. Fletcher (for the Petitioner)
S. Michael McColloch (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
George Jarkesy established two hedge funds, with Patriot28 as the investment adviser, managing $24 million in assets from over 100 investors. The SEC initiated an investigation in 2011, eventually bringing an in-house action alleging fraud under multiple acts. Jarkesy challenged the SEC’s proceedings in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, citing constitutional infringements, but both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit denied the injunction, finding that the district court lacked jurisdiction.
After an evidentiary hearing by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Jarkesy was found guilty of securities fraud. Jarkesy sought review by the Commission, and while that petition was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lucia v. SEC, holding that SEC ALJs were improperly appointed. Jarkesy, however, waived his right to a new hearing. The Commission affirmed the fraud findings, imposed penalties, and rejected several constitutional arguments. He then filed a petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed and remanded, finding multiple constitutional violations.
Question
Does the statutory scheme that empowers the Securities and Exchange Commission violate the Seventh Amendment, the nondelegation doctrine, or Article II of the U.S. Constitution?
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[22-721] McElrath v. Georgia
28 november 2023 · 59 min
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Argued on Nov 28, 2023.
Petitioner: Damian McElrath.
Respondent: Georgia.Advocates:
Richard A. Simpson (for the Petitioner)
Stephen J. Petrany (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2017, a Georgia jury found Damien McElrath guilty but mentally ill as to felony murder but not guilty by reason of insanity as to malice murder after an encounter between McElrath and his mother. The trial court did not recognize the verdicts as repugnant and accepted them, but the Georgia Supreme Court held that the verdicts were repugnant and vacated the verdicts, remanding McElrath’s case for retrial. On remand, McElrath alleged that retrial was precluded on double jeopardy grounds, but the trial court denied his motion.
On a second appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, McElrath argued that the court should have reversed rather than vacated his felony murder conviction in his previous appeal. He also challenges the trial court’s ruling on his double jeopardy claim, arguing that retrial on all of the counts is barred because the jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity on the malice murder count. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the lower court.
Question
Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibit a second prosecution for a crime of which a defendant was previously acquitted?
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[22-666] Wilkinson v. Garland
28 november 2023 · 1 uur 30 min
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Argued on Nov 28, 2023.
Petitioner: Situ Kamu Wilkinson.
Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General.Advocates:
Jaime A. Santos (for the Petitioner)
Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Situ Wilkinson, originally from Trinidad and Tobago, overstayed his tourist visa in the U.S., built a life, and fathered a U.S.-citizen son. In 2019, after being arrested for selling crack cocaine, he faced deportation proceedings. Wilkinson conceded his deportability but sought either cancellation or withholding of removal based on the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” it would cause his son and the threat to his own life or freedom if he returned to Trinidad due to his “membership in a particular social group,” specifically people who have filed complaints against Trinidadian police.
The immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals rejected both of Wilkinson's claims. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the hardship claim because was discretionary. The Third Circuit also concluded that Wilkinson’s claim of belonging to a “particular social group” did not meet the requirements for withholding of removal, as it was not socially distinct within Trinidadian society. Therefore, the Third Circuit dismissed in part and denied in part Wilkinson’s petition for review.
Question
Is an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), or instead a discretionary judgment call unreviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)?
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[22-6389] Brown v. United States
27 november 2023 · 1 uur 25 min
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Argued on Nov 27, 2023.
Petitioner: Justin Rashaad Brown.
Respondent: United States of America.Advocates:
Jeffrey T. Green (for the Petitioner Justin Rashaad Brown)
Andrew L. Adler (for the Petitioner Eugene Jackson)
Austin L. Raynor (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Justin Rashaad Brown was indicted in York County, Pennsylvania, for multiple counts, including being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Brown pleaded guilty to one charge of drug possession and distribution as well as the § 922(g) offense. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania sentenced him to concurrent terms of 180 months’ imprisonment due to prior convictions triggering the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence prescribed in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Brown appealed his enhanced sentence, arguing that his prior state marijuana convictions should not serve as predicates under the ACCA because those crimes are no longer a categorical match to their federal counterpart. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does the "serious drug offense" definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act incorporate the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense?
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[22-888] Rudisill v. McDonough
8 november 2023 · 1 uur 10 min
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Argued on Nov 8, 2023.
Petitioner: James R. Rudisill.
Respondent: Denis McDonough, Secretary of Veterans Affairs.Advocates:
Misha Tseytlin (for the Petitioner)
Vivek Suri (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The case involves the interpretation of education benefits under two different programs for veterans: the Montgomery GI Bill enacted in 1984 and the Post-9/11 GI Bill enacted in 2008. Both programs offer a maximum of 36 months of education benefits. Congress has implemented various provisions to limit the benefits under these two programs, including a 48-month cap for benefits generally and the prohibition against receiving benefits from both programs concurrently.
James Rudisill, who served three periods of active-duty service, initially used the Montgomery benefits for his undergraduate education. Later, he applied for Post-9/11 benefits to attend Yale Divinity School. The VA granted him only the remaining Montgomery benefits, and he appealed that decision to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. The Board denied the appeal, so Rudisill appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, where a split panel held that § 3327(d)(2) does not apply to veterans with multiple periods of service. ruled in his favor, finding the statute ambiguous. The Secretary of Veterans Affairs appealed the Veterans’ Court decision to the Federal Circuit, where a split panel affirmed, but then the court sitting en banc reversed, holding that the plain language of § 3327(d)(2) applies to veterans with multiple periods of service.
Question
Is a veteran who has served two separate and distinct periods of qualifying service under the Montgomery GI Bill and the Post-9/11 GI Bill entitled to receive a total of 48 months of education benefits without first exhausting the Montgomery benefit in order to obtain the more generous Post-9/11 benefit?
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[22-915] United States v. Rahimi
7 november 2023 · 1 uur 33 min
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Argued on Nov 7, 2023.
Petitioner: United States.
Respondent: Zackey Rahimi.Advocates:
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioner)
J. Matthew Wright (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Between December 2020 and January 2021, Zackey Rahimi was involved in a series of violent incidents in Arlington, Texas, including multiple shootings and a hit-and-run. Rahimi was under a civil protective order for alleged assault against his ex-girlfriend, which explicitly prohibited him from possessing firearms. Police searched his home and found a rifle and a pistol, leading to Rahimi’s indictment for violating federal law 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which makes it unlawful for someone under a domestic violence restraining order to possess firearms. Rahimi moved to dismiss the indictment on constitutional grounds but was denied, as his argument was foreclosed by United States v. McGinnis, 956 F.3d 747 (5th Cir. 2020).
Rahimi pleaded guilty but continued his constitutional challenge on appeal. As the appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 579 U.S. __ (2022). Rahimi argued that Bruen overruled McGinnis and thus that § 922(g)(8) was unconstitutional, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed.
Question
Does 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which prohibits the possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic-violence restraining orders, violate the Second Amendment?
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[22-846] Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz
6 november 2023 · 1 uur 18 min
Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz Lees meer
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Argued on Nov 6, 2023.
Petitioner: Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service.
Respondent: Reginald Kirtz.Advocates:
Benjamin W. Snyder (for the Petitioner)
Nandan M. Joshi (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 1970, Congress enacted the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) to regulate credit reporting and protect consumer privacy. The Act was amended in 1996 to impose additional obligations on entities like creditors and lenders that furnish information to credit reporting agencies. These amendments allowed consumers to dispute inaccuracies in their credit files and mandated furnishers to investigate and correct such inaccuracies. Reginald Kirtz filed a lawsuit in 2020 against Trans Union, AES, and the USDA, alleging both negligent and willful violations of the FCRA. Kirtz claimed that despite his loans being closed with a zero balance, both AES and the USDA continued to report him as “120 Days Past Due,” damaging his credit score. While Trans Union and AES responded to the lawsuit, the USDA sought dismissal, citing sovereign immunity. The district court granted the USDA’s motion, reasoning that the FCRA did not clearly express Congress’s intent to waive sovereign immunity, despite the Act’s language stating that it applies to “any person,” including government agencies. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, concluding that when Congress has clearly expressed its intent, as through the FCRA, even when the meaning is implausible, courts may neither second-guess its choices nor decline to apply the law as written.
Question
Do the civil-liability provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act unequivocally and unambiguously waive the sovereign immunity of the United States?
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[22-704] Vidal v. Elster
1 november 2023 · 1 uur 16 min
Vidal v. Elster Lees meer
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Argued on Nov 1, 2023.
Petitioner: Katherine K. Vidal, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office.
Respondent: Steve Elster.Advocates:
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Petitioner)
Jonathan E. Taylor (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2018, Steve Elster attempted to register the phrase “TRUMP TOO SMALL” for use on various types of shirts, intending the mark to serve as political commentary on President Donald Trump and his policies. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) examiner rejected the application, citing two sections of the Lanham Act: Section 2(c), which prohibits registering a mark that identifies a living individual without their consent, and Section 2(a), which bars marks that falsely suggest a connection with living or dead persons. Elster appealed, arguing that the provisions infringed on his First Amendment rights and were not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The Board upheld the examiner's decision based solely on Section 2(c), asserting that the statute is constitutional and serves compelling government interests, including the protection of individual rights and consumer protection. Elster appealed the decision, and the Federal Circuit reversed.
Question
Does the refusal to register a trademark under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) when the mark contains criticism of a government official or public figure violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?
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[22-324] O'Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier
31 oktober 2023 · 1 uur 41 min
O'Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier Lees meer
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Argued on Oct 31, 2023.
Petitioner: Michelle O’Connor-Ratcliff, et al.
Respondent: Christopher Garnier, et ux.Advocates:
Hashim M. Mooppan (for the Petitioners)
Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Pamela S. Karlan (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Petitioners Christopher and Kimberly Garnier are parents of children in the Poway Unified School District in the city of Poway, California, just north of San Diego. The Garniers frequently posted comments critical of the District’s Board of Trustees on the social media pages of the Trustees, including Respondents Michelle O’Connor-Ratcliff and T.J. Zane. For their school-board campaigns, O’Connor-Ratcliff and Zane created personal Facebook and Twitter pages, which they updated with their official titles once elected and continued to use to post about school-district business and news. The Trustees began to hide or delete the critical and often repetitive comments by the Garniers, and then around October 2017, they blocked the Garniers from their social media pages.
After the Trustees blocked the Garniers, the Garniers sued them, arguing that their social media pages constitute public fora and that by blocking them, the Trustees violated their First Amendment rights. The district court granted declaratory and injunctive relief to the Garniers but found that the Trustees’ had qualified immunity from the damages claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does a public official engage in state action subject to the First Amendment by blocking an individual from the official’s personal social media account, which the official uses to communicate about job-related matters with the public?
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[22-611] Lindke v. Freed
31 oktober 2023 · 1 uur 17 min
Lindke v. Freed Lees meer
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Argued on Oct 31, 2023.
Petitioner: Kevin Lindke.
Respondent: James R. Freed.Advocates:
Allon Kedem (for the Petitioner)
Victoria R. Ferres (for the Respondent)
Masha G. Hansford (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
James Freed created a private Facebook profile that was originally intended to connect with family and friends. Eventually, he grew too popular for Facebook's 5,000-friend limit on profiles. So Freed converted his profile to a "page," which has unlimited "followers" instead of friends and is public so that anyone may "follow" it. Freed designated the page category as "public figure."
In 2014, Freed was appointed city manager for Port Huron, Michigan, so he updated his Facebook page to reflect that new title. On his page, he shared both personal updates about himself and his family and professional updates, including directives and policies he initiated in his official capacity.
Kevin Lindke came across Freed’s page and did not approve of how Freed was handling the pandemic. He posted criticism of Freed in response to Freed’s Facebook page, and Freed deleted the comments and ultimately “blocked” Lindke.
Lindke sued Freed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his First Amendment rights by deleting his comments and blocking him. The district court granted summary judgment to Freed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Question
When does a public official’s social media activity constitute state action subject to the First Amendment?
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[22-585] Culley v. Marshall
30 oktober 2023 · 1 uur 40 min
Culley v. Marshall Lees meer
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Argued on Oct 30, 2023.
Petitioner: Halima Tariffa Culley, et al.
Respondent: Steven T. Marshall, Attorney General of Alabama, et al.Advocates:
Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioners)
Edmund G. LaCour, Jr. (for the Respondents)
Nicole F. Reaves (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
On February 17, 2019, Halima Tariffa Culley’s son was pulled over by police while driving a car registered to his mother. Police arrested him, charged him with possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia, and seized the vehicle. Culley unsuccessfully tried to retrieve the vehicle, and on February 27, 2019, the State of Alabama filed a civil asset forfeiture action in state court. After 20 months, the state court granted Culley summary judgment, finding that she was entitled to the return of her vehicle under Alabama’s innocent-owner defense.
Culley filed a class-action lawsuit in federal court claiming under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the failure of the state and local officials to provide a prompt post-deprivation hearing violated their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court ruled for the defendants, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed as to those claims that were not moot.
Question
What test must a district court apply when determining whether and when a post-deprivation hearing is required under the Due Process Clause?
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[22-807] Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP
11 oktober 2023 · 2 uur 5 min
Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP Lees meer
Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 11, 2023.
Appellant: Thomas C. Alexander, in His Official Capacity as President of the South Carolina Senate, et al..
Appellee: The South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, et al..Advocates:
John M. Gore (for the Appellants)
Leah C. Aden (for the Appellees)
Caroline A. Flynn (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
After the 2020 Census, South Carolina’s Republican-controlled legislature adopted a new congressional map that moved tens of thousands of Black voters to a different district, effectively making the district a safe seat for Republicans.
The South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP sued, and a three-judge panel concluded that the district was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The legislators appealed directly to the Supreme Court, arguing that the map was actually a political gerrymander (which is permissible) that merely had a racial effect.
Question
Does the South Carolina legislature’s redistricting map, which has the effect of moving tens of thousands of Black voters to a different district, constitute an impermissible racial gerrymander, even if the legislators’ purported intent was merely a political gerrymander?
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[22-660] Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC
10 oktober 2023 · 1 uur 28 min
Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC Lees meer
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Argued on Oct 10, 2023.
Petitioner: Trevor Murray.
Respondent: UBS Securities, LLC, et al..Advocates:
Easha Anand (for the Petitioner)
Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Eugene Scalia (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2011, UBS hired Trevor Murray as a strategist in its commercial mortgage-backed securities business. Under Securities and Exchange Commission regulations, Murray was required to certify that his reports were produced independently and that they accurately reflected his own views. According to Murray, two leaders at UBS improperly pressured him to skew his research. Murray repeatedly reported this conduct to his supervisor, who declined to take action. UBS terminated Murray in 2012.
Murray sued UBS in 2014 alleging that his former employer terminated him in response to his complaints about fraud on shareholders in violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's antiretaliation provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. The district court ruled for Murray, and UBS appealed, arguing that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that Murray had to prove UBS's retaliatory intent to prevail on his section 1514A claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with UBS and vacated the judgment of the district court.
Question
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, must a whistleblower prove his employer acted with “retaliatory intent” as part of his case in chief?
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[22-500] Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC
10 oktober 2023 · 1 uur 11 min
Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 10, 2023.
Petitioner: Great Lakes Insurance SE.
Respondent: Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC.Advocates:
Jeffrey B. Wall (for the Petitioner)
Howard J. Bashman (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Raiders Retreat Realty Co., a Pennsylvania company, insured a yacht for up to $550,000 with Great Lakes Insurance (GLI), a company headquartered in the United Kingdom. In June 2019, the yacht ran aground, incurring at least $300,000 in damage. Raiders submitted a claim to GLI for loss of the vessel, but GLI rejected it, claiming that, although none of the damage was due to fire, the entire policy was void because Raider had failed to timely recertify or inspect the yacht's fire-extinguishing equipment.
GLI asked the district court for a declaratory judgment that Raiders’ omission voided the policy, and Raiders raised five counterclaims based on Pennsylvania law. The district court dismissed those counterclaims, finding that the policy’s choice-of-law provision required the application of New York law. The court also rejected Raiders’ argument that the choice-of-law provision was unenforceable under the Supreme Court’s decision in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), which held that under federal admiralty law, a forum-selection provision is unenforceable “if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated, finding The Bremen controlled the outcome in this case.
Question
Is a choice-of-law clause in a maritime contract unenforceable if enforcement would conflict with the “strong public policy” of the state whose law is displaced?
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[22-429] Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer
4 oktober 2023 · 1 uur 25 min
Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 4, 2023.
Petitioner: Acheson Hotels, LLC.
Respondent: Deborah Laufer.Advocates:
Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Petitioner)
Erica L. Ross (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Kelsi B. Corkran (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Deborah Laufer, a prolific litigant with physical disabilities and vision impairments, sued Acheson Hotels for failing to publish information about their accessibility on their website, which is required under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
The district court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that Laufer lacked standing to sue because had no plans to visit the hotel and thus suffered no injury as a result of the lack of information on the website. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, concluding that Laufer’s lack of intent to book a room at the hotel operated by Acheson does not negate the fact of injury.
Question
Does an ADA “tester” have Article III standing to challenge a hotel’s failure to provide disability accessibility information on its website, even if she has no plans to visit the hotel?
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[22-448] Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Association of America
3 oktober 2023 · 1 uur 34 min
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Association of America Lees meer
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Argued on Oct 3, 2023.
Petitioner: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, et al..
Respondent: Community Financial Services Association of America, Limited, et al..Advocates:
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioners)
Noel J. Francisco (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In response to the financial crisis around 2007, Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which, among other things, authorized the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) as an independent agency within the Federal Reserve. The CFPB was tasked with writing and enforcing rules for financial institutions, examining financial institutions, monitoring and reporting on markets, and tracking consumer complaints.
In 2017, the CFPB adopted a rule that prohibited lenders from further attempting to withdraw funds from borrowers’ bank accounts after two consecutive attempts failed for lack of funds.
A group of lenders sued the CFPB over that rule, arguing that the agency’s funding scheme was unconstitutional. Instead of receiving money allocated to it each year by Congress, as most agencies do, the CFPB receives funding directly from the Federal Reserve, which collects fees from member banks. The district court concluded the funding scheme was not unconstitutional, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.
Question
Does the funding scheme for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which receives funding directly from the Federal Reserve, violate the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution?
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[22-340] Pulsifer v. United States
2 oktober 2023 · 1 uur 40 min
Pulsifer v. United States Lees meer
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Argued on Oct 2, 2023.
Petitioner: Mark E. Pulsifer.
Respondent: United States.Advocates:
Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioner)
Frederick Liu (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Mark Pulsifer pleaded guilty to distributing at least fifty grams of methamphetamine. Relying on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), Pulsifer asked the district court for a sentence lower than the otherwise applicable statutory minimum term of imprisonment. That provision, permits a district court to impose a sentence lower than the statutory minimum upon finding that the defendant does not have: “(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines.”
It was undisputed that Pulsifer had a criminal history that meets the criteria in subsections (A) and (B), due to having more than four criminal history points and a prior three-point offense. The district court concluded that this history alone made him ineligible for sentencing under § 3553(f), notwithstanding that he did not also have a prior two-point violent offense that would meet the condition in subsection (C). It therefore denied his request under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).
Pulsifer appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding the statutory word “and” means a defendant must not have any of the criteria, not that he must not have all of them.
Question
Must a defendant show he does not meet any of the criteria listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) to qualify for a sentence lower than the statutory minimum?
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[22-166] Tyler v. Hennepin County, Minnesota
26 april 2023 · 1 uur 41 min
Tyler v. Hennepin County, Minnesota Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 26, 2023.
Decided on May 25, 2023.Petitioner: Geraldine Tyler.
Respondent: Hennepin County, Minnesota, et al..Advocates:
Christina M. Martin (for the Petitioner)
Erica L. Ross (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Geraldine Tyler owned a condominium in Minneapolis. She stopped paying her property taxes and accrued a tax debt of $15,000. To satisfy the debt, Hennepin County foreclosed on Tyler’s property and sold it for $40,000, retaining the net proceeds from the sale.
Tyler sued the County, arguing that its actions violated her constitutional rights. The district court dismissed Tyler’s case for failure to state a claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Question
1. Does taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violate the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause?
2. Is the forfeiture of property worth far more than needed to satisfy a debt a fine within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment?
Conclusion
Taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violates the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the unanimous opinion of the Court holding that Tyler plausibly alleged that Hennepin County’s actions violated the Takings Clause and thus that her claim can go forward.
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the government from taking private property without “just compensation.” This does not prevent the government from collecting taxes, or from taking action to enforce the collection of taxes. However, the government may not, as Minnesota purported to do by statute in 1935, extinguish a property …
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[22-381] Yegiazaryan v. Smagin
25 april 2023 · 1 uur 4 min
Yegiazaryan v. Smagin Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 25, 2023.
Decided on Jun 22, 2023.Petitioner: Ashot Yegiazaryan.
Respondent: Vitaly I. Smagin, et al. .Advocates:
Vincent Levy (for the Petitioners)
Nicholas O. Kennedy (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Vitaly Smagin, a Russian citizen who resides in Russia, sued Ashot Yegiazaryan, a Russian citizen who resides in California, and eleven other defendants, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. Smagin alleged that Yegiazaryan and the other defendants illegally attempted to avoid paying a judgment Smagin won against them in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California for engaging in a series of fraudulent transactions between 2003 and 2009 in to steal Smagin’s shares in a joint real estate investment in Moscow, Russia.
The district court dismissed Smagin’s RICO claim, finding he did not suffer a domestic injury, which is a requirement for a RICO claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that Smagin did allege a domestic injury.
Question
Does a foreign plaintiff with no alleged connection to the United States state a cognizable claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act when it suffers an injury to an intangible property?
Conclusion
A plaintiff alleges a “domestic injury” for purposes of filing a private civil suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), when the circumstances surrounding the injury indicate it arose in the United States. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
The “domestic injury” requirement for private civil RICO suits comes from the Court’s decision in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community. However, the RJR Nabisco Court did not explicitly define a “domestic injury,” so the Court adopted a context-specific approach that c…
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[22-210] Dupree v. Younger
24 april 2023 · 58 min
Dupree v. Younger Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 24, 2023.
Decided on May 25, 2023.Petitioner: Neil Dupree.
Respondent: Kevin Younger.Advocates:
Andrew T. Tutt (for the Petitioner)
Amy M. Saharia (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Kevin Younger was a pretrial detainee at a state prison in Baltimore, Maryland. One morning, three guards attacked Younger and other inmates at the direction of Neil Dupree, an intelligence lieutenant at the prison. Younger sued Dupree under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Dupree violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court rejected Dupree’s argument that Younger’s suit was barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Dupree appealed that conclusion.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that Dupree was precluded from challenging the district court’s decision because Dupree raised the claim in a pretrial motion for summary judgment but did not raise it again in a post-trial motion.
Question
To preserve the issue for appellate review, must a party reassert in a post-trial motion a purely legal issue rejected at summary judgment?
Conclusion
A post-trial motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 is not required to preserve for appellate review a purely legal issue resolved at summary judgment. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
In Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180 (2011), the Court held that a party whose sufficiency-of-the evidence challenge was rejected at the summary judgment stage must reassert the claim in a post-trial motion to preserve it for appeal. That decision was based on the reasoning that the factual record developed at trial supersedes the record existing at the time of summary judgment.
When the motion for summary judgment is based on a purely legal question—rather than on the factual record—no subsequent proceedin…
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[22-227] Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin
24 april 2023 · 58 min
Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 24, 2023.
Decided on Jun 15, 2023.Petitioner: Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, et al..
Respondent: Brian W. Coughlin.Advocates:
Pratik A. Shah (for the Petitioners)
Gregory G. Rapawy (for the Respondent)
Austin L. Raynor (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In July 2019, Brian W. Coughlin took out a $1,100 payday loan from Lendgreen, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians (“Band”). Later that year, he filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the District of Massachusetts and listed his debt to Lendgreen as a nonpriority unsecured claim. When he filed his petition, the Bankruptcy Code imposed an automatic stay enjoining “debt-collection efforts outside the umbrella of the bankruptcy case.”
Despite the stay, Lendgreen repeatedly contacted Coughlin seeking repayment of his debt. Coughlin moved to enforce the automatic stay against Lendgreen, and in response, the Band asserted tribal sovereign immunity and moved to dismiss the enforcement proceeding. The bankruptcy court granted the motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed.
Question
Does the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally abrogate tribal sovereign immunity?
Conclusion
The Bankruptcy Code unequivocally abrogates the sovereign immunity of all governments, including federally recognized Indian tribes. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the majority opinion of the Court.
To abrogate sovereign immunity, Congress must make its intent to abrogate “unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” The statute at issue here contains such unmistakably clear language.
First, 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) expressly abrogates the sovereign immunity of “governmental unit[s]” for certain enumerated purposes. Section 101(27), d…
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[22-138] Counterman v. Colorado
19 april 2023 · 1 uur 46 min
Counterman v. Colorado Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 19, 2023.
Decided on Jun 27, 2023.Petitioner: Billy Raymond Counterman.
Respondent: The People of the State of Colorado.Advocates:
John P. Elwood (for the Petitioner)
Philip J. Weiser (for the Respondent)
Eric J. Feigin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Billy Raymond Counterman repeatedly contacted a person over Facebook in 2014, sending her “creepy” messages from numerous different accounts even after she repeatedly blocked him. Some of the messages implied that Counterman was watching her and saying that he wanted her to die or be killed. She reported Counterman to law enforcement, who arrested him in 2016. He was charged with one count of stalking (credible threat), one count of stalking (serious emotional distress, and one count of harassment; before trial, the prosecution dismissed the count of stalking (credible threat).
Counterman claimed that the remaining charges, as applied to his Facebook messages, would violate his right to free speech under the First Amendment because they were not “true threats.” The trial court denied his motion to dismiss, and a jury found him guilty of stalking (serious emotional distress). The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.
Question
To establish that a statement is a "true threat" unprotected by the First Amendment, must the government show that the speaker subjectively knew or intended the threatening nature of the statement?
Conclusion
To establish that a statement is a “true threat” unprotected by the First Amendment, the government must prove that the defendant had some subjective understanding of the statements’ threatening nature, based on a showing no more demanding than recklessness. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion of the Court.
While the First Amendment protects freedom of speech, it allows for restrictions of …
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[21-1326] U.S. ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc.
18 april 2023 · 1 uur 12 min
U.S. ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc. Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 18, 2023.
Decided on Jun 1, 2023.Petitioner: Unites States of America, Ex. Rel. Schutte, et al..
Respondent: SuperValu Inc., et al..Advocates:
Tejinder Singh (for the Petitioners)
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Carter G. Phillips (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
SuperValu owned or operated approximately 2,500 grocery stories with over 800 in-store pharmacies between 2006 and 2016. To compete with other pharmacies, SuperValu stores implemented a prescription price-matching program, under which it would match lower prescription prices of competitors. However, SuperValu did not report its price-match program prices as its usual and customary price, in violation of Medicaid regulations.
Tracy Schutte and Michael Yarberry (the “Relators”) sued SuperValu under the False Claims Act on behalf of the federal government and several states. They alleged that SuperValu knowingly caused false payment claims to be submitted to government healthcare programs between 2006 and 2016 by incorrectly reporting their drug prices. The federal government did not intervene in the case.
The district court concluded that the Relators had failed to prove the “scienter” element of their FCA claim—that is, they failed to show SuperValu that SuperValu’s interpretation of the reporting requirement was objectively unreasonable at the time. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Question
Is a defendant’s contemporaneous subjective understanding about the lawfulness of its conduct relevant to whether it “knowingly” violated the False Claims Act?
Conclusion
The False Claims Act’s scienter element refers to a defendant’s knowledge and subjective beliefs, not to what an objectively reasonable person may have known or believed. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for a unanimous Court…
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[22-174] Groff v. DeJoy
18 april 2023 · 1 uur 48 min
Groff v. DeJoy Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 18, 2023.
Decided on Jun 29, 2023.Petitioner: Gerald E. Groff.
Respondent: Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General.Advocates:
Aaron M. Streett (for the Petitioner)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Gerald Groff is a Christian and U.S. Postal Service worker. He refused to work on Sundays due to his religious beliefs. USPS offered to find employees to swap shifts with him, but on numerous occasions, no co-worker would swap, and Groff did not work. USPS subsequently fired him.
Groff sued USPS under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming USPS failed to reasonably accommodate his religion because the shift swaps did not fully eliminate the conflict. The district court concluded the requested accommodation would pose an undue hardship on USPS and granted summary judgment for USPS. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.
Question
Is inconvenience to coworkers an “undue burden” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 such that it excuses an employer from providing an accommodation requested for religious exercise?
Conclusion
Title VII requires an employer that denies a religious accommodation to show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business. Justice Samuel Alito authored the opinion for the unanimous Court.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on religion, and subsequent regulations issued by the EEOC required employers to make reasonable accommodation of an employee's religious beliefs unless doing so would cause “undue hardship” to the employer. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), the Supreme Court held that Title VII does not require an employer who uses a seniority system to assign shifts to deprive senior employees of their seniority ri…
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[22-200] Slack Technologies v. Pirani
17 april 2023 · 1 uur 10 min
Slack Technologies v. Pirani Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 17, 2023.
Decided on Jun 1, 2023.Petitioner: Slack Technologies, LLC, fka Slack Technologies, Inc., et al..
Respondent: Fiyyaz Pirani.Advocates:
Thomas G. Hungar (for the Petitioners)
Kevin K. Russell (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
On June 20, 2019, tech company Slack went public through a direct listing, which, unlike an initial public offering (IPO), does not involve the company issuing new shares and instead involves only filing a registration statement to allow existing shareholders to sell their shares on the exchange. Shares made available by a direct listing are sold directly to the public and not through a bank.
Fiyyaz Pirani purchased 30,000 Slack shares at $38.50 per share on the day it went public and went on to purchase another 220,000 over several months. Subsequently, the share price dropped below $25. On September 19, 2019, Pirani brought a class action lawsuit against Slack, alleging that Slack’s registration statement was inaccurate and misleading because it did not disclose information about its service disruptions and how it compensated customers for those disruptions.
The district court held that Pirani had standing to sue Slack even though he could not prove that his shares were issued under the registration statement he said was inaccurate. On appeal, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed over one dissenting vote.
Question
Do Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 require plaintiffs to plead and prove that they bought shares registered under the registration statement they claim is misleading?
Conclusion
To state a claim under §11(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, a plaintiff must allege the purchase of “such security” issued pursuant to a materially misleading registration statement. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
Section 11 of the Securit…
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[22-23] Pugin v. Garland
17 april 2023 · 1 uur 39 min
Pugin v. Garland Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 17, 2023.
Decided on Jun 22, 2023.Petitioner: Jean Francois Pugin.
Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General.Advocates:
Curtis E. Gannon (for Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General)
Martha Hutton (for the Petitioner in 22-23 (Pugin))
Mark C. Fleming (for the Respondent in 22-331 (Cordero-Garcia))
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Jean Francois Pugin is a citizen of Mauritius who has lived in the United States as a lawful permanent resident for nearly 40 years. The government began deportation proceedings against Pugin after he was found guilty of being an accessory after the fact to a felony. The Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes removal upon conviction for an “aggravated felony,” including felonies relating to obstruction of justice.
Despite Pugin’s argument to the contrary, the Board of Immigration appeals concluded that Virginia’s accessory after the fact to a felony constituted an offense relating to obstruction of justice, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Is Virginia’s offense of accessory after the fact to a felony an “offense relating to obstruction of justice” under the Immigration and Nationality Act?
Conclusion
Virginia’s offense of accessory after the fact to a felony is an offense “relating to” obstruction of justice under the Immigration and Nationality Act’s definition of an “aggravated felony.” Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
An offense can be categorized as “relating to obstruction of justice” under §1101(a)(43)(S) without a requirement for an ongoing investigation or proceeding. This understanding is supported by dictionary definitions, federal and state laws, and the Model Penal Code. Obstruction of justice can occur even if no formal investigation or proceeding is active. The phrase “relating to” in the statute further broadens its applicability, ensuring it encompas…
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[22-196] Samia v. United States
29 maart 2023 · 1 uur 38 min
Samia v. United States Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 29, 2023.
Decided on Jun 23, 2023.Petitioner: Adam Samia, aka Sal, aka Adam Samic.
Respondent: United States.Advocates:
Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioner)
Caroline A. Flynn (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Defendants Joseph Manuel Hunter, Carl David Stillwell, and Adam Samia were tried jointly and convicted on five counts: conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire, murder-for-hire, conspiracy to murder and kidnap in a foreign country, causing death with a firearm during and relation to a crime of violence, and conspiracy to launder money. All three defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment.
One piece of evidence used to convict the defendants was Stillwell’s redacted confession. Samia challenged the admission of that evidence, arguing that the redactions were insufficient because jurors would immediately infer that the confession’s references to “another person” referred to Samia himself. As such, Samia argued, his inability to cross-examine Stillwell violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court’s evidentiary ruling on that issue.
Question
Does admitting a codefendant’s redacted out-of-court confession that immediately inculpates a defendant based on context violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment?
Conclusion
The admission of a non-testifying codefendant’s confession did not violate the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause where the confession as modified did not directly inculpate the defendant but used the descriptor “other person” and the jury was instructed to consider the confession only as to the codefendant. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the majority opinion of the Court.
Historically, a non-testifying codefendant’s confession was permissible if the jury was instructed not to consider it aga…
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[21-1599] Polselli v. Internal Revenue Service
29 maart 2023 · 50 min
Polselli v. Internal Revenue Service Lees meer
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 29, 2023.
Decided on May 18, 2023.Petitioner: Hanna Karcho Polselli, et al..
Respondent: Internal Revenue Service.Advocates:
Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioners)
Ephraim McDowell (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Remo Polselli underpaid his federal taxes for over a decade, with an outstanding balance of over $2 million. In pursuit of those unpaid liabilities, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued administrative summonses to the banks of Polselli’s wife and lawyers. The IRS did not notify Polselli’s wife or lawyers of the summonses, relying on the exception in the Internal Revenue Code § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i), which excludes from the notice requirement summonses issued “in aid of the collection” of tax assessments.
The district court concluded that the summonses fell within the exception and that Polselli’s wife and lawyers were not entitled to notice. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does the exception in I.R.C. § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) to the notice requirements for an Internal Revenue Service summons on third-party recordkeepers apply to a summons for anyone’s records whenever the IRS thinks that person’s records might somehow help it collect a delinquent taxpayer’s liability?
Conclusion
The exception to the notice requirements described in I.R.C. § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) applies to a summons for anyone’s records, regardless of whether the delinquent taxpayer has a legal interest in the accounts or records summoned. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court.
The IRS has the power to pursue unpaid taxes and the people who owe them. In exercising that power, the IRS may issue a summons, including to third parties, to determine the liability of a taxpayer. In general, such summons require the IRS to give notice to any person identified in the summons. Anyone who is entitled to notice may bri…
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[21-1576] Smith v. United States
28 maart 2023 · 1 uur 17 min
Smith v. United States Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 28, 2023.
Decided on Jun 15, 2023.Petitioner: Timothy J. Smith.
Respondent: United States.Advocates:
Samir Deger-Sen (for the Petitioner)
Sopan Joshi (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Timothy Smith is a software engineer who lives in Mobile, Alabama, and who is an avid fisherman. He used a web application called Fiddler to obtain the coordinates of private artificial reefs from a website, StrikeLines, that sells such coordinates for between $190 and $199. Smith informed the owners of StrikeLines that he accessed their reef coordinates but refused to tell them how he did it. After negotiations between the owners of StrikeLines and Smith broke down, the owners contacted law enforcement, who executed a search warrant on Smith’s home.
A federal grand jury indicted Smith on three counts in the Northern District of Florida. Before trial, Smith moved to dismiss all counts for lack of venue because (1) he was a resident of Mobile, Alabama, which is in the Southern District of Alabama, and (2) StrikeLines’s servers, where the coordinate data is stored, are in Orlando, which is in the Middle District of Florida. Thus, venue in the Northern District of Florida was improper, even though StrikeLines was headquartered in Pensacola, which is within that district.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that venue was improper as to one count but that improper venue for one count does not require vacatur of the conviction for another count.
Question
Does a criminal trial’s improper venue as to one count require vacatur of the convictions for other counts?
Conclusion
The Constitution permits the retrial of a defendant following a trial in an improper venue conducted before a jury drawn from the wrong district. Justice Samuel Alito authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
When a defendant obtains a reversal of a prior, unsatisfied …
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[22-49] Lora v. United States
28 maart 2023 · 1 uur 1 min
Lora v. United States Lees meer
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 28, 2023.
Decided on Jun 16, 2023.Petitioner: Efrain Lora.
Respondent: United States.Advocates:
Lawrence D. Rosenberg (for the Petitioner)
Erica L. Ross (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Efrain Lora and three co-defendants ran an operation selling cocaine and cocaine base in the Bronx. Lora and the others allegedly conspired to murder a rival drug dealer in retaliation for threats the rival had made over drug territory.
A federal grand jury returned an indictment for aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime causing the death of a person. The government obtained a superseding indictment against Lora that added a drug trafficking conspiracy charge and a charge for causing an intentional killing in furtherance of that conspiracy. The jury found Lora guilty of all three counts, and the district court sentenced him to a five-year term of imprisonment for the first count to run consecutively with a 25-year sentence on the second two counts. Lora appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the consecutive sentences.
Question
Does federal criminal sentencing law require a man who was convicted and sentenced for his role in a drug-trafficking-related murder to serve consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences?
Conclusion
The bar on imposition of concurrent sentences in 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(D)(ii) does not apply to a sentence for a §924(j) conviction; a §924(j) sentence can run either concurrently with or consecutively to another sentence. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3584, a federal court imposing multiple prison sentences typically has the discretion to run the sentences concurrently or consecutively. However, § 924(c) provides that “no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subs…